Une étude expérimentale des préférences pour l'information by Bricet, Roxane
HAL Id: tel-02284064
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02284064
Submitted on 11 Sep 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
An experimental study of preferences for information
Roxane Bricet
To cite this version:
Roxane Bricet. An experimental study of preferences for information. Economics and Finance. Uni-
versité de Cergy Pontoise, 2018. English. ￿NNT : 2018CERG0959￿. ￿tel-02284064￿
Thèse de doctorat
pour l’obtention du titre de
docteur en sciences économiques
délivré par
l’Université de Cergy-Pontoise
École doctorale no 405 : Économie, Management, Mathématiques et Physique (EM2P)
Théorie Économique, Modélisation et Applications (THEMA)
CNRS UMR 8184
An experimental study of preferences for information
présentée et soutenue publiquement par
Roxane Bricet
le 5 juillet 2018
Directeurs de thèse : Eric Danan et Ani Guerdjikova
Jury
M. Eric Danan, Chargé de recherche au CNRS Directeur
Mme Johanna Etner, Professeur à l’Université Paris Nanterre Rapporteur
Mme Ani Guerdjikova, Professeur à l’Université Grenoble Alpes Directrice
Mme Meglena Jeleva, Professeur à l’Université Paris Nanterre Rapporteur
M. Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, Directeur de recherche au CNRS Président

Remerciements
En premier lieu, j’adresse mes remerciements à mes deux codirecteurs, les professeurs
Ani Guerdjikova et Eric Danan, pour avoir accepté d’encadrer cette thése. Je tiens à leur
exprimer ma profonde gratitude pour leur travail de supervision, leur investissement, leur
patience et leurs relectures rigoureuses.
Je remercie les membres de mon jury : le professeur Johanna Etner et le professeur
Meglena Jeleva, pour avoir accepté d’être les rapporteurs de cette thèse, et le professeur
Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, responsable du Laboratoire d’Economie Expérimentale de Pa-
ris, pour avoir consenti à participer à mon jury de thèse et m’avoir ouvert les portes du
LEEP afin d’y organiser les expériences de cette thèse.
Je remercie Maxim Frolov pour sa collaboration lors de la réalisation des expériences
au LEEP. Mes remerciements s’adressent également à la communauté en ligne des utili-
sateurs du logiciel expérimental z-Tree qui m’ont fourni une aide précieuse au moment de
programmer ces expériences.
Ce travail de recherche a bénéficié de l’appui matériel et financier du laboratoire
THEMA, de l’Ecole Doctorale EM2P, du Labex MME-DII, de l’Agence Nationale de la Re-
cherche (bourse ANR-2011-CHEX-006-01) et du Conseil Européen de la Recherche (bourse
Marie Curie PCIG-GA-2011-293529). Que les collaborateurs de ces différentes instances
en soient remerciés. Pour leur soutien dans la mise en œuvre de mes projets de recherche
et leur disponiblité, j’adresse mes plus sincères remerciements à l’équipe administrative
du THEMA, Lisa Collin, Imen Defferrard, Yolande Gustave et Cécile Moncelon.
Ce parcours doctoral n’aurait pas été le même sans les nombreux échanges avec les
étudiants de l’Université de Cergy-Pontoise, qu’ils aient lieu dans le cadre des cours dont
j’ai eu la charge, ou à l’occasion des sessions pilotes expérimentales auxquelles certains
d’entre eux ont accepté de participer. Que ces derniers en soit remerciés. Pour m’avoir
intégré à leurs équipes d’enseignants et accordé leur confiance, je remercie les professeurs
Régis Renault, Marius Ochea, Jérôme Stephan et Gorkem Celik. J’ai également une pensée
chaleureuse pour Ariane Gervaise et Lætitia Buton, dont le dynamisme à toute épreuve
est une réelle source d’inspiration.
Je remercie l’ensemble de mes collègues doctorants du laboratoire THEMA. Pour la
constante bonne humeur qui régnait dans notre bureau et pour toutes nos discussions
stimulantes, je suis particulièrement reconnaissante envers l’équipe exceptionnelle du 703 :
Emeline, Erwan, Ibrahima, Patrick, Nathaniel, Zéphirin et Dong Ook. Pour leurs nombreux
conseils avisés et pour m’avoir épaulée dans les moments décisifs, j’adresse également
un grand merci à Ignacio, Marie, Cigdem, Céline, Salimeh, Amélie, Lionel, Mehdi, Yun,
Romain, Delphine, Louis, Jérémie et Mi Lim.
Je remercie infiniment les membres de ma famille ainsi que mes amis de toujours. Leur
présence et leurs mots m’ont été d’un soutien inestimable durant ce parcours. J’exprime
également ma profonde gratitude envers Teddy dont les encouragements n’ont jamais failli.
Enfin, j’ai une pensée particulière pour les êtres chers qui m’ont rejoint et ceux qui
nous ont quittés durant ces années. Cette thèse leur est dédiée.
A mes fils Sakio et Ezio,
A mon grand-père René,

Contents
Contents i
List of Tables v
List of Figures vii
Introduction 1
Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Contribution and outline of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Methodological issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 Precise versus imprecise datasets: revisiting ambiguity attitudes in the
Ellsberg paradox 19
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.1.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2.1 Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2.2 Attitudes towards ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.2.3 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.2.4 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.2.5 Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3.1 Neutral and non-neutral ambiguity attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3.2 Score of ambiguity-sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.A Supplementary material for the experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
i
1.A.1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.A.2 Comprehension test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.B Complementary tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2 Preferences for information precision under ambiguity 51
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.1 Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.2 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2.3 Non-incentivized task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2.4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2.5 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2.6 Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.1 Certainty Equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.2 Direct choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.3.3 Preference reversals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.3.4 Estimates on the composition of the ambiguous bag . . . . . . . . . 76
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.A Supplementary material for the experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.A.1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.A.2 Detailed script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.A.3 Verification lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.A.4 Participation consent form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.B Complementary tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3 The value of instrumental information 99
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.1.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.2.1 Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.2.2 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2.3 Experimental measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.3 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3.1 Blackwell’s framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
ii
3.3.2 Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3.3 Mixed strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3.4 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.A Proof: Blackwell’s garbling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.B Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Conclusion 145
Bibliography 158
iii

List of Tables
1 Ellsberg’s two-color urns experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 The 11-groups classification of choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3 Choices by categories (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.4 Score of ambiguity-sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Maxima and minima per pB individual scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6 Bags composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.7 Detailed frequencies of choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.1 Incentivized tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.2 Number of draws describing the ambiguous bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Sample size and average gain by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 CEs - Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 CE differences - Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.6 Direct choices (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.7 Preference reversals (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.8 Estimates and limit bounds of the number of blue balls in bag B - Descrip-
tive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.9 Difference between Max_Blue and Min_Blue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.10 Socio-demographic variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.11 Bags composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.1 Structure of the experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
v

List of Figures
1.1 Histogram of individual score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 An example of envelope content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2 Proportions of choices in favour of the sure amount, by treatment . . . . . . 70
2.3 Histograms of the differences between CEs on blue (CEA(blue)− CEB(blue)),
by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.4 Histograms of the differences between CEs on red (CEA(red)− CEB(red)),
by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.5 Histograms of the estimates on the proportion of blue balls in the ambiguous
bag, by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.6 Histograms of the estimates on the proportion of blue balls in the ambiguous
bag, by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.7 Histograms of the estimates on the proportion of blue balls in the ambiguous
bag, by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.1 Example of MPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Example of a slider when the dataset contains 20 draws . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3 An example of envelope content (certain bag) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4 An example of envelope content (risky bag) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
vii

Introduction
In most real-life choice situations, decision makers cannot predict the outcome of their
action with certainty. However, the uncertainty inherent to the bet on the flip of a fair coin
is different from the uncertainty associated with the bet on the results of a football match.
The former bet consists of a risky lottery where the probabilities of the different events
are objectively known, whereas, in the latter bet, the agent is confronted with uncertainty
regarding the probabilities. Hence, as opposed to the situation of risk where probabilities
can be theoretically inferred, ambiguity arises when the agent fails to report a unique
probability distribution over outcomes. Drawing on the analysis of Frisch and Baron
(1988), who describe ambiguity as being caused by the lack of information, a standard
definition due to Camerer and Weber (1992) states that:
"Ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by missing information
that is relevant and could be known." (Camerer and Weber, 1992, p.330)
Thus, risk and ambiguity can be conceptualized as two extreme positions along the
same spectrum, based on the level of certainty regarding the outcome probabilities. How-
ever, most everyday decision situations do not fit this typical classification into risk and
ambiguity. Indeed, agents are often provided with partial information consisting of past
observations. Reconsider the previous example of a bet on the results of a football match:
before placing a bet, the decision maker may be willing to collect data on the past per-
formances of the players of the football teams, on the results of their potential previous
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meetings, etc. This example illustrates the notion of inductive reasoning that is at the heart
of the knowledge accumulation process: the agent observes occurrences which lead him
to generate predictions about future observations by using similarity judgments (Hume,
1748).
Although there is ample experimental evidence that uncertainty affects decision mak-
ing, there are comparatively few papers addressing the issue of choice behavior when
situations are informed by data. Moreover, the vast majority of the literature on decision
theory considers uncertainty and data separately.
This thesis aims to provide new insights into the understanding of decision making
under uncertainty when data are available. Different strategies can be implemented to
gather data. Since data resulting from randomized statistical sampling provides objective
information about the underlying probability distribution governing outcomes, the present
analysis focuses on this type of data collection. Hence, the first goal of this research is
to investigate the perception of ambiguity and the attitudes towards risk and ambiguity
when agents are provided with statistical information. The second axis of research explores
the individual valuation for additional information. These issues are considered from an
experimental perspective.
Literature review
The distinction between measurable uncertainty, in which the probability distribution
of outcomes is known, and unmeasurable uncertainty, in which the informational context
does not allow such objective probability judgment, dates back to Knight (1921). In both
circumstances, the agents are confronted with a choice between different acts yielding
uncertain consequences. Each decision maker is characterized by a preference relation over
the set of all acts. In order to predict which act will be chosen by the agent, economists have
proposed various theoretic frameworks accounting for the individual’s attitude towards
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uncertainty.
The benchmark model of decision making under uncertainty is the Expected Utility
(EU) theory, originally introduced by Bernoulli (1738) and then formalized by Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944). This model provides the relevant and usually agreed upon
framework to study preferences over risky prospects. Under risk, each available act yields
an outcome with a well-specified objective probability. According to the EU representa-
tion theorem, the preferences of a rational decision maker can be described by a cardinal
utility function whose curvature captures the individual’s attitude towards risk. The pre-
ferred act is the one that results in the highest expected utility. This prediction requires
the Independence axiom to hold. This central – but controversial – axiom states that the
preferences between two risky alternatives are invariant to mixing each of the alternatives
with a third one in the same proportions 1.
There has been extensive debate about the nature of probabilities as the numerical
expression of beliefs (Hacking, 1975). In particular, a relevant question asks whether ob-
jective probabilities derived from logical analysis or empirical frequencies should be treated
differently than subjective probabilities based on other type of (more disputable) evidence.
According to Savage (1954) and De Finetti (1937), the distinction between both types of
probabilities is inconsequential in normative decision theory. Savage’s characterization
of Subjective EU combines the von-Neumann-Morgenstern EU framework with subjective
probabilities. In this model, the decision maker has a single additive subjective probability
measure over events, which reflects his beliefs about relative likelihoods. The preferred
act is the one that yields the highest subjective expected utility. Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) propose an alternative approach of Subjective EU which involves both objective
and subjective uncertainty.
The models based on subjective probabilities postulate that the type and the amount of
1. Although the EU theory has remained the standard decision criterion to study preferences over
objective lotteries, its descriptive power has been challenged by Allais (1953) who outlines situations
leading to systematic violations of the Independence axiom. Alternative models of preferences, accounting
for the Allais paradox, have been lately proposed to describe preferences under risk (Machina, 2017).
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evidence supporting the individual probability measure does not influence decision making.
Ellsberg (1961) instead identifies patterns of choice that cannot be explained exclusively
by the desirability of outcomes and the likelihood of events. Indeed, he suggests that an
appropriate framework should also account for:
"[...] the nature of one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of events.
What is at issue might be called the ambiguity of this information, a quality
depending on the amount, type, reliability and "unanimity" of, information,
and giving rise to one’s degree of "confidence" in an estimate of relative likeli-
hoods." (Ellsberg, 1961, p.657)
Ellsberg presents thought-experiments to illustrate his statement. One of them posits
a pair of urns containing 100 balls each. Each ball can be either black or red. The
proportions of black and red balls in Urn I are unknown and Urn II contains exactly 50
black and 50 red balls. A ball is randomly drawn and the decision maker is asked to
express preferences between different bets. Table 1 displays the four bets offered to the
agent.
Urn I Urn II
Act Black Red Black Red
a $100 $0
b $100 $0
a′ $0 $100
b′ $0 $100
Table 1 – Ellsberg’s two-color urns experiment
Ellsberg argues that decision makers are typically indifferent between betting on black
or on red within each urn (a ∼ b and a′ ∼ b′) but they are likely to exhibit a strict
preference for Urn I over Urn II to bet on black and to bet on red (a  a′ and b  b′).
The reason is that agents usually feel uneasy with making predictions in the absence of
information. Consequently, they may be reluctant to bet on unknown probabilities. The
resulting twofold choice is termed ambiguity aversion – although less likely, the opposite
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pattern (a′  a and b′  b) is accordingly termed ambiguity loving. However, preferring a
over a′ implies Pr(black in Urn I) < .5 and preferring b over b′ implies Pr(red in Urn I) <
.5. Hence, Pr(black in Urn I) + Pr(red in Urn I) < 1. Such beliefs cannot be resumed
in a unique additive probability measure. As a result, the models relying on subjective
probabilities fail to explain this pattern of preferences, which is referred to as the Ellsberg
paradox.
The empirical validity of the Ellsberg paradox has been supported by ample experi-
mental evidence 2. Thus, over the last decades, a large number of alternative models have
been proposed to account for Ellsberg-type preferences 3. Schmeidler (1989) extends the
Subjective EU theory to non-additive probabilities. He proposes the Choquet EU model
where beliefs are characterized by a single capacity which weighs the different events
without necessarily summing up to 1. In this model, the acts are evaluated by a Choquet
integral with respect to the capacity. As in the EU theory, the preferred act is the one that
results in the highest weighted sum of the utilities of its outcomes. However, the weights
used to evaluate each of the acts depend on the act itself, which allows to accommodate
ambiguity aversion.
The multiple-prior approach assumes that the lack of information leads the decision
maker to consider a set of probabilities as feasible. Inspired by the Wald’s (1950) maximin
criterion, the Maxmin EU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) adapts the Anscombe-
Aumann framework to the case where the agent formulates multiple probabilistic priors
and evaluates each available act by its minimal expected utility over the set of priors.
The axiom of Uncertainty Aversion states that the decision maker has a preference for
a mixture of two different acts rather than each of these acts. Hence, ambiguity-averse
agents exhibit a preference for hedging. In contrast, when mixing with a certain act, such
hedging motives are absent. The Independence axiom is thus restricted to only apply
2. Early empirical literature is reviewed in Camerer and Weber (1992), most recent experiments are
surveyed in Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (2015). See also Table 1 in Oechssler and Roomets (2015).
3. For a comprehensive theoretical assessment of the Ellsberg paradox, see Machina and Siniscalchi
(2014).
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to such mixtures. As a result, the representation allows to accommodate the Ellsberg
paradox.
Initiated by Segal (1987), the multiple-stage models posit that ambiguous decision
situations can be represented by compound risk. For instance, in the Ellsberg’s two-color
example, the first lottery determines the composition of Urn I which is drawn among
the set of feasible urns, and, in the subsequent lottery, the agent bets on the color of
the ball. In particular, the Smooth Ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) represents
preferences by a functional of the double expectational form. If the agent has probabilistic
beliefs on the set of urns and reduces compound lotteries (i.e., is indifferent between a
compound lottery and its reduction to a simple one), the decision problem can be solved
with Subjective EU. In contrast, an ambiguity-sensitive decision maker first evaluates the
expected utility of each lottery by a utility function which reflects his ambiguity-attitude
and then uses a second-order prior over lotteries to compute a second-order expected
utility. Differently from the other models, this model separates perceived ambiguity from
ambiguity attitudes and incorporates the multiple prior model as a special case.
Although these popular approaches provide tractable representations to model decision
making 4, they remain silent about the informational structure of the decision situation.
In particular, these models rely on subjective beliefs without explicitly incorporating the
objective information which may be at the disposal of the agent. Consequently, these
models do not allow to separate the objective features of the available information from
the subjective individual perception of this information that both lead to the formation
of beliefs. Gajdos et al. (2008) consider a decision problem in which the information does
not allow to point-identify probabilities but enables to define a range of possible values
instead. Hence, their representation of preferences builds on Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
(1989) multiple-prior framework and the relation between the objective information and
the subjective beliefs is made explicit. In this model, the agent is able to compare acts
4. See Etner et al. (2012) for an extensive review of the recent models in decision theory under ambiguity.
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under different informational structures. Then, they define aversion towards imprecision
as the preference to act in the informational environment that yields the smaller set of
probabilities.
Relying on Hume’s (1748) principle of inductive reasoning, Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1995, 2001) propose a formal model of decision making under uncertainty, called the
Case-Based Decision Theory, in which the agents decide by drawing analogies with past
cases in memory. Hence, the available acts are evaluated according to their previous per-
formance in similar decision situations. This approach appears to be particularly salient
and realistic to model decision making when the agent has only imperfect knowledge
about the decision situation 5. Combining the case-based approach and an adaptation of
the Maxmin EU model, Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2013) present a decision model that
allows to distinguish between the perception of ambiguity and the individual attitude to-
wards it. Their representation can be used to study preferences for additional information.
In particular, they show that ambiguity averse agents prefer to decide with more precise
sets of information.
The theoretical literature on updating describes how decision makers form beliefs given
statistical data. When the agent is able to establish a probability distribution over the
states of nature, Savage’s (1954) representation of preferences implies that the agent will
update beliefs according to Bayes rule. Another crucial implication of Savage’s theory is
dynamic consistency which requires that the ex ante contingent plan coincides with the
actual choice made after obtaining the information. However, such ideal statistical infor-
mation allowing subjects to formulate correct probabilistic beliefs is not always available.
Most frequently, the informational context describes only partially the decision situation
at hand. Blackwell (1951, 1953) provides a criterion to rank different informative struc-
tures. In his framework, the agent conducts experiments (i.e., sampling procedures) to
5. Camerer (1998) emphasizes: "When you choose a movie, house, or colleague, do you think about
possible consequence states and weigh their likelihood? Or do you instinctively compare each movie,
restaurant, or colleague to others you have seen and liked or disliked? You almost surely do some of the
latter." (Camerer, 1998, p.176).
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address decision problems in which the loss that is obtained depends on the true state
of the world. Experiment I is said to be more informative than experiment II if the for-
mer is more valuable than the latter for all Subjective EU maximizers. This implies that
experiment I yields lower expected loss than experiment II for any subjective prior.
As reviewed above, Ellsberg (1961) points out paradoxical choices which provide evi-
dence against the descriptive validity of the Subjective EU theory. The variety of models
of decision making based on non-probabilistic beliefs leads to multiple interpretations with
regard to the way beliefs and ambiguity-sensitive preferences are updated to incorporate
new information. Indeed, while non-EU theories explain observed behaviors, giving up
the Independence axiom comes at a cost. First, the non-EU models do not provide a
unique way of generalizing the Bayes updating rule to non-additive beliefs. Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1993) consider a Maxmin EU maximizer and axiomatize a class of updat-
ing rules which generalize the Bayesian rule to the case of multiple priors. Eichberger
et al. (2007) characterize Bayesian updating in the context of the Choquet EU model.
A second problem related to the weakening of the Independence axiom is the violation
of dynamic consistency (e.g., Siniscalchi, 2011). The lack of dynamic consistency poses
further challenges for the definition of appropriate updating rules under ambiguity. In
particular, Epstein and Schneider (2003) axiomatize the recursive multiple-priors model,
an intertemporal version of the Maxmin EU model that preserve dynamic consistency.
Dynamic inconsistency has also led researchers to consider alternative approaches to up-
dating. Hanany and Klibanoff (2007, 2009) allows the update rule to depend on the
event that is observed. They propose a weak version of dynamic consistency according
to which the ex ante optimal act remains conditionally optimal. Siniscalchi (2011) draws
on the consistent-planning approach (Strotz, 1955) and characterizes the decision maker
as sophisticated if he has correct beliefs regarding his own future decisions. His analysis
provides a theoretic framework to study decision making with dynamically inconsistent
preferences.
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Another important issue related to updating concerns statistical learning. A common
view is that ambiguity should resolve if decision makers are repeatedly facing the same
data generation process. In the Ellsberg’s urn, this argument implies that increasing
the number of random draws with replacement lessens ambiguity. Consequently, it is in
principle possible for the decision maker to learn the exact composition of the urn by
observing an infinite number of draws. The standard models of Bayesian inference predict
that the subjective estimates (absolutely continuous with respect to the truth) of the
EU maximizers will indeed converge to the event’s true probability distribution as the
number of i.i.d. observations gets large. Marinacci (1999, 2002) derives a Law of Large
Numbers which allows statistical learning under ambiguity when beliefs functions are
modelled through capacities. Epstein and Schneider (2007) study the long-term behavior
of beliefs within the Maxmin EU model and provides conditions under which multiple
posteriors concentrate at the true objective probability distribution. Until now, however,
the theoretical literature fails to provide conditions applying to a large class of non-EU
preferences under which ambiguity would systematically vanish in the long run.
Finally, the literature on the value of information under ambiguity is sparse. A notable
exception is the analysis of Snow (2010) who shows that the value of information reducing
ambiguity is positive (negative) for ambiguity averse (loving) decision makers. In the
absence of dynamic consistency, models of ambiguity does not allow for a direct application
of Blackwell’s (1951) results. A dynamically inconsistent agent may be willing to pay
to avoid information (Wakker, 1988). Assuming that the decision maker can commit
to a strategy contingent on the signal observed, Li and Zhou (2016) show that most
classes of ambiguity-sensitive preferences admit a partial ranking of informative structures
equivalent to Blackwell’s ranking. Consequently, the increase in informativeness is valuable
for both ambiguity averse and ambiguity loving decision makers under suitable technical
assumptions.
In a nutshell, ambiguity raises theoretical issues when studying updating and learn-
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ing. Therefore, the experiments presented in this thesis are designed to address dynamic
decision making with particular care 6. Moreover, updating and learning depend on the
model used to describe choice behaviors and beliefs. Since there is no canonical model of
decision making under ambiguity and it is not straightforward to deduce which model is
implemented by experimental subjects, this thesis adopts a model-free approach.
Contribution and outline of the thesis
In this thesis, I explore choice behaviors under "partial ambiguity", defined by situa-
tions where sets of observations are available to the agents. More precisely, this research
experimentally investigates individual attitudes towards uncertainty when prospects can
be informed by statistical data. By providing decision makers with datasets, this study is
in line with the case-based approach and is intended to simulate a tractable and realistic
process of accumulation of information.
This thesis consists of three chapters: In the first and the second chapters, I exam-
ine individual preferences for uncertain prospects when ambiguous options are described
by datasets containing more or less observations. In other words, Chapters 1 and 2 de-
scribe decision making in the presence of information, i.e., when prospects are informed
ex ante. On the other hand, the third chapter addresses choice behaviors when agents can
acquire statistical information. In particular, this chapter aims at measuring the value of
additional information in uncertain environments.
The experiments presented in this thesis draw on the Ellsberg’s (1961) urns which
provide a straightforward and easily implementable design. Moreover, this enables me to
directly relate to the extensive empirical literature based on Ellsberg’s experiments. In this
thesis, the original two-color setting is modified by allowing the subject to observe random
draws with replacement so that he can learn about the composition of the urn. Datasets
6. The implications of dynamic inconsistency on empirical analysis are discussed in Chapter 3 especially.
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differ with respect to two objective dimensions: their precision and their frequencies. The
empty dataset (i.e., the one containing 0 observation) corresponds to the extreme case of
full ambiguity, as originally considered by Ellsberg. Increasing the number of observations
(i.e., the length of the dataset) while keeping the frequencies unchanged improves the
precision of the information, which in turn lessens ambiguity in an objective sense.
In Chapter 1, I report the results of an experimental study which examines whether
individual choices can be reconciled with the Subjective EU theory when both ambiguous
prospects are informed by more or less precise datasets. This experiment departs from the
classic Ellsberg two-color setting by confronting subjects with pairs of urns whose exact
compositions are all unknown. However, in each question, the two urns to be compared are
described by datasets which can be either relatively precise (100 draws) or imprecise (10
draws) with almost identical frequencies. Consequently, choosing the most precise dataset
for both color-bets is interpreted as ambiguity aversion in this framework (Eichberger and
Guerdjikova, 2013). The experimental design allows to distinguish between neutral and
non-neutral ambiguity attitudes where the former consists of frequentist and Bayesian
choices and the latter includes ambiguity averse and ambiguity loving preferences.
In this experiment, most answers (58%) are consistent with the EU hypothesis but a
significant proportion of choices (29%) can still be interpreted as an expression of non-
neutral ambiguity attitude – the remaining answers (13%) violate a standard property
of monotonicity. The results suggest that the frequency of the winning color in the
datasets does not significantly impact the distribution of answers across these three cate-
gories. From a within-subject perspective, I calculate an interpersonal score of ambiguity-
sensitivity that allows to estimate the extent to which individual preferences deviate from
ambiguity neutrality. This leads me to conclude that the non-negligible share of non-
neutral answers is not due to a small number of extremely ambiguity-sensitive subjects
but is rather due to a general tendency among subjects to make ambiguity averse choices
in several decision situations.
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In Chapter 2, I present an experiment designed to measure the effect of information
precision on the perception of ambiguity. The Ellsberg’s original two-urns experiment
is adapted so that the subjects are provided with sets of observations informing on the
composition of the ambiguous urn. Depending on the experimental treatment, the num-
ber of observations spans from 0 (no-information treatment) to 500 (highly-informative
treatment). Individual preferences are elicited in comparative (via binary choices between
urns) and non-comparative (via Certainty Equivalents – CEs – measurements) contexts.
Hence, I am able to address the occurrence of preference reversals that have been widely
documented under risk (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Grether and Plott, 1979) but rel-
atively less discussed under ambiguity. The central feature of the design consists in the
symmetry of draws reported in the datasets, i.e., in each dataset, the frequencies equal
1/2-1/2. Without information, the agent is likely to adopt a symmetric prior regarding the
composition of the ambiguous urn. Moreover, according to most of the standard updating
rules, the symmetry of draws implies the symmetry of the revised beliefs. Consequently,
the comparison between the subject’s valuations of the risky urn and of the ambiguous
urn depends only on the individual’s perception of ambiguity and his attitude towards
ambiguity.
The experimental results suggest that the availability of information does not eliminate
Ellsberg-type preferences since most subjects (61%) prefer the risky urn to the ambigu-
ous urn for both color-bets. However, the differences between the CEs for the risky and
ambiguous prospects are not statistically significant on average. When comparing direct
choices and valuations, a non-negligible share of participants (24%) exhibit preference re-
versals with CE measurements, contrary to what was found by Trautmann et al. (2011)
in a fully ambiguous framework. Between treatments, I do not find evidence that the
increase in information precision is associated with a higher valuation of the ambiguous
prospect. These findings lead me to conclude that ambiguity-averse preferences are only
weak since ambiguity aversion deduced from direct choices does not translate into signifi-
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cant differences in valuation. I relate this result to the fact that decision makers might also
experience difficulties in pricing bets whereas it may be easier to deal with comparative
tasks.
In Chapter 3, as opposed to the previous chapters, uncertain prospects are not informed
ex ante but the decision maker has the opportunity to obtain statistical information. In
this chapter, I propose an experimental design to measure the value of information under
compound risk and ambiguity. The second objective of this research is to provide operating
instructions to study subjects’ ranking of informative structures in the light of Blackwell’s
(1951) equivalence result and its extension (Li and Zhou, 2016). Moreover, the proposed
design allows to investigate the link between valuation of information and ambiguity at-
titudes. Hence, I formulate three experimental hypotheses that can be examined through
the proposed setting: the value of information is strictly positive and strictly increasing in
the informativeness of the signal under both compound risk (hypothesis 1) and ambiguity
(hypothesis 2) and the value of information increases with ambiguity-aversion (hypothesis
3).
Drawing on the Ellsberg’s two-color experiment, the subject faces three different urns
corresponding to three types of choice situations: simple risk, compound risk and am-
biguity. Without information, the participant is asked to state his reservation price for
a color-bet in each of these urns. By enabling the agent to obtain random draws with
replacement, it is then possible to investigate how agents value informative signals un-
der compound risk and ambiguity. I show that increasing the number of draws in the
dataset improves its informativeness in Blackwell’s sense. Hence, the subject’s reservation
price for different lengths of datasets is elicited which allows an experimental assessment
of Blackwell’s equivalence result. Special caution must be taken when studying decision
making under ambiguity in dynamic frameworks since ambiguity-sensitive preferences are
prone to dynamic inconsistency. Hence, delaying the choices after the observation of
the draws might lead to information-aversion in the absence of commitment. Conse-
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quently, one key feature of the proposed design consists in asking subjects to announce
their signal-contingent strategy before the realization of the draws. The implementation
of the experiment is left for future research.
This thesis is divided into three self-contained chapters. Thus, certain concepts may
be defined several times. The instructions and other experimental materials are collected
in an appendix at the end of each chapter.
Methodological issues
Every economic experiment on decision making under ambiguity has to address three
methodological concerns: (i) eliciting preferences, (ii) generating ambiguity in the lab and
(iii) incentivizing decisions.
The standard methods to elicit individual preferences consist of direct choices between
alternatives or contingent valuations in which alternatives are priced in isolation. Each
strategy has its own advantages and drawbacks. The direct choices method is straightfor-
ward and easy to implement but it usually requires confronting the subject with a large
number of alternatives which can reduce the tractability of the device. On the other hand,
valuation tasks are time-saving but cognitively demanding. Although procedure invari-
ance predicts that both strategies yield the same results, there is overwhelming empirical
evidence of systematic divergence in risky frameworks (Seidl, 2002). Hence, in this thesis,
both procedures are examined. In particular, I elicit preferences through direct choices
in Chapter 1, and through CEs 7 in Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, both elicitation methods
are combined to assess the robustness of preferences: direct choices are primarily used
to evaluate the incidence of Ellsberg-type preferences, and CE measurements provide an
estimation of the strength of the elicited preferences.
Simulating ambiguity in the lab is, by definition, challenging. In most incentivized
7. The experimental method used to elicit CEs is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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studies, the experimental instructions remain silent about the method to generate ambi-
guity and the description of the ambiguous urn simply replicates Ellsberg’s (1961) char-
acterization: "Urn I contains 100 red and black balls, but in a ratio entirely unknown [...];
there may be from 0 to 100 red balls." (Ellsberg, 1961, p.650). This method is theoret-
ically sound but, in practice, some have argued that the asymmetry of information can
yield subjects to disproportionately avoid the ambiguous prospect as a result of compar-
ative ignorance effects (Fox and Tversky, 1995) and suspicion 8 (Dominiak and Duersch,
2015). Hence, ideally and whenever possible, nobody (i.e., neither the participant nor the
experimenter) should know how ambiguity is generated. Although this condition is easily
attainable for hypothetical choices, real experiments require the definition of a transparent
and reliable device which is not straightforward.
So far, there is no consensus regarding the best strategies for generating ambiguity in
the lab. A common approach approximates ambiguity by two-stage probabilities. How-
ever, in theory, this method appears to be inappropriate since it allows probability calculus
for decision makers reducing compound lotteries. Moreover, empirical studies report sig-
nificant differences between compound risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes (Chow and
Sarin, 2002; Abdellaoui et al., 2015). Another way to generate ambiguity consists in involv-
ing participants in the urn generation process. E.g., in Trautmann and Zeckhauser (2013)
and in Abdellaoui et al. (2015), each subject fills his own ambiguous urn by drawing balls
from another urn. The composition of the individual’s urn is kept secret by covering the
balls or by having subjects wear a blindfold so that participants cannot observe the color
of the balls. Alternative methods relying on sophisticated machines have been proposed:
the Bingo Blower (Hey et al., 2010), i.e., a transparent box containing balls in continuous
motion in such a way that the balls of the different colors cannot be counted, and the ir-
8. Hey et al. (2010) stress that "[...] the possibility of distrust in the experimenter can change the entire
problem for the subjects. [...] If they assume that the experimenter wants to spend as little money as
possible on the experiment, they will naturally try and imagine ways that the experimenter could have
rigged Urn I to save money. Urn I becomes the ‘suspicious urn’ – and not the ambiguous/uncertain urn –
whether or not there are grounds for suspicion." (Hey et al., 2010, p.84).
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regular Galton Box (Oechssler and Roomets, 2015), i.e., a mechanism that arranges balls
in various bins according to an unknown distribution, are two of them 9.
In this thesis, the design of the experiments in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 requires con-
trolling for the frequencies reported in the datasets. Due to time and practical constraints,
I did not generate datasets in the presence of subjects and the urns are hence simulated
before the experimental sessions. The instructions of both experiments do not contain
an explicit description of the implemented mechanism as in the original Ellberg’s exper-
iments and the information provided to subjects is formulated as follows: "X balls have
been randomly drawn from the urn" which is actually true. In Chapter 3, the composi-
tion of the urns (except the one whose exact composition is known in the case of simple
risk) results from a two-stage procedure that involve the participants: one of them blindly
draws a numbered chip at random and tosses a coin. The result of the tossing of the coin
determines if the number of the drawn chip corresponds to the quantity of black balls or
the quantity of red balls in the urn. The composition of the urn remains secret to the
participants and the experimenter until the end of the session.
Another important issue in experimental economics deals with the proper way to in-
centivize decisions in the lab. Most of experiments involve several choices and paying
every one of them might yield income effects. Popularized by Savage (1954), the Random-
Incentive-System (RIS) addresses this problem by randomly selecting, at the end of the
experiment, only one of the decisions to be implemented for real. The RIS presents other
advantages: it is easy to understand, easy to implement, and, given budget constraints, it
allows to collect a large number of observations while keeping the face values of the stakes
unchanged. For these reasons, the RIS is the most commonly used incentive mechanism
to study individual choices (Grether and Plott, 1979; Holt and Laury, 2002).
Although, in theory, the RIS yields unbiased measurement of EU preferences, the
9. These machines can be seen in action at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z16_H5kM26E (the
Bingo Blower) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kq7e6cj2nDw (the regular Galton Board that ar-
ranges balls in bins according to a normal distribution).
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procedure has been criticized for its inability to induce truthfull-telling for agents with
non-EU preferences. Indeed, subjects may perceive the whole experiment (i.e., the decision
situations together with the random device) as a single lottery. If so, the RIS might fail
to elicit the true preferences of non-EU maximizers due to violations of the Independence
axiom (Holt, 1986). Hence, uncertainty, and ambiguity in particular, raises challenging
theoretical issues with regard to the implementation and the efficiency of the RIS. Empir-
ical assessments, however, suggest that decision makers treat each experimental decisions
in isolation when confronted with simple binary choices, providing support for the use of
the RIS in simple frameworks 10 (Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt et al., 1998). Conse-
quently, in this thesis, the decisions in the experiment related to Chapter 1 are incentivized
through the RIS procedure.
Most recently, Johnson et al. (2015) propose an original incentive mechanism, called
Prince, which allows to overcome the inherent drawbacks of the RIS by minimizing viola-
tions of isolation. A key feature of this innovative device consists in selecting at random
the question that serves for payment at the beginning of the experiment. The real choice
question is not observed by the participant but provided to him in a concrete form (e.g.,
in a sealed envelope). This procedure encourages subjects to consider each choice situ-
ation in isolation and hence to truthfully answer the experimental questions. Therefore,
the experiments in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use the Prince mechanism to incentivize
decisions 11.
10. See Bardsley et al. (2010, §6.5) for a detailed discussion on incentive mechanisms in experiments.
11. The Prince mechanism had not been presented yet at the moment I implemented the experiment of
Chapter 1, which explains why Prince has been only used in the experiment of Chapter 2.
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Chapter 1
Precise versus imprecise datasets:
revisiting ambiguity attitudes in
the Ellsberg paradox
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation
In line with Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk and uncertainty, the famous
Ellsberg paradox (1961) was a first experimental attempt to illustrate the failure of the
Expected Utility hypothesis to predict individual behavior in an uncertain environment.
Consider two urns: one urn is filled with 50 red and 50 black balls while the other urn
is filled with 100 black and red balls in unknown proportions. Whether the bet is on
black or on red, most people prefer betting on the urn with known composition. It is
then impossible to infer additive probabilities from these choices. This behavior, known
as the Ellsberg paradox, provides evidence of ambiguity aversion since decision makers
(henceforth, DMs) are reluctant to bet on events with unknown probabilities.
19
While the classic Ellsberg’s thought-experiment has been replicated several times
(Camerer and Weber, 1992 provide an overview), the present research deals with the
question of decision making in ambiguous situations when information about the urns is
provided in the form of datasets. In the classic version of the experiment, exact probabilis-
tic information is provided for one of the urns (the risky urn) whereas no information is
given for the other urn (the ambiguous urn). However, this type of information might not
be readily available in real-life situations. Indeed, DMs usually observe data generated by
the process at hand and have to make a decision based on more or less precise datasets.
For instance, in traditional societies, farmers are urged to adapt to climate change by
adopting new technologies, for which data are often scarce. Eichberger and Guerdjikova
(2012) show that the availability of information on returns of the new technology is cru-
cial for motivating them to modify their practices. In the absence of precise and relevant
information and if the share of ambiguity-averse agents is too high, most agents prefer
the known prospect (the traditional method) to the unknown alternative (the new tech-
nology), hence innovation in the society is slow, resulting in an inefficient equilibrium.
Financial trading provides also a relevant example to illustrate the consequences of lack
and imprecision of information on portfolio choices. Indeed, market participants have only
partial information regarding expected returns of traded assets. As a result, they might
engage in imitative behavior if they believe that other DMs have some important addi-
tional information. In particular, Ford et al. (2013) prove that herding can be rational for
agents with Choquet Expected Utility preferences. However, such behavior contributes to
the formation of bubbles, and to the subsequent crisis resulting from the burst of bubbles.
In an attempt to describe decision making in ambiguous environments, I draw on the
Ellsberg’s experiment with two urns and two colors of balls and I describe both urns by
sets of data (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001). I investigate the Ellsberg paradox in this set-
up of "partial ambiguity". In particular, I ask whether there is still a sizable proportion
of ambiguity-averse DMs in this context of partial ambiguity. Consider for instance the
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following set-up : there are two urns containing 200 balls each. Each of the urns contains
an unknown proportion of blue and red balls. Both urns are described by datasets of equal
frequencies but different number of observations (i.e., different information precision). In
urn 1, 5 blue balls and 5 red balls have been randomly drawn with replacement. In urn 2,
50 blue balls and 50 red balls have been randomly drawn with replacement. Which urn
is preferred when betting on blue? On red? A frequentist (or a Bayesian with a prior
50/50 on the composition of the urn) would be indifferent between both urns. In contrast,
an ambiguity-averse subject might prefer to bet on the urn with more draws regardless
of the color of the ball. Similarly, subjects who choose the least precise urn for both
bets exhibit ambiguity-loving preferences. Such preferences are axiomatized in Eichberger
and Guerdjikova (2013). The preferences for information precision are investigated for
different frequencies of blue and red balls in the datasets describing the urns. There, I ask
whether ambiguity attitudes change with the proportion of balls of the winning color in
the dataset, which ranges from 0.1 to 0.9 in the experiment.
I conducted a lab experiment to give insights into the individual preferences for infor-
mation precision. The goal is two-fold: First, I describe individual decision making in the
context of partial ambiguity. In particular, I examine whether individual choices can be
reconciled with Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model or whether non-neutral
ambiguity attitudes are needed to explain preferences for data-sources with various degrees
of precision. Indeed, the experiment is designed in such a way as to allow a classification
of subject’ answers into 4 classes of behavior: frequentist, Bayesian, ambiguity-averse and
ambiguity-lover (Section 1.2.2 describes these patterns of preferences in detail). Second,
I estimate the extent to which agents’ preferences deviate from the SEU predictions by
calculating an interpersonal score of ambiguity-sensitivity.
This experiment yields two key findings:
1. Among experimental answers satisfying a standard property of monotonicity, around
2/3 can be explained by the SEU model. The remaining 1/3 contradict the SEU and
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can be interpreted as an expression of non-neutral ambiguity attitude. Among them,
2/3 displays ambiguity-aversion and 1/3 of answers can be classified as ambiguity-
loving.
2. The average score of ambiguity-sensitivity in the experiment is slightly biased to-
wards ambiguity-aversion.
To summarize, when both prospects are partially described, most of experimental choices
are compatible with SEU maximization. Nevertheless, non-neutral ambiguity attitudes
are still required to explain preferences in the described context of partial ambiguity since
I observe a small but non-negligible share of ambiguity-sensitive agents.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The relevant research is reviewed
next. Section 1.2 presents the experimental design and details the different ambiguity
attitudes in the current set-up. The results of the experiment are discussed in section 1.3.
Section 1.4 concludes. Appendix 1.A provides supplementary material for the experiment.
Appendix 1.B contains complementary tables and figures.
1.1.2 Related literature
The present research builds on the seminal work of Ellsberg (1961), which illustrates
the difference between risk and ambiguity. Here, I depart from the classic experiment
and describe both urns by sets of observations. The aim of this study is to characterize
decision making in ambiguous situations when the information is provided in the form
of datasets. In particular, individual decisions in such realistic frameworks have been
modelled by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) in the Case-Based Decision Theory (CBDT),
designed to explain the effect of the available observations (cases) on agents’ evaluation of
actions. Drawing on Hume’s principles (1748), the authors state that:
"[...] the main reasoning technique that people use is drawing analogies between
past cases and the one at hand.
Applying this idea to decision making, we suggest that people choose acts
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based on their performance in similar problems in the past." (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 2001, pp.32-33)
Indeed, the key idea that underlies the CBDT is the following: information arrives
in the form of data, which might be more or less precise and more or less relevant for
the decision to be made. As a result, the CBDT provides an original paradigm to model
decision making when the probabilities of outcomes are not salient and cannot be eas-
ily constructed. Furthermore, Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2013) axiomatize an origi-
nal version of the alpha-maxmin decision model (Ghirardato et al., 2004) combining the
case-based approach with the theoretical literature on decision under ambiguity. In their
framework, DMs are characterized by a representation of preferences described by a von-
Neumann-Morgenstern subjective utility function over outcomes and non-additive beliefs
which associate a set of priors with each data set. More specifically, my experimental
design is inspired by their example of betting on a draw from an urn (Eichberger and
Guerdjikova, 2013, Example 1, pp.1437-1438), which provides a tractable testing setup
of the Ellsberg’s two-colors experiment when information about both urns consists of a
set of observations. In particular, when datasets exhibit identical frequencies but differ
in precision, they predict that ambiguity-averse (ambiguity-loving) DMs prefer the more
(less) precise dataset, regardless of the bet. This chapter is meant to provide experimental
assessment of preferences under this framework.
Although numerous experiments have evidenced the existence of Ellsberg paradox
(Camerer and Weber, 1992), the authors have principally focused on risk versus full ambi-
guity, and little is known about individual behavior with intermediate stages of knowledge.
Therefore, this research proposes an original version of the Ellsberg’s two-colors experi-
ment which builds upon CBDT by providing DMs with samples of observations. Recent
research has shown that CBDT provides a relevant framework to model decision making
in experimental settings under ambiguity (Grosskopf et al., 2015; Bleichrodt et al., 2017).
Besides, several lab studies have suggested that DMs are ambiguity averse when faced
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with imprecise information. Arad and Gayer (2012) estimate the degree of confidence
in observations that are imprecise. In their experiments, there are as many observations
in the precise set as observations in the imprecise set, but some cases in the imprecise
dataset are irrelevant for the decision problem. They deduce from experimental results
that imprecision of information is a source of ambiguity aversion whereas subjects act
as if there was no ambiguity with precise information. The present study departs from
their analysis in two main respects: First, in my experiment, all observations in both
the precise and imprecise sets are relevant for the choice to be made. The precision of
information is determined by the length of the dataset and hence, the precise dataset
contains more observations than the imprecise one. Second, they consider only short
sequences of observations (8 cases), which is comparable to the imprecise sets in my
experiment, whereas the precise sets here contain significantly more observations (100
cases).
In Baillon et al. (2017), the authors study the effect of learning new information on
decisions to trade options with payoffs dependant on stock prices. They use Initial Public
Offerings (for which no prior information on returns is available) that provide an adequate
natural framework to study the effect of information on beliefs and ambiguity attitudes.
Although they report only little ambiguity-aversion, they find that it does not decrease
with information received, yielding them to conclude that ambiguity-aversion is a stable
characteristic of DM’s preferences. As opposed to their study, I present a lab experiment
which allows to control for the frequencies of good/bad outcomes in the datasets. Conse-
quently, it is possible to investigate the influence of reported frequencies on preferences.
Lastly, Chew et al. (2017) describe attitudes towards variants of partial ambiguity:
two-point ambiguity (two possible compositions of red and black cards in a deck) and
disjoint ambiguity (union of disjoint intervals). They observe aversion to increasing size of
ambiguity in terms of the number of possible compositions of decks. Although their study
provides relevant intuitions, their definition of partial ambiguity differs significantly from
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the one considered in the present chapter. Indeed, they provide partial description about
the underlying probabilities of the prospects whereas participants in my experiment have to
learn them from observations. Description and statistical inference might induce different
behaviors, as evidenced in the literature on the description-experience gap (Barron and
Erev, 2003; Hau et al., 2010; Dutt et al., 2014).
In these three experimental papers, the ambiguity attitudes are investigated via Cer-
tainty Equivalent measurements. By contrast, participants are confronted with binary
choices between prospects in my experiment. Although procedure invariance predicts that
normatively equivalent procedures should give the same ranking between options, prefer-
ence reversals have been widely reported by experimental psychologists and economists
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, 1973; Grether and Plott, 1979). Hence, this chapter aims
to complement the study of ambiguity attitudes and precision of information with an
alternative method for eliciting preferences.
1.2 Experimental design
1.2.1 Stimuli
In the spirit of Ellsberg’s two-colors urns, I design a short experiment of binary ques-
tions on preferences over pairs of bags containing balls. Each bag in the experiment
contains 200 balls which can be either blue or red. Each bag is described by a set of ob-
servations. The datasets inform participants on previous random draws with replacement
from bags and can be either relatively Precise (100 draws) or Imprecise (10 draws). Keep-
ing the precision (i.e., the length) of the datasets constant makes it simpler for participants
to mentally represent frequencies along the experiment. For the sake of brevity, in the
following, the bags described by a precise (imprecise) dataset are denominated the precise
(imprecise) bags 12. Given the datasets, the participant is asked to choose his preferred
12. Note that, during the experimental sessions, the experimenter referred to bags with neutral capital
letters (bag A, bag B, bag C...).
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bag to bet on blue and his preferred bag to bet on red.
The proportions of blue balls in datasets (pB) range approximately from 0.1 to 0.9.
In the experiment, pB can take 5 values: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. These questions deal with
simple probabilities that participants can easily mentally represent. For each proportion
pB, there are two pairs of bets. In each pair of bets, datasets describing bags exhibit
similar but different frequencies. The imprecise datasets display identical frequencies in
both pairs: the number of blue draws is simply given by pB ∗ 10 and the number of red
draws is equal to (1− pB) ∗ 10. On the other hand, the number of blue balls in the precise
datasets is given by pB ∗ 100+1 in one pair of questions and by pB ∗ 100− 1 in the second
pair of bets 13.
The detailed questionnaire is presented in Table 1.1. The experiment consists of 10
pairs of questions presented in random order so as to avoid potential order effects. The
bags differ in each pair of questions. Therefore, there are 20 bags in this experiment: 10
precise bags and 10 imprecise bags. In questions where the proportion pB is indexed by
a (+), the frequency of blue balls is higher in the precise dataset than in the imprecise
one and in questions indexed by a (-) the precise dataset displays a smaller frequency of
blue balls. For instance, consider the pairs of bets 0.1+ and 0.1−. In q1, the participant
is asked to choose between two bags to bet on a blue draw. The precise bag is described
by a dataset containing 100 draws, among which 11 are blue and 89 are red; and the
imprecise bag is described by a dataset containing 10 draws, among which 1 is blue and
9 are red. In q2, the participant faces the same pair of bags but the winning ball is
now red. In q3 and q4, the respondent considers a different pair of bags. The precise
dataset contains 9 blue draws and 91 red draws; and the imprecise dataset displays 1
blue draw and 9 red draws. Choosing the precise (imprecise) bag in the 4 bets provides
convincing evidence of strict preference for information precision (imprecision). Therefore,
13. The frequency of blue balls in the precise datasets is different but set as close as possible to the
frequency of blue balls in the imprecise datasets. The smallest variation is given by 1 observation since
the number of balls can only be described by an integer.
26
pB Question
Number of draws
BetPrecise bag Imprecise bag
Blue Red Blue Red
0.1+ q1 11 89 1 9 Blueq2 11 89 1 9 Red
0.1− q3 9 91 1 9 Blueq4 9 91 1 9 Red
0.3+ q5 31 69 3 7 Blueq6 31 69 3 7 Red
0.3− q7 29 71 3 7 Blueq8 29 71 3 7 Red
0.5+ q9 51 49 5 5 Blueq10 51 49 5 5 Red
0.5− q11 49 51 5 5 Blueq12 49 51 5 5 Red
0.7+ q13 71 29 7 3 Blueq14 71 29 7 3 Red
0.7− q15 69 31 7 3 Blueq16 69 31 7 3 Red
0.9+ q17 91 9 9 1 Blueq18 91 9 9 1 Red
0.9− q19 89 11 9 1 Blueq20 89 11 9 1 Red
Table 1.1 – Questionnaire
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the combination of the two pairs of questions per proportion pB is used as a robustness
test for the elicited preferences. Consequently, an agent whose preferences switch from
the precise (imprecise) bag to the other bag for one out of the 4 bets would be interpreted
as having only weak preferences for information precision (imprecision). The different
attitudes towards ambiguity are described in detail in Section 1.2.2. Moreover, the slight
difference in frequencies allows to constrain subjects to choose between bags, without
including an indifference option. Enabling subjects to express indifference would raise
technical problems when implementing one choice for real for payment 14.
1.2.2 Attitudes towards ambiguity
Ambiguity neutrality
Ambiguity-neutral attitude is revealed when the answers of a subject can be explained
by SEU maximization. Frequentist and Bayesian DMs fall into this category.
A frequentist sets his beliefs equal to the frequency of observations in the dataset. He
is therefore indifferent between any two datasets with different precisions but identical
frequencies. A frequentist is thus insensitive to the precision of information. For two
datasets with different frequencies, he will always chose to bet on the bag with the highest
frequency of the winning color whatever the length of the dataset. Table 1.2 details all
the possible combinations of answers for each pB in the experiment. For the analysis, the
questions are here combined by color: for instance, the bets on blue for the proportion 0.1,
where the precise dataset displays 11 blue balls in q1 and 9 blue balls in q3, are presented
together. Below, the bet on red in q2 is coupled with the bet on red in q4. To bet on blue,
a frequentist prefers the precise bag (P ) in q1 and the imprecise bag (I) in q3, whereas,
to bet on red, he prefers the imprecise bag in q2 and the precise bag in q4.
14. It would require the experimenter to randomize between bags. However, as first noticed by Raiffa
(1961), an ambiguity-averse agent may exhibit a strict preference for randomization and then use the
randomization device to hedge. Theoretical debate is still ongoing (see, e.g., Epstein, 2010; Eichberger
et al., 2016).
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A Bayesian subject is characterized by an updating belief function given by:
λ = δµ+ (1− δ)f (1.1)
The updated belief (λ) is a convex combination of the prior regarding the composition of
the bag (µ) and the observed frequencies in the dataset (f), weighted by a parameter (δ)
that depends on and decreases in the number of observations. The shorter the dataset,
the more one relies on his prior: hence, δI > δP . A Bayesian DM starts the experiment
with a prior regarding the proportion of blue balls in the precise bag (µP (Blue)) and a
prior regarding the proportion of blue balls in the imprecise bag (µI(Blue)). Consider
for instance a DM with symmetric prior on the composition of both bags, which are
natural and plausible beliefs without information on the composition of bags (Gilboa and
Marinacci, 2016, p392). Hence, he assigns the same subjective probabilities to both colors
in both bags, i.e., µP (Blue) = µP (Red) = µI(Blue) = µI(Red) = 0.5. Intuitively, with
equal frequencies in both datasets:
λI(Blue)− λP (Blue) = (δI − δP )(µ(Blue)− f(Blue)) (1.2)
λI(Red)− λP (Red) = (δI − δP )(µ(Red)− f(Red)) (1.3)
The statistical information corresponds to a negative signal for blue balls if the frequency
of blue balls in the datasets is less than the prior, i.e., f(Blue) < µ(Blue) in Eq. (1.2).
Since δI > δP , the updated belief is greater in the imprecise bag than in the precise
bag, i.e., λI(Blue) > λP (Blue). Thus, the DM prefers the imprecise bag to bet on
blue. If the frequency of blue balls is less than the prior, the frequency of red balls in
the datasets is necessarily higher than the prior. Hence, a negative signal for blue balls
translates to a positive signal for red balls for Bayesian DMs. Since f(Red) > µ(Red) in
Eq. (1.3), the updated belief is higher in the precise bag than in the imprecise bag, i.e.,
λP (Red) > λI(Red). Thus, to bet on red, he prefers the precise bag. This reasoning can
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be extended to the present design with roughly equal frequencies. Therefore, to bet on
Blue in questions q1 and q3, a Bayesian DM with symmetric prior prefers the imprecise
bag 15 (column Bay1 in Table 1.2). On the other hand, he chooses the precise bag to bet
on red in q2 and q4.
In Table 1.2, the three columns (Freq, Bay1, Bay2) contain all the neutral answers.
Column Bay1 displays the answers of Bayesians with priors greater than pB and Column
Bay2 contains the answers of Bayesians with priors smaller than pB. Note that it is not
possible to differentiate between a frequentist and a Bayesian with a prior equal to pB.
Indeed, they both prefer to bet on the dataset which displays the highest frequency of the
winning color (whatever the precision of the datasets) and hence, their answers coincide
in this case. This yields Bayesians to be counted as frequentists and consequently, the
measure of frequentist answers might be biased upwards. However, this is of minor impor-
tance since both patterns of choice fall into the global category of ambiguity-insensitive
preferences and hence it does not affect the partitioning between neutral and non-neutral
ambiguity attitudes.
Ambiguity non-neutrality
The columns Pess, WP1, WP2, Opti, WO1 and WO2 in Table 1.2 describe the non-
neutral ambiguity attitudes. Ambiguity non-neutral preferences contradict SEU maxi-
mization, meaning that no additive probabilities can be deduced from these patterns of
choices. This is the case when, given two particular datasets with (almost) identical ob-
served frequencies, the DM selects the same bag to bet on blue and to bet on red. For
instance, choosing the bag associated to the dataset that contains more (less) draws for
both bets indicates preference for information precision (imprecision). This is particularly
salient because in each pair of questions, one dataset displays a higher frequency of blue
balls while the frequency of red balls is higher in the other dataset. Hence, the slight dif-
15. Formally, for q1: λI(Blue) = δI0.50+(1−δI)0.10 and λP (Blue) = δP 0.50+(1−δP )0.11. λI(Blue)−
λP (Blue) = (δI − δP )0.40− (1− δP )0.01 is positive for all δI ∈ [0; 1] and all δP ∈ [0; 1] such that δI > δP .
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ference in frequencies does not compensate for the difference in the lengths of the datasets.
The combination of two pairs of bets with proportions pB allows to measure the strength
of preferences. Pessimistic choices (Pess) consist of strict preferences for information preci-
sion such that, given a particular pB, the respondent prefers the precise bag for the 4 bets.
WP1 and WP2 stand for weakly-pessimistic choices in the following sense: the subject
chooses 3 times the most precise dataset out of 4 bets. Thus, pessimistic and weakly-
pessimistic answers compose the general class of ambiguity-averse preferences. On the
other hand, optimistic choices (Opti) are interpreted as strict preferences for information
imprecision (4 choices in favour of the imprecise bag) and weakly-optimistic choices (WO1
and WO2) consist of weak preferences for information imprecision (3 choices in favour
of the imprecise bag). Consequently, optimistic and weakly-optimistic answers define the
general class of ambiguity-loving preferences.
Non-monotonic preferences
The last two columns of Table 1.2 (NM1 and NM2) gather the choices that do not
satisfy the property of monotonicity. For instance, monotonicity requires that a DM who
prefers the precise bag to bet on blue in q3 should also prefer it in q1 since 11/100 evidence
for blue (q1) is always at least as good as 9/100 evidence for blue (q3). If the DM prefers
the imprecise bag in q1, a symmetrical argument implies preference for the imprecise bag
in q3. Hence, a DM with preference for the imprecise bag in q1 and preference for the
precise bag in q3 (as described in the column NM1) violates monotonicity of preferences.
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pB Q. Bet
Precise bag Imprecise bag Types of answers
Blue Red Blue Red Freq Bay1 Bay2 Pess WP1 WP2 Opti WO1 WO2 NM1 NM2
0.1
q1 Blue 11 89 1 9 P I P P P P I P I I
q3 Blue 9 91 1 9 I I P P I P I I I P
q2 Red 11 89 1 9 I P I P P I I I I P
q4 Red 9 91 1 9 P P I P P P I I P I
0.3
q5 Blue 31 69 3 7 P I P P P P I P I I
q7 Blue 29 71 3 7 I I P P I P I I I P
q6 Red 31 69 3 7 I P I P P I I I I P
q8 Red 29 71 3 7 P P I P P P I I P I
0.5
q9 Blue 51 49 5 5 P I P P P P I P I I
q11 Blue 49 51 5 5 I I P P I P I I I P
q10 Red 51 49 5 5 I P I P P I I I I P
q12 Red 49 51 5 5 P P I P P P I I P I
0.7
q13 Blue 71 29 7 3 P I P P P P I P I I
q15 Blue 69 31 7 3 I I P P I P I I I P
q14 Red 71 29 7 3 I P I P P I I I I P
q16 Red 69 31 7 3 P P I P P P I I P I
0.9
q17 Blue 91 9 9 1 P I P P P P I P I I
q19 Blue 89 11 9 1 I I P P I P I I I P
q18 Red 91 9 9 1 I P I P P I I I I P
q20 Red 89 11 9 1 P P I P P P I I P I
Table 1.2 – The 11-groups classification of choices
Note: Freq: Frequentist, Bay1: Bayesian with prior > pB , Bay2: Bayesian with prior < pB , WP1 and WP2: Weakly Pessimistic preferences,
WO1 and WO2: Weakly Optimistic preferences, NM1 and NM2: Non-Monotonic preferences.
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1.2.3 Participants 16
I ran 6 experimental sessions during January and February, 2014 in the LEEP (Labora-
toire d’Economie Expérimentale de Paris 17). 91 participants were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015): females represent 2⁄3 of the pool of subjects, the average age is above 29
and a majority of people completed higher education. The average payment amounts to
12.86e for a 30 minutes experiment, compared to the french minimum hourly wage which
is less than 7.50e in 2014.
1.2.4 Procedures
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-
Tree 18 (Fischbacher, 2007). The script was written in French. There were no particular
requirements for participation and there was no time limit to answer the questions.
The timing of the experiment is composed of 6 stages:
1. First, I welcome the participants in the lab. Before entering the room, they randomly
pick a number that determines where they sit in the room. They are also asked to
sign a participation consent before the start of the session.
2. Second, I gave the instructions in the form of an oral presentation with slides 19.
3. Next, the participants are asked to answer a short comprehension test to check their
understanding of the experiment 20. No one can reach the next stage before I have
made sure that everybody has answered correctly.
4. Stage 4 consists of filling out the questionnaire on choices of bags.
16. I am grateful to undergraduate and PhD Economic students from the University of Cergy-Pontoise
for their participation to non-incentivized pilot sessions. Preliminary experimental data were also collected
through Qualtrics online platform, these participants are acknowledged for their valuable help.
17. http://leep.univ-paris1.fr/accueil.htm. Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106 - 112 boulevard
de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris cedex 13, France.
18. http://www.ztree.uzh.ch/en.html
19. Appendix 1.A.1 provides a full set of the instructions.
20. See Appendix 1.A.2 for a screenshot of the comprehension questionnaire.
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5. In a next stage, participants are asked to fill out a complementary questionnaire on
socio-economic characteristics.
6. Lastly, participants are paid according to a Random-Lottery Incentive System (see
section 1.2.5).
Regarding the technical aspect of the composition of the bags, I wrote a 3-step program
on MATLAB: first, I generate 199 bags with composition ranging from (1 blue, 199 red),
(2 blue, 198 red), ... to (199 blue, 1 red); second, for a random half of them, I randomly
draw 10 balls with replacement, for the second half, 100 balls are randomly drawn with
replacement; lastly, I keep the bags for which I obtain datasets with frequencies of interest.
Detailed bags composition is provided in Appendix B (Table 1.6).
1.2.5 Incentives
The payment scheme includes a show-up fee of 5e and in addition each participant
plays out one of his choices for real according to a Random Incentive System (RIS). In
concrete terms, when the subject has completed the whole questionnaire, one question is
randomly selected and displayed on his computer. Hence, the question used for payment
is not necessarily the same for all participants. The answer of the respondent is reminded
and the subject is asked to reach the experimenter’s office. There, he faces the pair of
bags corresponding to the selected question and he has to randomly draw a ball from the
bag chosen during the experiment. If he wins the bet, he is paid 18e (including show-up
fee); if he loses, he gets 6e (including show-up fee). Participants implement real draws
with real bags in order to persuade subjects that the procedure is truly not-manipulated
by experimenters. This has an organisational cost since I display as many real bags as
questions, i.e., 20 different bags in total.
Popularized by Savage (1954), the use of the RIS induces subjects to consider all ques-
tions of the experiment to be equally relevant while only paying one of them, which avoids
potential portfolio effects resulting from the payment of all questions in the experiment.
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Hence, for a given research budget, this method allows to collect a large number of ob-
servations from each subject. Moreover, the RIS is easy to explain, to understand and
to implement in the lab. For these reasons, it has been extensively used to incentivize
experimental choices. The RIS requires that subjects perceive each decision as a single
real choice (i.e., in isolation). Rather, they may perceive the whole experiment as a single
choice problem involving compound lotteries, in which case the RIS does not allow to
elicit true preferences (Holt, 1986; Karni and Safra, 1987; Bade, 2015). However, several
experimental studies have concluded that isolation is verified when decision problems con-
sist of simple binary choices (Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Hey and Lee, 2005a, 2005b). In
the present experiment, the subject answers 20 binary questions, therefore I use the RIS
which provides an appropriate mechanism to incentivize decisions.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Neutral and non-neutral ambiguity attitudes
The percentages of answers falling in the 4 general classes of ambiguity attitudes are
given in Table 1.3. The detailed frequencies of answers within the 11-groups classification
are displayed in Table 1.7 in Appendix B.
Neutral Non-neutral
pB Freq Baye AA AL NM
0.1 33 26 19 10 12
0.3 28 29 25 6 12
0.5 42 12 19 15 12
0.7 27 33 17 5 18
0.9 33 23 21 9 14
Total 33 25 20 9 13
58 29 13
Table 1.3 – Choices by categories (in %)
Note: Baye contains Bay1 and Bay2 subgroups; AA stands for
ambiguity-averse and contains Pess, WP1 et WP2 subgroups;
AL stands for ambiguity-loving and contains Opti, WO1 and
WO2 subgroups; NM contains NM1 and NM2 subgroups.
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On average, 87% of answers satisfy the standard property of monotonicity. Among
them, 2/3 of choices are ambiguity-neutral and can be explained by SEU maximization.
They are distributed among frequentist and Bayesian answers. The remaining 1/3 of
answers satisfying monotonicity contradict the Expected Utility hypothesis and can be
interpreted as an expression of non-neutral ambiguity attitude. Among them, 2/3 displays
ambiguity-aversion and only 1/3 of the answers can be classified as ambiguity-loving.
Regarding non-neutral ambiguity attitudes, a share of 20% of the whole sample of an-
swers displays ambiguity-aversion (pessimistic and weakly-pessimistic answers), suggesting
that the difference in frequencies does not compensate for the precision of the datasets.
For half of them, the bag associated with the most precise dataset is chosen for the two
complementary bets even when the frequencies of the datasets are slightly changed (pes-
simistic). The other half prefers the precise dataset for 3 bets out of 4 (weakly-pessimistic
answers). On the other side, only 9% of answers can be classified as ambiguity-loving
(optimistic and weakly-optimistic answers).
Non-monotonic answers amount to 13% of response patterns in the experiment: 60.4%
of respondents do not violate monotonicity in any of the 5 pairs of bets, 18.7% violate
monotonicity only once, 13.2 % twice and 7.7% thrice.
The shares of respondents falling into the 5 reported categories are pretty stable across
the proportions pB apart from the questions related to frequencies 1/2–1/2: except for the
proportion 0.5, where they amount to 42%, frequentist answers represent approximately
a share of 30% of the total answers. At 0.5, only 12% of answers correspond to Bayesian
preferences, while they represent at least 23% in the other proportions. This may be due to
the fact that a significant share of subjects behave as Bayesians with a prior on pB equals
to 1/2, because, as stated previously, it is not possible to distinguish between frequentists
and Bayesians with prior equal to pB. This is confirmed by the fact that significant
percentages of answers fall into Bay1, i.e., prior greater than pB, for questions related to
proportions smaller than 0.5 and the tendency is reversed for proportions greater than 0.5
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with a substantial share of answers falling in Bay2, i.e., prior less than pB (see Table 1.7
in Appendix B). Apart from this difference due to classification of neutral answers, it is
not possible to conclude on a particular effect of frequencies of blue and red balls in the
datasets on ambiguity attitudes.
1.3.2 Score of ambiguity-sensitivity
From a within-subject perspective, I calculate an individual score S of ambiguity-
sensitivity: for a given color in a given proportion pB, it takes the value 1 if the DM
exhibits ambiguity-averse preferences, 0 if neutral and -1 if ambiguity-loving. The total
score for a given individual is obtained by summing up the scores for the 10 pairs of
questions. Hence, a score of 10 refers to extreme ambiguity-aversion and -10 denotes
extreme ambiguity-loving. Formally, S = ∑pB ,j spB ,j , where pB ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9},
j ∈ {B,R} denotes the color of the bet and
spB ,j =

+1 if the precise bag is chosen twice (PP ),
0 if if each bag is chosen once (IP or PI),
−1 if the imprecise bag is chosen twice (II).
In the data, scores range from -4 to 10 (see Table 1.4 and Figure 1.1). 43% of partic-
ipants have a positive score, 38% have a null score and the remaining 19% have a score
below 0. The average score in the experiment is .96, significantly different from 0 (one-
sample t(90) = 3.2, p < 0.01). This number includes non-monotonic answers for which
spB ,j takes value 0 (since each dataset is chosen once). Excluding non-monotonic answers,
the average score equals 1.04.
Since null scores can be obtained with ambiguity-neutral answers as well as with com-
binations of ambiguity-loving and ambiguity-averse answers, further investigations are
needed to distinguish between scores resulting from unstable ambiguity-sensitive prefer-
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S N Freq CumFreq
-4 2 2.2 2.2
-3 6 6.6 8.8
-2 3 3.3 12.1
-1 6 6.6 18.7
0 35 38.4 57.1
1 16 17.6 74.7
2 5 5.5 80.2
3 7 7.7 87.9
4 0 0.0 87.9
5 4 4.4 92.3
6 1 1.1 93.4
7 2 2.2 95.6
8 1 1.1 96.7
9 0 0.0 96.7
10 3 3.3 100.0
Total 91 100.0
Table 1.4 – Score of ambiguity-sensitivity
Note: N gives the number of subjects, Freq stands for
Frequency, CumFreq for Cumulative Frequency.
Figure 1.1 – Histogram of individual score
ences and scores due to regular decision patterns. For pB ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}, spB ,. is
the individual score in proportion pB obtained by summing up the score for bets on blue
and bets on red: spB ,. = spB ,B + spB ,R hence spB ,. ∈ [−2; 2]. Excluding non-monotonic
38
answers, the maxima and minima spB ,. are given in Table 1.5 21. The individuals on the
bold diagonal have the same decision mode along the experiment since their per proportion
score is constant. For instance, the 4 subjects in group (2,2) choose the precise dataset at
each question. They exhibit extreme ambiguity-aversion. The farther from the diagonal,
the more the DM exhibits different choice behaviors. The largest group is the (0,0) group
with 35 subjects: such participants obtain a zero score at each proportion, this denotes
clear ambiguity-neutrality. Looking more in detail at the data: almost half of them (16)
behave as pure frequentists and the rest (19) exhibits a mix of frequentist and Bayesian
answers. The second largest group is the (0,1) group. These two findings are in line with
the previous result showing a weak bias towards ambiguity-aversion. It is worth noting
that only one subject obtains a negative maximum score -1 and no one stands in the other
groups with negative maximum scores. This suggests that no regularity can be found in
the patterns of ambiguity-loving answers.
spB ,. min \spB ,. max -2 -1 0 1 2 Total
-2 0 1 2 8 4 15
-1 - 0 5 2 6 13
0 - - 35 13 8 56
1 - - - 1 2 3
2 - - - - 4 4
Total 0 1 42 24 24 91
Table 1.5 – Maxima and minima per pB individual scores
Note: Excluding non-monotonic answers.
1.3.3 Discussion
In order to keep the experiment as simple as possible, the precision of the datasets is
kept constant in this study and the imprecise (precise) dataset contains always 10 (100)
draws. Ert and Trautmann (2014) propose an experiment where participants can learn
21. Keeping the non-monotonic answers does not significantly change the reported frequencies in the
table.
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about an ambiguous prospect by sampling unlimitedly at no cost. A sample returns the
result of an independent draw from the relevant distribution. They report that median
numbers of samples are small and lie between 11 and 15 (depending on the decision
problem). Hence, the reported neutral ambiguity attitudes in my experiment might result
from the fact that DMs consider the observation of 10 draws to be sufficient to form a
confident judgment regarding the composition of the bag. Consequently, agents would not
process differently the dataset containing 10 draws and the dataset containing 100 draws.
This finding is also is in line with the "law of small numbers" of Tversky and Kahneman
(1971). According to them, DMs have a tendency to regard limited samples of observations
as highly representative. The reason is that they believe random samples to be very similar
to one another and to the population from which they are drawn. Hence, agents make
confident inference about the true distribution based on the results of short samples, as
if the law of large numbers applied to them. The results of Experiment 1 in Arad and
Gayer (2012) support this prediction. Participants are asked to consider betting on a
draw from an opaque two-color Ellsberg’s urn. In the control group, participants know
the composition of the urn whereas subjects of the treatment group are provided with a
sample of observations from the urn. The urn in the treatment group contains 90 balls and
the dataset consists of 8 random draws with replacement. The distribution of Certainty
Equivalents do not differ significantly across treatments. Therefore, the authors conclude
that there should be no great difference between the beliefs in both informative conditions,
yielding agents to value the prospects equally.
1.4 Conclusion
I present an adaptation of the Ellsberg’s two-colors experiment allowing to explore
decision making under partial ambiguity. In this study, one bag is described by a precise
set of observations containing a large number of draws and the other bag is described by an
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imprecise set of observations containing a small number of draws. I report that a majority
of choices in the experiment are consistent with the SEU model when datasets are available
for both bags. Indeed, most answers correspond to frequentist and Bayesian preferences.
On the other hand, non-neutral ambiguity attitudes cannot be removed from the analysis.
More precisely, ambiguity-non-neutral choices consist of a majority of ambiguity-averse
answers whereas ambiguity-loving attitudes can be interpreted as a marginal and unstable
trait of preferences. This is confirmed by the estimation of a score of ambiguity-sensitivity
which is slightly biased towards ambiguity-aversion on average.
In order to reach a general assessment of preferences under partial ambiguity, it is
necessary to conduct additional experiments with different lengths of datasets. In partic-
ular, it might be worthwhile to compare the case of full ambiguity to partial ambiguity
when very few observations are available since there is empirical evidence of ambiguity-
aversion under full ambiguity and of ambiguity-neutrality when ambiguous prospects are
described by short sequences of information. Both findings suggest that ambiguity-averse
DMs consider small samples informative enough to resolve the ambiguity characterizing
the decision situation. This question will be addressed in the subsequent chapters.
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Appendix
1.A Supplementary material for the experiment
1.A.1 Instructions (translated from French)
Note: The sentences in brackets are not included in the instructions but inform the
reader on the moment an action is performed.
— Start of Instructions —
Hello everybody, and thank you for accepting our invitation to participate in this ex-
periment. My name is Roxane Bricet and I am pursuing my research at the Economics
department of the University of Cergy-Pontoise. I am going to briefly present the outline
of the experiment, please pay close attention to this short presentation.
First, some important rules which must be respected: It is important that the experi-
ment takes place in silence, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants.
The use of mobile phones and calculators is forbidden. No particular preliminary knowl-
edge is needed to participate. As soon as the experiment starts, if you have any questions,
please raise your hand and I will assist you.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
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What do we do?
You are invited to participate in an economic experiment on decision theory.
Formally, in each question you will consider two opaque bags containing balls. In each
bag, balls can be either blue or red.
Consider the following example:
(a) Bag Y. Bag Y contains 200 balls,
which can be either blue or red.
(b) Bag Z. Bag Z contains 200 balls,
which can be either blue or red.
The exact proportions of blue and red balls in each bag are unknown. However, we
have partial information on the content of the bags. Indeed, we have randomly drawn one
ball from bag Y and reported its color, then we replaced it in bag Y. This operation
has been replicated several times in bag Y and in bag Z. Note that the number of draws
from bag Y may be different from the number of draws in bag Z.
[At this point, we use real bags Y and Z to randomly draw with replacement 2 balls
from one of the two bags.] These random draws with replacement are given for your
information.
Example:
From bag Y, we have drawn a blue ball 15 times and a red ball 85 times.
From bag Z, we have drawn a blue ball 2 times and a red ball 8 times.
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Your choices of bags:
In the experiment, you will be asked to answer questions of the following type:
We will proceed to draw a ball at random from one of these two bags. If the color of the
ball is blue, you win the bet, if the ball is red, you lose.
Which bag would you rather bet on?
 Bag Y  Bag Z
Important: There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this experiment, it is
only a matter of preferences.
Consider the following example of screen that you will face during the experiment:
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Your payment:
— For your participation in the experiment, each of you will receive 5 euros.
— Moreover, you have the opportunity to win an additional 13 euros. Indeed, at the
end of the session, one of the questions in the experiment will be randomly selected.
Each participant will be rewarded depending on his choice to the selected question.
Let us return to the previous example: suppose that you prefer to draw a new ball
from bag Y, you will proceed to draw a ball at random from bag Y. If the ball is
blue, you win the bet and you obtain 13 additional euros; if the ball is red, you lose
the bet and you only receive one extra euro. Therefore, it is in your own interest to
make choices according to your true preferences.
Altogether, you can win up to 18 euros if you draw the right ball from the selected bag!
Plan of the experiment:
In practice, you will answer the questions of the experiment using the computer in front
of you.
— The first screen will remind you briefly of the outline of the experiment.
— Then, you will be asked 5 comprehension questions to check your understanding of
the instructions. Your answers to these questions do not affect your payment.
— Next, the experiment on your choices of bags will start. The question that
determines your payment will be randomly selected among them. This
part will consist of 10 consecutive screens for a total of 20 questions.
— Finally, you will be asked to fill out a short complementary questionnaire to get to
know you better. Your answers to these questions do not affect your payment.
— The last screen will inform you of the randomly selected question and you will be
reminded of your answer to this question.
Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, henceforth, feel free to
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answer as you like. Moreover, there is no time limit, so take all the time you need to read
the instructions and answer the questions.
Do you have any questions?
If everything is clear, you can now start the experiment!
— End of Instructions —
1.A.2 Comprehension test
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1.B Complementary tables and figures
pB Question Bag
Dataset Bag
Blue Red Blue Red
0.1+ q1, q2 P 11 89 38 162
I 1 9 98 102
0.1− q3, q4 P 9 91 26 174
I 1 9 61 139
0.3+ q5, q6 P 31 69 62 138
I 3 7 58 142
0.3− q7, q8 P 29 71 68 132
I 3 7 50 150
0.5+ q9, q10 P 51 49 88 112
I 5 5 93 107
0.5+ q1, q12 P 49 51 102 98
I 5 5 106 94
0.7+ q13, q14 P 71 29 133 67
I 7 3 105 95
0.7− q15, q16 P 69 31 145 55
I 7 3 158 42
0.9+ q17, q18 P 91 9 188 12
I 9 1 163 37
0.9− q19, q20 P 89 11 175 25
I 9 1 170 30
Table 1.6 – Bags composition
Note: See Section 1.2.4 for the description of the procedure.
Lecture: In the pair of questions (q1,q2), participants are informed that 100
balls have been randomly drawn with replacement from the precise bag, among
them 11 were blue and 89 were red; 10 balls have been randomly drawn with
replacement from the imprecise bag, among them 1 was blue and 9 were red
(public information). The precise bag contains actually 38 blue balls and 162
red balls and the imprecise bag contains actually 98 blue balls and 102 red balls
(non-public information).
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pB Freq Bay1 Bay2 Pess WP1 WP2 Opti WO1 WO2 NM1+NM2
0.1 32.9 20.9 5.5 8.8 4.4 5.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 12.1
0.3 28.5 19.8 8.8 15.4 7.7 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.1 12.1
0.5 41.7 7.7 4.4 9.9 1.1 7.7 7.7 6.6 1.1 12.1
0.7 27.4 9.9 23.1 7.7 4.4 4.4 2.2 2.2 1.1 17.6
0.9 32.9 6.6 16.5 11.0 4.4 5.5 4.4 3.3 1.1 14.3
Total 32.7 11.6 13.0 10.5 4.4 5.1 4.0 3.5 1.5 13.6
Table 1.7 – Detailed frequencies of choices
Note: Freq: Frequentist, Bay1: Bayesian with prior > pB , Bay2: Bayesian with prior < pB , WP1 and
WP2: Weakly Pessimistic preferences, WO1 and WO2: Weakly Optimistic preferences, NM1 and NM2:
Non-Monotonic preferences.
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Chapter 2
Preferences for information
precision under ambiguity
2.1 Introduction
In real-life decision situations, exact probabilistic information about the outcomes of
actions is usually unavailable. However, most decision makers are reluctant to chose
ambiguous prospects and hence, are more likely to bet on events with known rather than
unknown probabilities. This pattern of choices, known as ambiguity aversion, has found
considerable empirical support since the pioneer paper by Ellsberg (1961) 22. In this
article, Ellsberg describes the following thought-experiment: 2 opaque urns are filled with
100 balls each and balls can be either black or red. Urn I contains exactly 50 black and
50 red balls while the composition of Urn II is unknown. What is the preferred urn to
bet on black? And to bet on red? Most agents strictly prefer the known urn (Urn I) for
both bets. These choices cannot be reconciled with Savage’s (1954) axiomatization of the
Subjective Expected Utility theory and consequently, are known as the Ellsberg paradox.
Subsequent influential works have provided various theoretical frameworks to account for
22. Surveyed by Camerer and Weber (1992) and most recently by Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (2015).
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this type of preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004; Klibanoff
et al., 2005).
However, compared to the limit cases of risk (where probabilites are objectively known)
and ambiguity (where no information on probabilites is known), decision makers often own
partial information about the decision process at hand: they refer to weather forecasts
before setting an outside meeting, they compare customer ratings and reviews before an
expensive investment, they purchase medical trials before undergoing an innovative treat-
ment... In our modern societies, information has become one of the most traded good and,
from global interests to micro motives, the issue of information acquisition is paramount
in decision under uncertainty. Indeed, learning allows to mitigate ambiguity (Marinacci,
2002; Epstein and Schneider, 2007; Zimper and Ma, 2017). In particular, regarding the
proportions of colored balls in Ellsberg urns, Nicholls et al. (2015) observe that "subjective
estimates converge to the true proportions of differently colored balls (=‘objective’ prob-
abilities) if the respondents can observe large data samples from multivariate Bernoulli
trials." (pp.103–104). Consequently, information that reduces ambiguity has a positive
value for ambiguity-averse decision makers (Snow, 2010; Attanasi and Montesano, 2012).
In an experiment, Ambuehl and Li (2018) elicit subjects’ Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) for
useful information (a single observation) using uncertainty equivalents. They especially
find that agents have a strong preference for information that resolves uncertainty.
In the present article, I report the results of an experimental investigation on the role of
information in ambiguous settings. This chapter explores the following question: how do
agents value partially ambiguous bet, i.e., when some information describing the decision
situation is available? Since information allows to mitigate ambiguity, additional infor-
mation may render the gamble more attractive for the ambiguity-averse decision maker.
Moreover, I investigate the extent to which preferences are robust to different elicitation
procedures. Considering two choice options, preference reversals describe situations where
an individual provides contradictory preference orders under different elicitation mecha-
52
nisms. As initially demonstrated by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), it is pretty common
that one gamble, characterized by a high probability of winning a small gain (usually
called the P-bet), is strictly preferred to a second gamble, featuring a small probability
of winning a high gain (usually called the $-bet). However, the preferred gamble is often
assigned a lower selling price. Both decisions appear to be mutually inconsistent and this
is known as the standard preference reversal phenomenon. Indeed, most of the standard
theories of rational choice do not admit the existence of preference reversals. This raises
the question of what true preferences are since choices may depend on how the task is
framed.
While preference reversals have been widely studied in riskless and risky environ-
ments 23, there are comparatively few papers addressing the occurrence of such paradox in
ambiguous frameworks. Maafi (2011) investigates standard preference reversals and finds
that agents do reverse their preferences under ambiguity, and the effect is even more salient
than under risk. In her experiment, although the share of subjects preferring the P-bet is
roughly constant across the risky and the ambiguous conditions, ambiguity increases the
gap between the prices of the ambiguous $-bets and their corresponding ambiguous P-bets,
so that reversals occur more frequently. Closely related to my research is the Trautmann
et al. (2011) study of preference reversals within only one attribute: contrary to standard
design, the payments of the 2 lotteries are identical and the lotteries only differ in their
likelihood. In several Ellsberg 2-color experiments, they report a minor but significant
share of preference reversals under ambiguity when the price is elicited via WTP; how-
ever, this finding is mitigated when gambles are evaluated via Certainty Equivalents (CE).
They show that WTP measurements entail a general overestimation of ambiguity aver-
sion due to a reference point effect and the resulting loss aversion. Therefore, this study
asks whether preference reversals occur under ambiguity. My design focuses on preference
reversals exclusively within the likelihood attribute as in Trautmann et al. (2011), but I
23. Surveyed by Seidl (2002).
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enable agents to observe informative signals whereas they focus on complete ambiguity.
In a lab experiment, subjects are asked (1) to provide their CE for an unambiguous
(hence, risky) bet and an ambiguous bet and (2) to select their most preferred bet between
the two. The experimental design draws on Ellsberg’s two-color urns and the bets consist of
gambling on the color of the ball to be drawn from an urn. In the risky bets, the participant
is asked to consider gambling on blue and gambling on red in the known urn containing
as much blue balls as red balls; while in the ambiguous bets, the exact composition of
the urn is unknown but the urn is described by a dataset containing random draws with
replacement. Hence, the degree of precision of information depends on the number of
reported draws. This experiment consists of 5 treatments for 5 distinct ambiguous urns.
Depending on the treatment, the number of random draws performed in the ambiguous
urn spans from 0 to 500.
One key feature of the design relies on the symmetry of draws reported in the dataset:
half of them are blue, the other half being red. Without information, the agent is likely to
adopt a symmetric prior about the composition of the ambiguous urn (Gilboa and Mari-
nacci, 2016, p.392). Thereafter, all commonly used updating rules predict that symmetric
information about the color of draws result in symmetric revised beliefs. Hence, the sym-
metry of draws allows for a direct comparison of the CEs and the preferences between the
risky urn and the ambiguous urn, since the risky urn contains as much blue balls as red
balls. Indeed, if the symmetry of prior and posterior beliefs is verified, the comparison be-
tween the CEs depends only on the individual perception of ambiguity and the individuals’
attitude towards ambiguity. Besides, the symmetry of signals allows to relate this study
to other experimental replications of Ellsberg’s two-urns problem in similar symmetrical
frameworks.
Further, this experiment can be used to investigate the strength of Ellsberg-type pref-
erences: the direct choices between urns are used to evaluate the incidence of ambiguity
aversion in the case of partial ambiguity and the CE measurements provide an estimation
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of the magnitude of the preference for one urn compared to the other (high differences
in CE indicate strong preferences whereas small differences suggest weak preferences). In
the last stage of the experiment, the participant is asked to explicitly state his individual
beliefs on the composition of the ambiguous bag. More specifically, his estimation of the
number of blue balls in bag B is collected and the respondent has to provide lower and
upper bounds for the proportion of blue balls in the bag. This non-incentivized task serves
to study how the precision of information influences beliefs and perceived ambiguity.
In terms of payment device, the choices are incentivized via the Prince mechanism,
recently proposed by Johnson et al. (2015). Compared to standard methods, the Prince
mechanism allows to clarify consequences of decisions and makes incentive compatibility
completely transparent to subjects. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first
experimental study to implement this method to incentivize preferences for information
precision in an ambiguous framework.
This experiment yields three key findings:
1. Within treatments, despite the fact that the majority of participants prefer the risky
urn to the ambiguous urn for both bets (in conformity with the Ellsberg paradox),
they do not place a higher value on the risky gamble compared to the ambiguous
one (even in the no-information treatment).
2. Between treatments, although one would have expected a positive correlation be-
tween the precision of information and the value attributed to the ambiguous bet
(the more information, the more appealing the ambiguous gamble), there is no sig-
nificant relationship between the number of draws in the dataset and the CE of the
ambiguous bet. Moreover, the comparison of standard deviations of the distribu-
tions of CE by treatments does not indicate more dispersion in the less informative
treatments.
3. On average, 1/4 of the subjects exhibit preference reversals. Hence, CE measure-
ments do not eliminate preference reversals in this framework, as opposed to the
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findings of Trautmann et al. (2011).
I can conclude from these results that ambiguity-averse preferences expressed by the sub-
jects are relatively weak since ambiguity-aversion deduced from direct choices does not
translate into significant CE differences between the risky and the ambiguous gambles.
The reason is that it might be easier to evaluate attributes jointly than separately. In
particular, my finding can be related to the "coherent arbitrariness" explanation proposed
by Ariely et al. (2003). The authors argue that DMs experience difficulties to value goods
and they show in a series of experiments that subjects’ valuations are notably arbitrary
and unstable since individual prices can be manipulated by normatively irrelevant fac-
tors (such as framing and anchors). Furthermore, the similarity of valuations between
treatments suggests that the increase in informativeness does not significantly modify the
perception of ambiguity and this tends to prove that subjects form a confident “fifty–fifty”
probability judgment for the composition of the ambiguous urn even when no or very little
information is available. This is confirmed by individual estimates on the composition of
the ambiguous bag.
The type of information considered here is fundamentally different from Eliaz and
Schotter (2010) who study demand for non-instrumental information (information that
may not change the final decision). In a risky environment, Eliaz and Schotter report
that experimental subjects assign a positive value to non-instrumental information. This
may be due to what they call the "confidence effect", i.e., an intrinsic preference for being
confident in choosing the right decision. This study departs also from Ambuehl and Li’s
(2018) experiment for two main reasons: First, while they estimate WTP for information, I
choose to focus on CE since WTP measurements have been blamed for artificially inflating
the number of ambiguity averse agents and subsequent estimates of preference reversals
(Trautmann et al., 2011). Second, their sets of observations contain only one draw from
the urn whereas, in this chapter, the datasets describing the ambiguous bag are of different
lengths depending on the treatment. Hence, I am able to generate a wide range of degrees
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of information precision, ranging from 2 observations (weakly-informative treatment) to
500 observations (highly-informative treatment), whereas the respondents of the control
group (no-information treatment) do not receive any statistical feedback. Contrary to
Trautmann et al. (2011) who impose that CEs lie between the minimum payoff and the
Expected Value of the risky lottery (or the mean of the payoffs of the ambiguous lottery),
the CE elicited in my experiment can take any value between the minimum and the
maximum payoffs of the gamble. Indeed, 1/3 of estimated CE in this experiment are
higher than the Expected Value of the lottery.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the experimental design. Results
of the experimental sessions are discussed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes. Appendix
2.A provides supplementary material for the experiment (including the instructions of the
experiment). Additional tables and figures appear in Appendix 2.B.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Stimuli
The experimental design draws on Ellsberg’s two-color urns experiment. Subjects are
shown two opaque bags: bag A and bag B. They are informed that both bags contain 100
balls each and that balls can be either blue or red. The composition of bag A is perfectly
known: it contains exactly 50 blue balls and 50 red balls. The proportions of blue and
red balls contained in bag B are unknown but some information on its composition is
sometimes available: subjects are told that previous random draws with replacement from
bag B have been been carried out and are informed of the results of the draws.
The gambles presented to the participant are of the following type: if you draw a ball of
a prespecified color, you win 15e, otherwise you win 5e 24. There are 4 different possible
24. Given that there is a 5e show-up fee, the minimum reward in this experiment does amount to 5e.
This fee is included in the gambles payoff because agents seem to pay more attention to their decisions
and make less errors when the monetary incentives are high (see for instance Lévy-Garboua et al., 2012).
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gambles: betting on a blue ball from bag A and betting on a red ball from bag A (risky
bets), betting on a blue ball from bag B and betting on a red ball from bag B (ambiguous
bets). For each of these gambles, the subject’s Certainty Equivalents (CE, defined as the
sure amount equally desirable as the gamble) are elicited.
There exist two alternative experimental strategies to elicit prices such as CE: direct
matching and choice-based procedures. The direct matching method consists of determin-
ing the CE by directly asking the subject to find the monetary outcome that represents
the switching point 25. In contrast, choice-based procedures refer to strategies based on
outright choices, where the value of CE is deduced from a series of choices. The Multiple-
Price List (MPL) technique belongs to this last category 26: it consists of binary decisions
between the prospect and (usually equally spaced) sure amounts (e.g., Bruhin et al., 2010,
Experiment 4 in Trautmann et al., 2011, Chew et al., 2017). The seminal paper of Holt
and Laury (2002) popularized the MPL procedure. Thereafter several recent experimen-
tal studies on decision theory estimate prices through MPL. Indeed, this method presents
several advantages. First, it is the easiest method to deal with: (i) for experimenters,
because instructions and implementation are clear and straightforward; (ii) for partici-
pants, because it is easy to understand. Although direct matching is undoubtedly the
most time-saving procedure, it is cognitively demanding since subjects are asked to find
their indifference point which is not a natural inquiry. In contrast, the MPL method inter-
rogates subjects about their preferences, which is more intuitive. Second, the simplicity of
the MPL procedure (together with the Prince incentive method, see Section 2.2.6 on in-
centives) makes it relatively obvious for participants that truthful revelation of preferences
is in their best interest. Third, experimental evidence shows that choice-based procedures
are more consistent than direct matching. Indeed, preference reversals occur more often
with matching techniques (Bostic et al., 1990). Since there is a particular concern with the
25. For instance, individual Willingness-To-Accept is elicited via direct matching procedure in Maafi
(2011).
26. Along with the bisection method (Abdellaoui, 2000). See also pages 555-556 of Glimcher and Fehr
(2013) for a discussion of the different elicitation techniques.
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prevalence of preference reversals in this chapter, I selected the method that is the least
prone to such paradoxical choices to avoid artificial inflation of preference reversals oc-
currences. For a review on the most recent experimental literature on Ellsberg-urns tasks
and on the different valuation and incentive methods, see Trautmann and Van De Kuilen
(2015, Table 1).
Therefore, in this experiment, the CEs are reported using MPL. Precisely, for the 4
gambles, subjects are asked to consider 10 choices between playing the gamble and receiv-
ing a sure amount. In each row of the MPL, the participant has to single out his preferred
option between: "Bet on color in bag" or "xe", with color being replaced by blue or red,
bag being replaced by bag A or bag B and x taking the 10 equally spaced values between
5.50 and 14.50. In each MPL, the monetary amounts rise moving down the list while the
bet remains the same. By linear interpolation, the CE is taken as the mid-point of the two
sure amounts for which the subject switched preferences. However, several experiments
show that people often report multiple switching points, which violates monotonicity of
preferences. For instance, Lévy-Garboua et al. (2012) replicate Holt and Laury’s (2002)
seminal procedure for measuring risk aversion, they report a substantial rate of inconsis-
tencies under various frames (in their experiment, 30% of subjects violate monotonicity
when presented with 10 simultaneous ranked choices). In Cohen et al. (2011), most par-
ticipants violate monotonicity at least once in their online experiment. To avoid this type
of issues in my experiment, I wrote a computer program that enforces the monotonicity
of revealed preferences by allowing at most one switching point from the gamble to the
sure amount. More concretely, once the subject ticks a given option on the MPL, the
computer fills in the lines above and below so as to ensure monotonicity (see the Instruc-
tions in Appendix 2.A for an exhaustive description of the mechanism). This convenient
technique has been implemented in numerous cases since the influential paper of Gonzalez
and Wu (1999) 27. Moreover, in an experimental study comparing different MPL filling
27. See recently for instance: Csermely and Rabas (2016), Gerhardt et al. (2017), Ambuehl and Li
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designs, Andersen et al. (2006) finds no systematic effect of monotonicity-enforcement on
subjects responses. Finally, this method allows to keep the experiment as short as possible
to maintain subjects aware and concentrated since the tedious task of filling rows one by
one can be boring.
In a second step, the participant is asked to select his most preferred bag to bet on
blue and his most preferred bag to bet on red.
Table 2.1 summarizes the 6 different tasks performed by the participant.
Task 1 Fill out the MPL for "Bet on blue in bag A".
Task 2 Fill out the MPL for "Bet on red in bag A".
Task 3 Fill out the MPL for "Bet on blue in bag B".
Task 4 Fill out the MPL for "Bet on red in bag B".
Task 5 Choose between "Bet on blue in bag A" and "Bet on blue in bag B".
Task 6 Choose between "Bet on red in bag A" and "Bet on red in bag B".
Table 2.1 – Incentivized tasks
Valuation tasks (Tasks 1-4 in Table 2.1) are run before choice tasks (Tasks 5-6) 28. The
two types of tasks are performed one after the other. Indeed, in the literature on preference
reversals, there is a substantial number of works arguing that valuation tasks and choice
tasks call forth different heuristics and different cognitive processes 29 (see recently Loomes
and Pogrebna, 2016). Thus, I decide to not randomize between types of tasks to make the
experiment easy to understand and to avoid confusion. Similarly, since it is much more
straightforward to mentally represent risky prospects than ambiguous ones, the risky bag
is presented first in the instructions and the description of the ambiguous bag follows.
Then, when performing the tasks, the participant evaluates first the bets on blue/red in
bag A (Tasks 1 and 2) and second, the bets on blue/red in bag B (Tasks 3 and 4).
(2018). Cubitt et al. (2014) proposes an alternative but similar framework: the participants can freely
complete the choice-list but the computer program only accepts answers with a single switching point.
28. There is no particular agreement relative to the presentation order of tasks: for instance, in Maafi
(2011), participants answer valuation questions before choice questions whereas in Trautmann et al. (2011)
the participants perform choice tasks first.
29. Besides, Grether and Plott (1979) show that the presentation order between valuation and choice
tasks does not significantly influence the pattern of reversals under risk.
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2.2.2 Treatments
There are 5 different treatments for 5 different bags B. For the sake of clarity, these
5 distinct bags are labelled bag B1, bag B2, bag B3, bag B4, bag B5 in this chapter but
note that the partially ambiguous bag is always named bag B during the experimental
sessions. In each treatment, the participant faces only 2 bags: the risky bag (bag A) and
the ambiguous bag (bag B). The treatments differ in the number of draws contained in
the dataset describing the ambiguous bag. Indeed, different lengths of datasets correspond
to different degrees of information precision. One key feature of the design relies on the
symmetry of draws reported in the dataset: in each treatment, half of the draws are blue,
the other half being red. Since the alternative bag (bag A) contains as much blue balls
as red balls, the symmetry of draws in the dataset describing bag B greatly simplifies the
comparison of preferences for bets on the ambiguous bag B to the situation of objective
risk in bag A. Indeed, if initial beliefs on the composition of bag B are symmetric and if
the symmetry of draws implies the symmetry of revised beliefs, the comparison between
CEs depends only on the individual’s perception of ambiguity and his attitude towards
ambiguity.
Table 2.2 describes the different datasets associated to the 5 ambiguous bags. For
example, consider treatment 1: in this treatment, the subject is informed that 500 random
draws with replacement have been carried out in bag B. We have observed 250 blue balls
and 250 red balls. Depending on the treatment, the number of previous draws spans from
0 to 500 where the no-information treatment (treatment 5) mimics the classical Ellsberg’s
experiment and serves as a benchmark for the impact of information precision on ambiguity
perception.
2.2.3 Non-incentivized task
After the valuation and choice questions, an additional belief task is added to the
experiment: the subject is asked about his individual belief about the composition of the
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Treatment Bags
Dataset
Total number Blue Red
of draws (d) draws draws
1 B1 500 250 250
2 B2 50 25 25
3 B3 10 5 5
4 B4 2 1 1
5 B5 0 0 0
Table 2.2 – Number of draws describing the ambiguous bag
ambiguous bag. In particular, he has to explicitly report his estimation of the number of
blue balls in bag B. Then, he reports his lower and upper bounds for the proportion of blue
balls in the bag which provides a measure of his degree of confidence in his estimate 30.
This task allows to study the influence of precision of information on learning. Learning
occurs when the subjective estimates converge to the objective probabilities. In my frame-
work, given the symmetry of draws reported in the datasets, it is likely that respondents
state equal proportions for both colors. Moreover, increasing the number of observations
raises the precision of information which might lead the agent to behave as if he knew
the true composition of the bag in the limit. For instance, one might feel more confident
in one’s 50-50 probability judgment with the observation of 250 blue draws and 250 red
draws (treatment 1) than with the realization of 1 red draw and 1 blue draw (treatment 4).
Therefore, subjects belonging to the most informative treatments are expected to report
less dispersed estimates as compared to subjects in the less informative treatments. The
control group is given by the no-information treatment (treatment 5).
30. The questions are framed as follows: "In your opinion, how many blue balls are contained in bag B?
Indicate also your minimal estimate and your maximal estimate of blue balls contained in bag B.".
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2.2.4 Participants 31
The experiment was conducted at LEEP (Laboratoire d’Economie Expérimentale de
Paris 32) and consisted of 10 sessions in July, 2017. For each of the 5 treatments, 40 partic-
ipants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and no one was allowed to participate
in more than one treatment. None of the subjects had previously participated in a similar
economic experiment. 181 participants showed up and took part in the experiment: 60%
of them are female, ages vary between 18 and 77 (median age being 28), and half of them
have completed at least 3 years of higher education. Table 2.3 details the sample size and
the average gain by treatment (see also table 2.10 in Appendix B for additional figures on
participants). The experiment lasted about 50 minutes (including payment). The aver-
age payment amounts to 10.32e (including the 5e show-up fee), compared to the french
minimum hourly wage which is less than 7.60e in 2017.
Treatment Number of Average gainparticipants
1 37 10.55e
2 37 10.32e
3 34 10.02e
4 36 9.90e
5 37 10.56e
Total 181 10.32e
Table 2.3 – Sample size and average gain by treatment
2.2.5 Procedures
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-
Tree 33 (Fischbacher, 2007). No particular skill is required to participate, except the
31. I am grateful to undergraduate Economic students from the University of Cergy-Pontoise for their
participation to non-incentivized pilot sessions.
32. http://leep.univ-paris1.fr/accueil.htm. Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106 - 112 boulevard
de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris cedex 13.
33. http://www.ztree.uzh.ch/en.html
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understanding of french language. There is no time limit to answer the questions.
A typical session is structured as follows: after an oral presentation of the experiment 34,
the participant is asked to perform the 6 tasks using the computer in front of him. Then
the subject reaches the experimenter’s office for payment: one question of the experiment
is played for real according to the Prince incentive mechanism (see section 2.2.6). If the
preferred option is a sure amount, he receives the sure gain; if the preferred option is a
bet, he randomly draws one ball from the bag involved in the bet. Besides, the subject
may implement real draw in real bag in order to persuade him that the procedure is truly
not-manipulated by experimenters. The detailed script of the experiment is provided in
Appendix 2.A.2.
The experimental design is as follows: the participant is presented with only 2 different
bags. Both bags are fully described in the instructions so that when evaluating one bag,
the subject knows about the existence of the other. There are only 6 tasks to perform.
This short and easily understandable design allows mainly for between-subject analysis.
Regarding the technical aspects of the composition of the bags, bag A contains 50 blue
balls and 50 red balls as announced. The composition of bags B1-B4 follows from a 3-steps
program on MATLAB: first, I generate all the possible bags containing 100 (blue or red)
balls, this yields 101 different bags with composition ranging from (0 blue, 100 red), (1
blue, 99 red), ... to (100 blue, 0 red); second, I randomly draw d balls with replacement
from all the bags (d ∈ {2, 10, 50, 500}) and I keep the bags for which I obtain the dataset
with frequencies of interest, i.e., d/2 blue and d/2 red balls; third, for each d, I randomly
select one of these bags to be presented to the participants. Lastly, since no balls have
been drawn from bag B5, bag B5 is randomly drawn among the 101 possible bags. The
detailed bags composition is provided in Appendix B (Table 2.11).
34. See Appendix 2.A.1 for a full set of instructions.
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2.2.6 Incentives
One commonly known challenge of experimental economics lies in the choice of the
adequate method to incentivize decisions made in the laboratory. Studies usually in-
volve more than one decision and paying every choice results in wealth effects. Thus, in
most experiments, only one round is chosen by a specified random device at the end of
the experiment (ex post) and implemented for real. Such design, popularized by Savage
(1954) under the name Random-Incentive-System (RIS), produces valid results only if
participants consider each experimental decision in isolation (i.e., as a single real choice).
Otherwise, the method violates incentive-compatibility (IC). An experimental design is
said to be IC when it ensures that all participants act according to their true preferences.
Most experimental studies in the literature on decisions under uncertainty uses RIS,
often combined with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (1964), to elicit
preferences for ambiguous lotteries. However, these devices have been criticized for their
inability to motivate truthfull-telling for non-expected-utility maximizers. It has been
shown that BDM does not ensure IC in experiments involving risky lotteries (Karni and
Safra, 1987), and even in experiments involving non-random goods (Horowitz, 2006). Be-
sides, Bade (2015) argues that without the assumption of expected utility preferences,
a participant’s behavior in the RIS needs not reflect his behavior in single choice experi-
ments. The reason for this is that ambiguity-averse agents can use random device to hedge
across experimental tasks and hence may not act according to their true preferences. Bail-
lon et al. (2015) also demonstrate that usual implementations of the RIS yield violations
of IC for ambiguity-averse DMs. The underlying argument is that, in case of ex-post sit-
uation determination, agents may represent the choice problem as a meta-lottery, leading
to violations of isolation. They show how IC may be restored with a slight modification
of the device in which the randomization takes place before the decisions are made 35.
35. See also Oechssler and Roomets (2014) and Kuzmics (2017) for further discussions on hedging and
misclassifications of ambiguity-sensitive subjects in experiments.
65
I thus choose to incentivize the decisions in this experiment using the innovative Prince
mechanism proposed by Johnson et al. (2015). Compared to standard methods, this
mechanism allows to clarify consequences of decisions and makes IC completely transparent
to subjects. In concrete terms, this device relies on the following main features contained
in the acronym PRINCE:
"[...] (1) the choice question implemented for real is randomly selected PRior
to the experiment; (2) subjects’ answers are framed as INstructions to the
experimenter about the real choice to be implemented at the end; (3) the real
choice question is provided in a Concrete form, e.g., in a sealed envelope; (4)
the Entire choice situation, rather than only one choice option, is described in
that envelope." (Johnson et al., 2015, p.3)
Prince allows to overcome the inherent drawbacks of other standard techniques by
enhancing isolation between experimental tasks. Consequently, participants are ensured
that truthful revelation is in their best interest and the internal validity of the experiment is
improved. Finally, in an experiment, in which Johnson et al. (2015) elicit the Willingness-
to-Accept for a mug, Prince has been found to produce similar results under choice and
matching strategies. Here, I elicit the CE of several gambles which are more complex to
mentally represent than a concrete object such as a mug 36. Moreover, there is no empirical
evidence that both strategies are equivalent to estimate CE of lotteries under Prince. For
this reason and the ones surveyed in section 2.2.1, I chose to provide subjects with MPLs.
In my experiment, before performing the tasks, each subject receives a closed envelope
containing the question that will be implemented for real. Each question describes two
choice options (e.g., a lottery versus a certain amount of money, see Figure 2.1). The
goal of the participant is to obtain the most preferred option. For each session, there are
60 envelopes, numbered 1-60 in random order. Besides, each of the 6 tasks is associated
36. Proposing a matching strategy here is equivalent to asking subjects to determine the amount that
makes them indifferent between playing the lottery and receiving the amount for sure, which is not a
straightforward task.
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Type α
Option 1 :
Bet on
Blue in A
5e if Red50/100
15e if Blue50/100
Option 2 : 5.50e.
Figure 2.1 – An example of envelope content
to a type and referred to by a Greek letter, which helps improving and speeding up the
payment phase. There are 10 envelopes of each type (e.g., envelope contents of type α
correspond to the rows of the MPL of Task 1 37). Hence, each question of the experiment
is contained in one envelope at least. The type of the envelope remains secret until the
opening of the envelope. During the experimental session, all the possible contents of
envelopes are presented to the subjects. Each of these choices is made particularly salient
with the envelope at hand. The subject is informed about all the possible contents of the
envelopes in the experiment but does not know the content of his own in particular. At
the end of the session, the envelope is opened and the choice of the subject is performed
recalling the instructions he gave on the computer: If the preferred option was a sure
amount, the subject receives the sure gain; if the preferred option was a bet, he randomly
draws one ball from the bag involved in the bet and receives the gain associated with the
color of the drawn ball.
The rules of the experiment are made explicitly clear from the beginning of the ex-
periment: as soon as they get into the room, the participant is asked to sign a consent
form where it is specified that the gain is conditional upon the respect of the instructions
and especially upon the envelope remaining closed until the end of the experiment (See
Appendix 2.A.4). Moreover, to render the experiment completely transparent, the partici-
pant gets verification lists at the end of the session. These lists describe the contents of all
37. See the table in the instructions (p.82) for the complete list of the types of envelopes.
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the envelopes in the experiment and each participant can check that they were truthfully
described, avoiding deception (See Appendix 2.A.3).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Certainty Equivalents
Descriptive statistics on CEs are reported in table 2.4. As in all subsequent tables,
the numbers of draws describing the ambiguous bag (in parentheses) are listed next to
the treatment. N gives the sample size. In the following, the CE for the bet on blue
(red) in bag A is denoted CEA(blue) (CEA(red)) and similar notation applies for bag B.
Normal distributions of CEs cannot be rejected 38. However, whenever possible, I favour
nonparametrical analysis over parametrical tests because the sample sizes are relatively
small (less than 40 subjects in each treatment).
First, the experimental data do not provide evidence on substantial difference of val-
uation of bets depending on the color of the ball to be drawn. The differences between
the CEs in bag A and the CEs in bag B are not statistically significant (paired Wilcoxon
Signed-rank test 39, all p > .05), except for the treatment 5 where CEB(blue) differs sig-
nificantly from CEB(red) (paired Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, z = −1.970 and p = .0488).
Apart from treatment 1, the means and the medians of CEs on bag A are between
9 and 10 euros and are not significantly different from 10, which is the expected value
of the risky prospect (one-sample t-tests: all p > .05 and one-sample Wilcoxon tests: all
p > .05) 40. This finding suggests, on average, relative risk-neutrality for participants
38. I performed a series of statistical tests for normality of variables that preclude the rejection of the null
hypothesis that CEs are drawn from a normal distribution: Shapiro-Wilk (all p > .05), Shapiro-Francia
(all p > .05 except for CEA(blue) in treatment 2: z = 1.667 and p = 0.04779), Jarque-Bera (all p > .05).
39. Under the assumptions that (1) data are paired and come from the same population, (2) paired
observations are independent and (3) paired differences can be ranked, the paired Wilcoxon-Signed rank
test (non-parametric) tests the null hypothesis that the median of the paired differences is zero.
40. Under the assumption of the variables being approximately normally distributed, the one-sample
t-test is used to test the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to 10. In the absence of such normal
pattern, one-sample Wilcoxon test allows to test the hypothesis of equality of median with 10.
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Treatment
1 (500) 2 (50) 3 (10) 4 (2) 5 (0)
N = 37 N = 37 N = 34 N = 36 N = 37
Bag A (risky)
CEA(blue) mean 10.84 9.76 9.86 9.58 9.95
med 10 10 10 10 9
var 7.08 7.13 7.28 7.91 9.83
std 2.66 2.67 2.70 2.81 3.14
CEA(red) mean 10.54 9.51 9.24 9.78 9.73
med 10 10 9.5 10 10
var 7.81 6.26 8.37 6.92 8.70
std 2.79 2.50 2.89 2.63 2.95
Bag B (ambiguous)
CEB(blue) mean 10.32 9.68 9.44 9.36 9.21
med 10 10 10 9 9
var 8.95 5.95 11.10 7.89 7.73
std 2.99 2.44 3.33 2.81 2.78
CEB(red) mean 10.57 9.27 9.29 9.31 9.95
med 10 10 9 9.5 10
var 7.53 6.09 8.82 5.99 7.72
std 2.74 2.47 2.97 2.45 2.78
Table 2.4 – CEs - Descriptive statistics
Note: med, var and std stand for median, variance and standard deviations, respec-
tively.
in treatments 2-5. In treatment 1, CEA(blue) differs significantly from 10 (one-sample
Wilcoxon, z = 1.99, p = .0458) but the null hypothesis of equality of mean with 10 cannot
be rejected with a one-sample t-test (p > .05). Identical analysis on CEA(red) suggests
that it is not significantly different from 10.
Figure 2.2 depicts the proportions of choices in favour of the sure gain in bag A and
in bag B. It shows that the percentage choosing the sure gain falls as the sure amount
increases. There is little graphical evidence of stochastic dominance of one distribution over
the other. Indeed, for each treatment, the differences between CEA(blue) and CEB(blue)
are not statistically significant (Wilcoxon-Signed rank test: all p > .05). The same results
apply for the differences between CEA(red) and CEB(red). These findings are summarized
in Result 1.
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Figure 2.2 – Proportions of choices in favour of the sure amount, by treatment
Note: bag A (solid line) versus bag B (dashed line). x-axis: sure amount, y-axis: percentage of respondents.
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Result 1 Within treatments, for both color bets, there is no significant difference between
the valuation of bets on the risky bag and the valuation of bets on the ambiguous bag.
This result is in line with Maafi’s (2011) study of preference reversals in Ellsberg’s
two-color framework. My design is closely related to a particular condition in her experi-
ment where the probability of winning from the risky urn equals .5 while the probability
of winning from the ambiguous urn is unknown (Maafi, 2011: $-bet of Pair V in Table
1). In case of success, the participant wins 12e (+ 5e of show-up fee) and 0e (+ 5e)
otherwise, which is similar to the stakes in my experiment. The Willingness-To-Accept for
both bets is not significantly different and is close to the Expected Value of the risky urn,
as reported in the present chapter with CE measurements. Maafi’s analysis falls within
the framework of Prospect Theory due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992), and she
argues that her results may be due to the particular form of the probability-weighting
function, which is S-shaped and has an inflexion point in the middle region. According to
this explanation, while DMs tend to overweigh small probabilities and underweigh large
probabilities, they are relatively insensitive to probability changes in the middle zone. This
implies ambiguity-aversion for likely-events and ambiguity-loving for rare events, whereas
DMs exhibit ambiguity-neutrality for the events that are assigned intermediate probabil-
ities of occurrence. This explains hence that the risky and the ambiguous prospects are
valued almost equally.
Between treatments, the valuation of the bet on blue in the ambiguous bag is increasing
in the number of observations describing the bag. This is in line with the intuition that
more information renders the bet more attractive. The valuation of the bet on red does not
exhibit such trend. However, Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) tests 41 suggest that, for both bets,
the CE differences between treatments is statistically insignificant (all p > .05). Moreover,
the dispersion of the results across treatments is never statistically significant according
41. Under the assumptions that the observations across groups are independent and that the scale of
measurement is at least ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test (non-parametric) tests the null hypothesis that
the medians of all groups are equal.
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to a Levene’s test 42 (all p > .05). This yields to formulate Result 2.
Result 2 Between treatments, more information does not induce agents to value signifi-
cantly more the ambiguous bet.
This is confirmed by the analysis of the difference between the CEs for the bets on
blue and the difference between the CEs for the bets on red in the risky bag and in the
ambiguous bag. Table 2.5 provides descriptive statistics of both differences (histograms
are plotted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 in Appendix B).
Treatment
1 (500) 2 (50) 3 (10) 4 (2) 5 (0)
N = 37 N = 37 N = 34 N = 36 N = 37
CEA(blue)− CEB(blue) mean 0.51 0.08 0.41 0.22 0.73
med 0 0 0 0 0
var 4.98 6.47 12.01 4.98 14.65
std 2.64 2.54 3.47 2.23 3.82
CEA(red)− CEB(red) mean -0.03 0.24 -0.06 0.47 -0.22
med 0 0 0 0 0
var 4.42 5.19 7.39 3.80 10.23
std 2.10 2.28 2.72 1.95 3.20
Table 2.5 – CE differences - Descriptive statistics
Note: med, var and std stand for median, variance and standard deviations, respectively.
Since CEs lie in the interval [5; 15], the differences can take values from -10 to 10. As
explained previously, the experimental design allows to examine agent’s attitude towards
ambiguity by directly comparing the CEs in both bags because: (i) bag A contains as
much blue balls as red balls, and (ii) the symmetry of draws in the datasets describing
bag B should induce the symmetry of beliefs. Hence, positive differences are associated
to ambiguity-averse preferences (henceforth denoted CE-ambiguity-aversion) and negative
differences reflect ambiguity-loving preferences (CE-ambiguity-loving). All means and me-
dians are not significantly different from 0 (one-sample t-tests: all p > .05, one-sample
42. Under the following assumptions: (1) observations across groups are independent, (2) the scale of
measurement is at least ordinal and (3) the samples are approximately normally distributed, the Levene’s
test (parametric) tests the null hypothesis of equality of sample variances (homoscedasticity).
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Wilcoxon tests: all p > .05). Moreover, for both colors, I cannot reject the hypothesis
that all differences originate from the same distribution (K-W tests: all p > .05). At last,
although one would have expected more dispersion among the less informative treatments,
this is not supported by experimental data since the variances do not significantly differ
across treatments according to Levene’s tests (all p > .05).
2.3.2 Direct choices
Table 2.6 reports the decisions of subjects in the direct-choice tasks.
Treatment
1 (500) 2 (50) 3 (10) 4 (2) 5 (0) Total
N = 37 N = 37 N = 34 N = 36 N = 37 N = 181
Bet on blue
Bag A (risky) 76 65 71 61 73 69
Bag B (ambiguous) 24 35 29 39 27 31
Bet on red
Bag A (risky) 70 78 79 75 81 77
Bag B (ambiguous) 30 22 21 25 19 23
Bet on blue and on red
Bag A (risky) 59 59 65 52 68 61
Bag B (ambiguous) 14 16 15 17 14 15
Table 2.6 – Direct choices (in %)
To bet on a particular color, there are, on average, more than 2/3 of subjects that
prefer the risky bag over the ambiguous one. When combining the two direct choices,
61% of participants exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior and prefer the risky bag for both bets
(henceforth denoted choice-ambiguity-aversion). This is even more salient in the no-
information treatment where the share of ambiguity-averse agents is maximum (68%),
although the differences between treatments are not statistically significant (K-W test:
p > .05). This finding is in line with the experimental evidence on Ellsberg-type problems.
Oechssler and Roomets (2015) surveyed 40 Ellsberg’s experiments and they report that,
on average, slightly more than half of subjects are classified as ambiguity averse.
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On the other hand, there is little evidence of choice-ambiguity-loving in my experiment
since, on average, only 15% of subjects choose the ambiguous bag twice. The remaining
subjects (24%) whose preferences switched from one bag to the other are classified as
ambiguity-neutral. These effects are summarized in Result 3.
Result 3 In all treatments, the majority of subjects exhibit Ellsberg-type preferences by
preferring the risky bag to the ambiguous bag to bet on both colors.
Hence, the information on the ambiguous bag does not allow to remove the Ellsberg
paradox from the analysis of patterns of preferences as ambiguity-aversion is the behavior
most often reported in all information conditions. I report ambiguity-averse preferences
when subjects are comparing the bets (Result 3), but the valuations are not significantly
different when prospects are priced in isolation (Result 2). Therefore, choice-ambiguity-
aversion seems to be an unstable trait of preferences since it does not translate into CE-
ambiguity-aversion. One rationale for this finding can be found in Ariely et al. (2003)
argument that subjects’ absolute valuations of goods are arbitrary and manipulable. In my
experiment, DMs may have a hard time pricing gambles in isolation whereas comparative
tasks might be easier to deal with. Henceforth, the Ellsberg paradox prevails especially
when the DM directly expresses preferences between risky and ambiguous prospects.
2.3.3 Preference reversals
For each color bet, two types of preference reversals can occur: either bag A is preferred
to bag B but the value attributed to the bet on bag B exceeds the value associated with
the bet on bag A (choice-ambiguity-aversion and CE-ambiguity-loving), or the converse,
i.e., when bag B is preferred to bag A but the value attributed to the bet on bag A exceeds
the value associated with the bet on bag B (choice-ambiguity-loving and CE-ambiguity-
aversion). Table 2.7 reports the proportions of choices that reverse preferences.
As it has been previously found in Trautmann et al. (2011) with WTP measurements,
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Treatment
1 (500) 2 (50) 3 (10) 4 (2) 5 (0) Total
N = 37 N = 37 N = 34 N = 36 N = 37 N = 181
Choice-ambiguity-aversion and CE-ambiguity-loving
Blue 14 8 15 17 27 16
Red 16 19 26 14 22 19
Total 15 14 19 15 24 17
Choice-ambiguity-loving and CE-ambiguity-aversion
Blue 11 5 6 19 5 9
Red 5 5 3 8 3 5
Total 8 5 4 14 4 7
Table 2.7 – Preference reversals (in %)
I report more preference reversals that result from the combination of choice-ambiguity-
aversion and CE-ambiguity-loving (17%) than choice-ambiguity-loving and CE-ambiguity-
aversion (7%). In particular, the results of their Experiment 4 can be compared to the
control group (treatment 5): in their experiment, the agents consider one risky bag con-
taining half winning chips and one ambiguous bag with unknown composition. The gamble
consists in choosing the color on which to bet for the ball to be drawn from the bag, and the
individual valuation for the bet is given by a CE measurement. They observe a majority
of ambiguity-averse subjects (2/3 of subjects prefer the risky bag to bet on the color of a
random draw). However, they find no credible evidence of preference inconsistencies with
CE estimations (8%), whereas 28% of subjects reverse preferences in my no-information
condition. Moreover, in my experiment, when more information is provided about the am-
biguous bag, the frequency of preference reversals tends to decrease without disappearing,
although the differences between treatments do not reach statistical significance (K-W
tests: all p > .05). This yields to formulate Result 4.
Result 4 In all treatments, a small but statistically significant share of subjects exhibit
preference reversals with CE measurements.
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2.3.4 Estimates on the composition of the ambiguous bag
Descriptive statistics of the individual beliefs of the balls’ proportions are reported
in Table 2.8 (histograms are plotted in Figures 2.5-2.7 in Appendix B). The individ-
ual estimate (Estim_Blue) is bounded by a lower limit (Min_Blue) and an upper limit
(Max_Blue), all reported by the participant. The estimates are not significantly different
from 50 (one-sample Wilcoxon tests: all p > .05) and not different across treatments (K-W
test: p > .05).
Treatment
1 (500) 2 (50) 3 (10) 4 (2) 5 (0)
N = 37 N = 37 N = 34 N = 36 N = 37
Min_Blue mean 38.3 26.8 26.5 24.6 28.3
med 40 25 25 27.5 30
var 464.4 130.8 263.2 300.8 361.2
std 21.6 11.4 16.2 17.3 19.0
Estim_Blue mean 53.5 46.2 51.7 47.5 51.5
med 50 50 50 50 50
var 440.7 265.8 405.3 492.1 308.2
std 21.0 16.3 20.1 22.2 17.6
Max_Blue mean 63.4 57.7 64.5 60.5 68.1
med 60 60 60 60 65
var 529.4 358.2 382.1 567.3 643.2
std 23.0 18.9 19.6 23.8 25.4
Table 2.8 – Estimates and limit bounds of the number of blue balls in bag
B - Descriptive statistics
Note: med, var and std stand for median, variance and standard deviations, respectively.
On average, the mean of the lower bounds is the highest in the most informative
condition (treatment 1) and exceeds the mean in the control group by 10 points (K-
W test: p > .05). Regarding the upper bounds, the difference between the means of
treatment 1 and treatment 5 is weaker and equals -4.7 points (K-W test: p > .05).
Moreover, I measure the size of the range of beliefs (dispersion) by calculating the difference
between the limit bounds: Max_Blue - Min_Blue. Descriptive statistics are reported in
Table 2.9. As expected, the difference is the largest in the control group (treatment
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5) and the weakest in the treatment 1 43. This denotes higher confidence in the 50-50
belief regarding the composition of the bag in the most-informative condition than in the
less-informative treatments although the differences between all treatments do not reach
statistical significance (K-W test: p > .05).
Treatment
1 (500) 2 (50) 3 (10) 4 (2) 5 (0)
N = 37 N = 37 N = 34 N = 36 N = 37
mean 25.1 30.9 38 35.9 39.8
med 20 25 37.5 30 40
var 557.15 609.0 263.2 775.1 850.7
std 23.6 21.8 24.7 27.8 29.2
Table 2.9 – Difference between Max_Blue and Min_Blue
Note: med, var and std stand for median, variance and standard de-
viations, respectively.
This result can be related to Nicholls et al. (2015) who observe statistical learning in
a 3-colors urn framework. Their urn contained 60 blue, 20 red and 20 yellow balls. In the
absence of information, the respondents of the control group report roughly equal propor-
tions for all colors (36-33-31 respectively, on average), whereas answers of participants who
receive statistical feedback (54-25-21) converge to the true proportions. In my experiment,
the subjects of the control group report 50-50 probability judgment as a reflection of their
ignorance. This prior is confirmed by the information and as the number of draws rises,
the size of the range of beliefs decreases which suggests that subjects feel more confident
about their estimation. These findings are summarized in Result 5.
Result 5 Increasing the precision of information tends to reduce the dispersion of beliefs
on the composition of the ambiguous bag (without reaching statistical significance).
43. According to (two-sample) K-W tests, the differences between dispersions are statistically significant
at the 5% level for treatment 1 and treatment 5 and for treatment 1 and treatment 3, at the 10% level for
treatment 1 and treatment 4, and not significant for treatment 1 and treatment 2.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I present an experiment designed to measure the effect of information
precision on ambiguity attitudes and preference reversals. To this end, subjects are pro-
vided with sets of observations that inform on the ambiguous alternative. The informative
signals differ within only one attribute: their precision (the number of observations varies
across treatments), while the reported frequencies are kept constant.
Although most subjects exhibit Ellsberg-type preferences (Result 3), the valuations
of the risky and ambiguous prospects do not differ significantly (Result 1), suggesting
only weak ambiguity-aversion. An alternative explanation might be that DMs experience
difficulties to provide absolute valuation for prospects whereas comparing alternatives is
an easier task. Moreover, I did not find evidence that increasing the information precision
increases the attractiveness of the ambiguous prospect (Result 2) although respondents
seem to feel more confident in their estimation as the number of observations rises (Result
5). Finally, contrary to what was found by Trautmann et al. (2011), preference reversals
are not eliminated even when using CE estimations (Result 4).
Several tests reported in this experiment do not provide statistically significant results.
This has to be seen in the context of the small sample sizes of each treatment. Therefore, it
may be worthwhile to conduct additional experiments with a larger pool of participants to
gain further insights into the link between information precision and ambiguity attitudes.
Moreover, the increase of information considered here is not valuable for frequentist DMs.
Indeed, a frequentist is indifferent between any two datasets with different precision but
identical frequencies. Therefore, the study of the relation between ambiguity perception
and the informativeness of signals that differ within the two attributes (precision and
frequencies) might exhibit different and more significant effects. This question will be
addressed in Chapter 3.
78
Appendix
2.A Supplementary material for the experiment
2.A.1 Instructions (Treatment 1, translated from French)
Note: The sentences in brackets are not included in the instructions but inform the
reader on the moment an action is performed.
— Start of Instructions —
Hello everybody, and thank you for accepting our invitation to participate in this
experiment. My name is Roxane Bricet and I am working at the Economics lab of the
University of Cergy-Pontoise. I am going to briefly present the outline of the experiment,
please pay close attention to this short presentation.
First, some important rules which must be respected: It is important that the experi-
ment takes place in silence, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants.
The use of mobile phones and calculators is forbidden. No particular preliminary knowl-
edge is needed to participate. As soon as the experiment starts, if you have any questions,
please raise your hand and I will assist you.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
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What do we do?
You are going to participate in an economic experiment on decision theory.
In this experiment, there are two opaque bags, A and B, each containing 100 balls. These
balls can be either blue or red.
The composition of bag A is perfectly known. It contains exactly 50 blue balls and 50
red balls.
The composition of bag B is not known. However, partial information on the content
of this bag is provided. Indeed, we have randomly drawn one ball from bag B and reported
its color, then we have replaced it in bag B. This operation has been replicated 500 times
and we have observed: 250 blue balls and 250 red balls. [This phrase was adjusted to
reflect the information in the specific treatment (2, 3 and 4). In treatment 5, the last
sentences are replaced by: "The composition of bag B is unknown.".]
Note that nothing indicate that bag B contains as many blue balls as red balls!
The gambles:
During the experiment, you will be asked to consider gambles on bags A and B. Here is
an example of gamble on bag A:
You are going to proceed to draw a ball at random from bag A. If the color of the ball
is blue, you win 15e, if the ball is red you win 5e.
The composition of bag A being known, these gambles are presented in the following
way:
Bet on
Blue in A
15 e if Blue50/100
5 e if Red50/100
In other words, since 50 of 100 balls contained in bag A are blue, you have a chance of 50
out of 100 to win 15 e and a chance of 50 out of 100 to win 5 e.
80
Here is an example of a gamble on bag B:
You are going to proceed to draw a ball at random from bag B. If the color of the ball
is blue, you win 15e, if the ball is red you win 5e.
The composition of bag B being unknown, these gambles are presented in the following
way:
Bet on
Blue in B
15 e if Blue?/100
5 e if Red?/100
The envelopes:
Before the beginning of the experiment, each of you will receive a closed envelope. Each
envelope contains two options. These options differ across the envelopes. Your goal is to
tell us which of the two options you prefer for each envelope in the experiment. At the end
of the experiment, you will be rewarded depending on the content of your own envelope
and your choices of options.
Important: There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this experiment, it is only a matter
of preferences.
Here are some examples of envelope content:
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In concrete terms, there are 6 types of envelopes: type α (alpha), type β (beta), type
γ (gamma), type δ, type  and type φ (phi), corresponding to 6 different questions.
The options contained in the different types of envelopes are given in the following
table:
envelopes option 1 option 2
α bet on Blue in A xe
β bet on Red in A xe
γ bet on Blue in B xe
δ bet on Red in B xe
φ bet on Blue in A bet on Blue in B
 bet on Red in A bet on Red in B
During the experiment, the contents of the envelopes will be presented to you as follows:
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This is the message contained in the envelopes of type alpha. Option 1 corresponds
to the bet on the draw of a blue ball from bag A. If you draw a blue ball, you win 15e, if
you draw a red ball, you win 5e. Option 2 corresponds to a sure amount x in euros.
For each amount x, tell us which of the 2 options you prefer. To this end, fill out the
following table. In this table, each line describes the content of an envelope.
The filling of this table is automated. When you tick a box of a line of the table, option
1 is automatically ticked for the lines above and option 2 is automatically ticked for the
lines below.
Thus, it is enough for you to tick a single box of the table to fill out every lines of the
table.
Indeed, if for the first line of the table you choose option 1 "Bet on Blue in A", tick
option 1 on the first line of the table. Then, option 2 will be automatically ticked for the
rest of the decisions, that is to say for the lines 2 to 10. If for the first line of the table,
you choose option 2 "5.50e", tick option 2 on the first line of the table. Then, option 2
will be automatically ticked for the rest of the decisions, that is to say for the lines 2 to
10. [Each pattern of answers described in the instructions is illustrated with an example
of a filled table.]
You may also choose option 1 for the second line of the table. In this case, tick option
1 on the second line of the table. Option 1 will be automatically ticked for the line 1
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of the table, and option 2 will be automatically ticked for the lines 3 to 10 of the table.
Otherwise, you may choose option 2 for the second line of the table. In this case, tick
option 2 on the second line of the table. Option 1 will be automatically ticked for the line
1 of the table, and the option 2 will be automatically ticked for the lines 3 to 10 of the
table.
Again, you may choose option 1 for the third line of the table. In this case, tick option
1 on the third line of the table. Option 1 will be automatically ticked for the lines 1 and
2 of the table, and option 2 will be automatically ticked for the lines 4 to 10 of the table.
Otherwise, you may choose option 2 for the third line of the table. In this case, tick option
2 on the third line of the table. Option 1 will be automatically ticked for the lines 1 and
2 of the table, and option 2 will be automatically ticked for the lines 4 to 10 of the table.
And so on until the end of the table. You can choose option 1 for the tenth line of
the table. In this case, tick option 1 on the tenth line of the table. Option 1 will be
automatically ticked for the rest of the decisions, that is to say for the lines 1 to 9.
Note that you can revise your choice as many times as needed before confirming your
choice and proceeding to the following question.
There are 60 envelopes, 10 of each type.
These envelopes are numbered from 1 to 60. Three of you are now asked to check their
numbering.
With this established, I am going to walk among you and each of you will randomly
draw one of the envelopes.
DO NOT OPEN YOUR ENVELOPE!
Anyone who opens his envelope will be immediately excluded from the experiment and
will not receive any financial reward.
Your payment:
In this experiment, the minimum gain is 5 euros and the maximum gain is 15 euros.
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Reminder: There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this experiment, it is only a
matter of preferences.
Plan of the experiment:
In practice, you will answer the questions of the experiment using the computer in front
of you.
First, you will be asked some comprehension questions to check your understanding of
the instructions. Your answers to these questions do not affect your payment.
Then, the experiment on your choices of options will start. The experiment consists
of 6 successive screens for the 6 types of envelopes (6 types of different questions).
Finally, you will be asked to fill out a short complementary questionnaire to get to
know you better. Your answers to these questions do not affect your payment.
The last screen will invite you to reach the experimenter’s office to proceed to the
payment.
In the office of the experimenter:
I will open the envelope in front of you and I will just implement what you chose during
the session. If the option chosen during the session is a bet: you will proceed to draw a
ball at random from the bag involved in the bet. If the drawn ball matches the winning
color, you win 15e; otherwise, you only win 5e. If the option is a sure amount x: you get
the xe gain.
Because you do not know the content of your envelope and because I will implement
your choices, it is in your best interest to tell us your preferred option at each question.
Indeed, if you tell us what you want, your preferred option will be the one implemented!
Verification:
At the end of the experiment, you will get a list describing the contents of all envelopes.
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This list describes the content of each envelope: number of the envelope, type of the
envelope, option 1, option 2.
You will then check that our description of the numbered envelopes was truthful.
You will also be able to check that the list does contain the 6 mentioned tasks.
Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, henceforth, feel free to
answer as you like. Moreover, there is no time limit, so take all the time you need to read
the instructions and answer the questions.
Do you have any questions?
If everything is clear, you can now start the experiment!
— End of Instructions —
2.A.2 Detailed script
0. Preliminaries: The 60 envelopes are grouped in 20-tuples (1-20; 21-40; 41-60). The
envelopes and the opaque bags A and B are placed on the table in the front of the
room.
1. The participants are welcome at the doorstep of the lab. Before entering the room,
they randomly pick a number that determines where they sit in the room. They are
also asked to sign a participation consent before the start of the session.
2. The experimenter gives the instructions in the form of an oral presentation with
slides. At the relevant points during the explanations:
— The bags A and B are showed.
— Each 20-tuple of envelopes is checked for the presence of every number by a
volunteering subject, and then thrown into an opaque bag. Each participant
then randomly picks one envelope from the bag.
3. Computerized: The participants are asked to answer a short comprehension test to
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check their understanding of the experiment. No one can reach the next stage before
everybody has answered correctly.
4. Computerized: The participants perform the 6 tasks of the experiment.
5. Computerized: Stage 5 consists of filling out a short complementary questionnaire.
This form consists of:
— individual estimations of the composition of bag B;
— socio-demographic variables: sex, age, level of education.
6. When they are done, the participants reach the office of the experimenter. The
payment phase proceeds individually:
6.1 The experimenter opens the envelope of the subject and reads aloud the note
contained inside.
6.2 The experimenter recalls the answer of the participant via the computerized
experimental data collection.
6.3 The option chosen by the participant is implemented: if it is a sure amount, the
participant gets the sure gain; if it is a bet in a bag, the participant proceeds
to draw a ball at random from the bag in question.
6.4 The participant receives the corresponding payment and signs a receipt.
6.5 The participant gets the verification lists describing all envelopes in order to
check that the envelopes were truthfully described.
7. The participants leave the room.
2.A.3 Verification lists (Treatment 1, session 1)
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List of envelopes by type
Envelope nr. Type Option 1 Option 2
45 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 5.50 e
57 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 6.50 e
24 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 7.50 e
1 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 8.50 e
28 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 9.50 e
16 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 10.50 e
32 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 11.50 e
41 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 12.50 e
27 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 13.50 e
25 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 14.50 e
58 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 5.50 e
59 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 6.50 e
26 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 7.50 e
29 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 8.50 e
17 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 9.50 e
18 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 10.50 e
13 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 11.50 e
30 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 12.50 e
39 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 13.50 e
14 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 14.50 e
3 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 5.50 e
11 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 6.50 e
20 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 7.50 e
5 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 8.50 e
42 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 9.50 e
36 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 10.50 e
22 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 11.50 e
7 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 12.50 e
40 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 13.50 e
44 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 14.50 e
49 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 5.50 e
50 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 6.50 e
4 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 7.50 e
31 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 8.50 e
46 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 9.50 e
55 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 10.50 e
34 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 11.50 e
23 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 12.50 e
8 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 13.50 e
21 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 14.50 e
38 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
54 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
12 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
43 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
47 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
6 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
35 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
60 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
53 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
2 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
10 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
52 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
56 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
48 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
19 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
51 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
15 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
33 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
9 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
37 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
List of envelopes by number
Envelope nr. Type Option 1 Option 2
1 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 8.50 e
2 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
3 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 5.50 e
4 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 7.50 e
5 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 8.50 e
6 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
7 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 12.50 e
8 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 13.50 e
9 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
10 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
11 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 6.50 e
12 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
13 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 11.50 e
14 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 14.50 e
15 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
16 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 10.50 e
17 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 9.50 e
18 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 10.50 e
19 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
20 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 7.50 e
21 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 14.50 e
22 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 11.50 e
23 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 12.50 e
24 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 7.50 e
25 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 14.50 e
26 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 7.50 e
27 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 13.50 e
28 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 9.50 e
29 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 8.50 e
30 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 12.50 e
31 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 8.50 e
32 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 11.50 e
33 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
34 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 11.50 e
35 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
36 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 10.50 e
37 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
38 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
39 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 13.50 e
40 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 13.50 e
41 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 12.50 e
42 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 9.50 e
43 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
44 Type γ (gamma) Bet on Blue in B 14.50 e
45 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 5.50 e
46 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 9.50 e
47 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
48 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
49 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 5.50 e
50 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 6.50 e
51 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
52 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
53 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
54 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
55 Type δ (delta) Bet on Red in B 10.50 e
56 Type θ (theta) Bet on Red in A Bet on Red in B
57 Type α (alpha) Bet on Blue in A 6.50 e
58 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 5.50 e
59 Type β (bêta) Bet on Red in A 6.50 e
60 Type  (epsilon) Bet on Blue in A Bet on Blue in B
2.A.4 Participation consent form
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2.B Complementary tables and figures
Treatment Female Age Education
1 54% 26 3 years
2 65% 27 3 years
3 53% 25 2 years
4 72% 31.5 3 years
5 59% 30 3 years
Table 2.10 – Socio-demographic variables
Note: Age and Education correspond to median
values. Education stands for the number of com-
pleted years in higher education.
Treatment Bag Draws Bag compositionTotal Blue Red Blue Red
1 B1 500 250 250 47 53
2 B2 50 25 25 43 57
3 B3 10 5 5 38 62
4 B4 2 1 1 10 90
5 B5 0 0 0 90 10
Table 2.11 – Bags composition
Note: See Section 2.2.5 for the description of the procedure.
Lecture: Participants of treatment 1 are informed that 500 balls have been randomly
drawn with replacement from bag B1, 250 were blue and 250 were red (public infor-
mation). The bag B1 contains actually 47 blue balls and 53 red balls (non-public
information).
91
Figure 2.3 – Histograms of the differences between CEs on blue (CEA(blue)− CEB(blue)),
by treatment 92
Figure 2.4 – Histograms of the differences between CEs on red (CEA(red)− CEB(red)),
by treatment 93
Figure 2.5 – Histograms of the estimates on the proportion of blue balls in the ambiguous
bag, by treatment 94
Figure 2.6 – Histograms of the estimates on the proportion of blue balls in the ambiguous
bag, by treatment 95
Figure 2.7 – Histograms of the estimates on the proportion of blue balls in the ambiguous
bag, by treatment 96


Chapter 3
The value of instrumental
information
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
In most decision situations, the available information is insufficient to allow agents to
predict the outcome of an action with full confidence. However, a Decision Maker (hence-
forth, DM) who can observe statistical information in the form of data generated by the
true probabilities will become increasingly confident in his personal estimates. Hence,
subjective beliefs may converge to objective probabilities through statistical learning. In
this chapter, I focus on the subsequent question: How do agents value instrumental infor-
mation?
While statistical observations are theoretically not valuable for simple risky prospects
(e.g., betting on the result of the toss of a fair coin), it might inform decisions under
compound risk. Consider the decision situation in which the state of the world is unknown
but drawn from a known and well-defined distribution function. For instance, suppose that
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you have to bet on the result of the toss of a coin which is chosen uniformly at random
between a fair one and a biased coin that comes up tails with objective probability 9/10.
Since data collection might inform on the true state of the world (the coin that is tossed),
the value of information under compound risk is a worthwhile question. However, empirical
evidence on the valuation of informative signals in such risky framework is missing.
As opposed to risk, a decision situation is characterized by ambiguity when the agents
are not able to derive a unique and additive probability measurement from the informa-
tional context (Knight, 1921). This is the case when the probability distribution over the
states of the world cannot be inferred from the available data. Suppose, for instance, that
you are asked to bet on the result of the toss of a coin but now, you have no clue on
the fairness of the coin. While the study of choice under ambiguity has been one of the
main topics in decision theory over the last decades, the related question of the value of
information that mitigates or resolves ambiguity has attracted seemingly less attention.
Therefore, this chapter is intended to further investigate how DMs value instrumental
information under uncertain decision contexts — the word ’uncertainty’ is used, here, as
a general concept that encompasses both compound risk and ambiguity. To answer this
research question, I provide an operational experimental design which allows to estimate
the reservation price of agents for informative signals on the objective probability structure
of uncertain prospects. Discriminating between different relevant signals requires the
definition of a sorting criterion depending on their informativeness. This is provided by
Blackwell’s (1951, 1953) seminal papers in which he proposes a ranking of information
structures independent of beliefs. According to his equivalence result, experiment I (i.e.,
a sampling procedure) is more "Blackwell-informative" than experiment II if the former
is more valuable than the latter for all expected-utility maximizers. Li and Zhou (2016)
extend Blackwell’s equivalence result to a general class of ambiguity-averse preferences. It
can be inferred from their analysis that both ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-loving DMs
should place higher value on informative data as its degree of informativeness increases.
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This chapter aims at improving understanding about the pricing of informative signals by
ambiguity-sensitive agents. For ambiguity-neutral DMs who behave in accordance with
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory, it provides also experimental assessments of
the Blackwell result, which lacks empirical evidence.
The main contribution of this research is to provide a unified Blackwell’s experimental
framework to measure the value of information in uncertain settings. Next, the effect of
the informativeness on the value of the signal can be estimated and examined in the light
of Blackwell equivalence result and its extension. With my design, it is also possible to
gain insight into the link between the value of information and ambiguity attitudes, which
has not been addressed in the literature so far to the best of my knowledge. At last, this
research is conducted in a model-free set-up. Since I do not restrain the analysis to a
particular class of non-EU preferences, it provides a general testing context.
The design proposed here is an extension of Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color experiment
when samples of draws with replacement are available. In a laboratory experiment, the
subject is asked to consider gambles on three different urns containing 100 (blue or red)
balls each. The first urn contains 50 blue and 50 red balls (simple risk); the number of
blue balls in the second urn is uniformly distributed between 0 and 100 (compound risk);
the composition of the third urn cannot be deduced from an objective distribution func-
tion (ambiguity). The gambles offer the participant to bet on his preferred color without
information (for all urns) and with information (for the last two urns). Especially, the
Certainty Equivalents (CEs) are estimated for different number of random draws, where
weakly-informative signals contain small number of draws and highly-informative signals
consist of large number of draws. This design intends to simulate a realistic process of
accumulation of information. The first urn serves as a benchmark: it allows to distin-
guish between attitudes toward risk and ambiguity and to study agents’ ability to reduce
compound lotteries. While controlling for ambiguity attitudes, this design enables ex-
perimental assessments of: (i) the value attributed to informative signals and (ii) the
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individual ranking of signals of different informativeness. One key feature of the design
relies on the sequence of the bet: the subject is asked to announce his signal-contingent
strategy before observing the draws. Indeed, Li et al.’s (2016) statement requires full
commitment to hold. It is motivated by the fact that an ambiguity-averse DM might be
dynamically inconsistent and the inner conflict between ex-ante and ex-post preferences
could make him reject information in the absence of commitment (Siniscalchi, 2011).
The novelty of the approach also lies in the payment procedure: the choices of partic-
ipants are incentivized according to the Prince mechanism, recently proposed by Johnson
et al. (2015). Therefore, I depart from the related literature that incentivizes decisions with
the standard techniques (Random-Incentive-System, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak) even
though these mechanisms have been criticized for their inability to induce truthful revela-
tion of preferences in ambiguous contexts (see, e.g., Bade, 2015; Baillon et al., 2015). The
features of Prince allow to overcome inherent drawbacks of other techniques and, thus,
ensure incentive-compatibility of experimental choice questions.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Related literature is reviewed next.
Section 3.2 presents the experimental design. Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical back-
ground and its requirements. Section 3.4 concludes. Appendix 3.A explains how the
described signals can be compared with respect to their informativeness in Blackwell’s
sense. Appendix 3.B displays a full set of the instructions of the experiment.
3.1.2 Related literature
Marinacci (1999) presents a relevant mathematical framework for learning under am-
biguity and derives a Law of Large Number that applies to non-additive probabilities in
the context of capacities. In 2002, he studies the particular case of learning by sampling
with replacement from the same ambiguous urn and shows that ambiguity resolves asymp-
totically. Most recently, Marinacci and Massari (2017) generalize the previous result to
the case in which the DM have misspecified prior beliefs over the decision problem and
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they prove that ambiguity may still fade away under standard assumptions. Besides, Ep-
stein and Schneider (2007) and Zimper and Ma (2017) generalize the Bayesian learning
model within the decision-theoretic framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) Maxmin
Expected Utility (MEU) preferences. So far, the theoretical literature fails to provide
suitable conditions that apply to a general class of ambiguity preferences and thus it does
not ensure that ambiguity would systematically resolve with experience.
Blackwell (1951, 1953) defines an informativeness ranking of data structures. Accord-
ing to his main theorem, structure I is more "Blackwell-informative" than structure II if
II is a garble 44 of I. For any decision problem and subjective prior, the expected loss sup-
ported by the DM from choices based on I is at least as low as the expected loss resulting
from choices based on II. Hence, I is preferred to II. However, Wakker (1988) shows that
violation of the Independence Axiom (as formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944) might lead to the existence of decision situations in which information-aversion is
exhibited, in contradiction to Blackwell’s theorem. The rationale for this phenomenon lies
in the typical non-compliance with the commutativity principle of non-EU maximizers
and their subsequent violations of dynamic consistency. Moreover, Siniscalchi (2011) and
Epstein and Ji (2017) study the dynamics of information acquisition under ambiguity. The
resulting optimal stopping problem is solved and they show that rejection of learning op-
portunities can be optimal for an ambiguity averse agent given a small cost of information
(Epstein and Ji, 2017) or even when the information is freely available (Siniscalchi, 2011).
Çelen (2012) was the first to apply Blackwell’s ranking to ambiguity-sensitive preferences
in the case of MEU preferences. Further, Heyen and Wiesenfarth (2015) draw on Çelen’s
framework and provide a definition of the value of information that is compatible with
recursive utility and thus respects dynamic consistency. Lately, Li and Zhou (2016) show
that Blackwell’s equivalence result holds for a general class of ambiguity-averse preferences,
under reduction and commitment.
44. A garble is a transformation from one informative structure to another which adds noise to the
original structure. See Appendix 3.A for a formal definition of a garble.
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The literature on the value of information and ambiguity is limited. Using Machina’s
(2004) concept of almost-objective acts, Quiggin (2007) shows that ambiguity aversion
may be defined in terms of the value of information. He states that, for expected utility
preferences, the value of information with respect to almost-objective acts is asymptoti-
cally equal to zero. Snow (2010) studies the value of information in a particular adaptation
of the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al., 2005). His analysis relies on a particular
definition of greater ambiguity in terms of mean-preserving spreads. Given this framework,
he proves that ambiguity averters (lovers) are willing to pay to obtain (avoid) informa-
tion that lessens ambiguity while leaving the decision maker’s expectations unchanged 45.
Similarly, Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2013) study preferences for information precision
in an adaptation of the Maxmin Expected Utility model. Increasing the number of ob-
servations while keeping frequencies constant enhances the precision of information in an
objective sense and therefore the informativeness of the data. Controlling for the frequency
of observations, they show that the value attributed to precise sets of observations rises
with greater ambiguity aversion. Although this theoretical literature provides compelling
insights, the experiment presented in this chapter leads to a substantially different analy-
sis since additional information affects both the ambiguity perceived by the DM and his
expectations.
Reviewing the most recent experimental research on ambiguity, Trautmann and Van
De Kuilen (2015) point out that there are only few experimental studies on how learn-
ing influences ambiguity attitude, and how ambiguity attitude may affect the decision
to experiment and learn. Regarding the effect of information on beliefs and ambiguity
attitudes, the existing studies display particularly mixed evidence. Nicholls et al. (2015)
find that statistical learning does not reduce the number of violations of the basic Sav-
age’s sure-thing principle compared to a control group. On the other hand, Baillon et al.
45. Besides, Snow (2010) also states that the value of information which resolves ambiguity increases
with greater ambiguity and with greater ambiguity aversion. Note that, in this chapter, I will only consider
information that reduces ambiguity.
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(2017) observe that subjects’ beliefs move towards Expected Utility with more informa-
tion although substantial deviations remain even in their maximum information condition.
Moreno and Rosokha (2016) estimate a behavioral model of belief updating in a three-urns
design closed to mine. They note that learning behavior in the compound urn is consistent
with Bayesian updating whereas participants tend to overweigh additional information in
ambiguous frameworks. As predicted by Prospect Theory, Abdellaoui et al. (2016) report
that subjects tend to be more ambiguity-averse for likely events and more ambiguity-
loving for rare events when subjects can learn about the composition of an ambiguous
urn. Moreover, they find that participants exhibit less ambiguity-sensitive behavior as the
sample size increases although statistical learning does not allow to preclude ambiguity-
nonneutral preferences. On the contrary, Ert and Trautmann (2014) show that sampling
completely reverses traditional patterns of preferences: they observe ambiguity-aversion
with low frequencies and ambiguity-seeking with high frequencies.
Regarding the preferences for information, Trautmann and Zeckhauser (2013) report
that subjects forgo opportunities to learn about an ambiguous urn in favour of the risky
urn, even in an extreme learning experience (complete resolution of ambiguity). Ambuehl
and Li (2018) find that subjects underreact to the increase of informativeness of data
and they have a strong preference for information that entirely resolves ambiguity. Fur-
ther, Eliaz and Schotter (2010) report that experimental subjects are willing to pay for
information that will not affect their decision (non-instrumental information). This result
contrasts with Hoffman (2016) who finds that agents exhibit significant overconfidence
about their knowledge, inducing low demand information.
So far, some recent papers have examined the influence of information on ambiguity
attitudes, but experimental evidence regarding the effects of ambiguity attitudes on the
willingness to pay for additional information is clearly missing. This research aims at
providing a relevant framework to study this open question.
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3.2 Experimental design
3.2.1 Stimuli
The experimental design draws on Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color urns experiment. In this
experiment, the participants are shown three opaque bags. They are informed that each
of the three bags contain 100 balls and that balls can be either blue or red. The subjects
could win a fixed amount of money by betting on the color of their choice to be blindly
drawn from a bag by themselves. More specifically, the gambles on the color of the ball
pay 15e if the color of the drawn ball matches the color of the bet, 5e otherwise. The
composition of the first bag is perfectly known to the subjects or equivalently certain: it
contains exactly 50 blue balls and 50 red balls. The exact proportions of balls in the second
and third bags remain unknown but they differ with respect to the delivered description
of their composition. The participants know that the composition of the second bag is
determined using a uniform distribution over the 101 possible bags containing 100 balls,
the composition of this bag is then risky. The composition of the third bag, however,
is ambiguous in the sense that there is no such objective distribution device that defines
the proportions of balls: the number of blue (or red) balls in the bag is determined by a
number drawn from a pool of 200 numbers ranging from 0 to 100, with no hints on the
frequencies of each number in the pool except that each number appears at least once. For
the sake of brevity, in the rest of the chapter, the three bags are referred to as the certain
bag, the risky bag and the ambiguous bag respectively 46. Subsection 3.2.2 provides a
detailed description of the procedure to generate the bags. Since the composition of the
certain bag is known, objective probabilities can be easily inferred and betting on a color
from this bag relates to simple risky prospects.
The risky and ambiguous bags refer to different ways to generate uncertainty in the
lab. The former have been substantially used in the experimental research (e.g., Becker
46. During the experimental sessions, note that one should refer to bags with neutral labels such as bag
A, bag B and bag C.
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and Brownson, 1964; Maafi, 2011). Although this transparent technique enhances the
trust of participants in the experimental design, this condition may not be perceived as
real ambiguity. Indeed, the prospects related to this bag result from a compound lottery
which allows subjects who satisfy the Reduction Of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom
to use second-order objective probabilities to inform their beliefs. Recent empirical studies
display contradictory findings on the link between ambiguity attitudes and multiple-stage
lotteries. For instance, Halevy (2007) finds equivalence between ROCL and ambiguity-
neutrality, whereas ambiguity-sensitive agents generally fail to reduce compound lotteries.
Moreover, Halevy et al. (2008) and Seo (2009) provide axiomatizations which explicitly
relate attitudes towards ambiguity and two-stage lotteries while accomodating Halevy’s
(2007) findings. On the other hand, Abdellaoui et al. (2015) report contrasting empiri-
cal evidence: they find that a substantial share of ambiguity-neutral agents violates the
ROCL axiom while most of the subjects who successfully reduce two-stage lotteries ex-
hibit non-neutral ambiguity attitudes 47. Finally, the strategy used to generate the third
bag (ambiguous bag) described previously can be viewed as an attempt to create an am-
biguous condition with a tractable and credible device that prevents subjects from using
probability reduction.
Such "three-urns" design has been previously implemented in two other articles, Yates
and Zukowski (1976) and Chow and Sarin (2002), who study standard Ellsberg-type pref-
erences without learning. They found evidence that the two-stage lottery occupies an
intermediate position: it is usually preferred to the ambiguous prospect but less attractive
than the simple one-stage objective lottery. Therefore, combining both strategies to gen-
erate uncertainty in this experiment allows me to estimate the differential effects of this
distinct types of uncertainty on the value of information while relating to existing sparse
research.
47. See also Attanasi et al. (2014) who conduct an experimental study on ambiguity attitudes using
bets with unknown probabilities, as well as compound lotteries, when preferences are specified within the
smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al., 2005).
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The experiment consists of three stages: in the first stage, the participant’s attitude
towards risk is estimated, this preliminary step is necessary to disentangle risk attitude
from ambiguity attitude in the subsequent data analysis; in the second stage, the indi-
vidual reservation price for information about the uncertain bag is elicited for varying
degrees of informativeness; the third stage replicates the questions of the second stage on
the ambiguous bag. All subjects participate to each stage in that order.
Stage 1. In this stage, the participant deals with the certain bag. First, he has to
choose the color of the ball on which to bet to be drawn from this bag. Then, he is asked
to express preferences between the bet on the color of the ball previously chosen and dif-
ferent sure amounts. He is presented with a series of 10 binary choices where the sure
amounts is increased in order to elicit the subject’s Certainty Equivalent (CE, defined as
the sure amount equally desirable as the gamble) for such risky prospect (CEC). The CE
is reported using a Multiple-Price List (MPL). More precisely, in each row of the MPL,
the participant has to single out his preferred option between Option 1: "Bet on the color
of the ball" or Option 2:"xe", with x taking the 10 equally spaced values between 5.50
and 14.50. The monetary amounts rise moving down the table while the bet remains the
same. Figure 3.1 provides an example of such MPL. By linear interpolation, the CE is
taken as the mid-point of the two sure amounts for which the subject switched prefer-
ences. Moreover, to avoid inconsistent answers resulting from multiple switching points, a
computer program enforces the monotonicity of revealed preferences by allowing at most
one switching point from the gamble to the sure amount. More specifically, the filling of
the table is automated: by ticking a box of a line of the table, the boxes corresponding
to the bet are automatically ticked for the lines above and the boxes corresponding to the
sure amount are automatically ticked for the lines below 48.
48. See Chapter 2 for a thorough discussion on the advantages of the MPL as compared to other valuation
methods and on the automatic filling of the table.
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Figure 3.1 – Example of MPL
Stage 2. In the second stage, the participant has to consider bets on the risky bag.
This stage consists of two successive phases:
Non-informational phase. First, the subject is asked to select a color on which to bet
for a draw from the risky bag. Then, the CE for the related prospect is elicited when no
information is available (CER,0). The CE is estimated via a similar procedure as in stage
1: the subject has to fill out a MPL with 10 binary choices between a bet on the color of
the ball to be drawn from the risky bag and a sure gain.
Informational phase. Next, the participant is asked to consider different informational
situations in which a sample of random draws with replacement from the risky bag is
available. This phase consists of 5 informational situations corresponding to datasets
of 5 different lengths ranging from weakly-informative for small number of draws to
highly-informative for large number of draws. The number of draws (d) are fixed and
d ∈ D = [1; 5; 20; 50; 200]. For each informational condition: First, the subject has to an-
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Figure 3.2 – Example of a slider when the dataset contains 20 draws
nounce his color-betting strategy conditional on the resulting draws of the dataset. There,
he specifies the particular signal, i.e., the minimum number of blue draws out of the d
draws and the corresponding maximum number of red draws, above which he chooses to
bet on a blue ball to be drawn and below which his bet goes on red. The subject selects
this threshold (tR,d) using an horizontal slider as proposed in Figure 3.2. Then, the subject
is asked to fill out a MPL with 10 binary choices between a bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from the risky bag conditional on the information and a sure gain. Hence, the
CE (CER,d) is elicited via the aforementioned procedure.
Stage 3. The last stage replicates the phases of stage 2 on the ambiguous bag. Thus,
this stage starts with the non-informational phase which serves to elicit the CE for the
ambiguous prospect without information (CEA,0). The signal-contingent strategies (tA,d)
and the CEs associated to the informative signals (CEA,d) are collected for the 5 different
lengths of datasets (d ∈ D) specified above in the subsequent informational phase.
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Table 3.1 summarizes the structure of the experiment, the tasks performed by the
participant and the experimental variables collected. The informational phases proceed
by increasing the degree of informativeness of the dataset and the participant never receives
information on color of the draws nor feedback about his decisions until the end of the
experiment. Indeed, delivering information on the draws throughout the course of the
experiment would progressively alter the experimental variables as the participant learns
about the composition of the risky and ambiguous bags. Since this experiment is not
meant to study the dynamics of learning under ambiguity, each decision has to be taken
in isolation. Therefore, subjects make all choices before having observed the signals and
the ex-post strategies implemented in the payment stage correspond to the ex-ante optimal
strategies (full commitment). Indeed, the generalization of Blackwell equivalence result
by Li and Zhou (2016) requires full commitment to all signal-contingent strategies (this
requirement is discussed in Subsection 3.3.2).
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Bag Information Tasks Variables
Stage 1
Certain No Select the color of the bet & Fill out the MPL CEC
Stage 2
Non-informational phase
Risky No Select the color of the bet & Fill out the MPL CER,0
Informational phase
Risky
d = 1 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tR,1; CER,1
d = 5 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tR,5; CER,5
d = 20 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tR,20; CER,20
d = 50 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tR,50; CER,50
d = 200 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tR,200; CER,200
Stage 3
Non-informational phase
Ambiguous No Select the color of the bet & Fill out the MPL CEA,0
Informational phase
Ambiguous
d = 1 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tA,1; CEA,1
d = 5 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tA,5; CEA,5
d = 20 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tA,20; CEA,20
d = 50 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tA,50; CEA,50
d = 200 State the threshold & Fill out the MPL tA,200; CEA,200
Table 3.1 – Structure of the experiment
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3.2.2 Procedures
Composition of the bags
Regarding the technical aspect of the composition of the bags, the certain bag contains
50 blue balls and 50 red balls as announced. The risky and ambiguous bags contain 100
balls each, balls being either blue or red, but in unknown proportions. This experimental
design relies on the results of Li and Zhou (2016) which require a fully supported prior
on the set of balls. If the set of priors of the DM reduces to a singleton, i.e., if the DM
is certain about the composition of the bag, the information might be of no value to him
(as, e.g., is the case for a max-min EU maximizer). Hence, the method for generating the
bags has to make explicitly clear that the risky and ambiguous bags in the experimental
sessions can be any bag out of the 101 possible bags containing 100 blue or red balls. To
do so, the composition of the risky bag is determined as follows: 101 chips numbered from
0 to 100 are presented so that the subject can check for the presence of every number.
After verification, they are thrown in an opaque bag. A participant blindly draws one
numbered chip out of the 101 chips of the bag. Next, a fair external device (toss of a coin)
is used to determine if the number of the drawn chip corresponds to the quantity of blue
balls or the quantity of red balls in the risky bag. Hence, each color can be selected with
an objective probability of 50%. With this two-stage technique, the probability to draw a
blue ball is the same as the probability to draw a red ball which equals 50% — although
nothing ensures that the subjects achieve to calculate them.
The composition of the ambiguous bag follows a different procedure: A second set of
101 chips numbered from 0 to 100 are presented to the subjects. After checking, they are
thrown in an opaque bag. Another 99 numbered chips are added to the previous pool of
chips but the chips of this second set can take any number between 0 and 101 and multiple
chips can have the same number. The numbers of this second set of chips are not observed
by the subject. Both pools of chips are shuﬄed jointly and a participant blindly draws
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one numbered chip out of the 200 chips of the bag. Next, a coin is tossed to determine if
the number of the drawn chip corresponds to the quantity of blue balls or the quantity of
red balls in the ambiguous bag.
This method allows to generate uncertainty about the composition of the risky and
ambiguous bags while inducing the subject to consider the entire set of possible bags. It
is pretty straightforward to implement a transparent procedure to determine the compo-
sition of the risky bag. On the other hand, the authors usually choose to remain silent
about the method to generate the ambiguous bag in the lab and describe it only as being
filled with blue and red balls in unknown proportions (e.g., Halevy, 2007; Chow and Sarin,
2002). However, when the experimenter holds private information on the composition of
the bag, the participants are more inclined to distrust the experimenter, suspecting him
to have generated the bag in a way to save them money. The participation of subjects
in the composition of the bag allows to minimize suspicion by ensuring that the bag is
truly not-manipulated by the experimenter. For instance, in Trautmann and Zeckhauser
(2013), each subject filled his own bag by blindly drawing balls from a bag whose com-
position is known. Ideally, the composition of the bag is unknown to everyone, reducing
potential "comparative ignorance" effects (Fox and Tversky, 1995) in which the presence of
an informed agent reduces the desirability of the prospect. Therefore, in this experiment,
the number of the drawn chips and the result of the tossing of the coins remain secret to
the participants and the experimenter until the end of the session.
Incentive device
At the end of the session, one question of the experiment, corresponding to one row
out of the 13 MPLs of the experiment, is played for real according to the Prince incentive
mechanism (Johnson et al., 2015). The key component of this mechanism design relies on
the timing of the random selection of the question that serves for payment: contrary to
most standard techniques, the question is selected at the beginning of the experiment and
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provided to the participant in a sealed envelope. Each subject knows about the content
of all envelopes in the session but does not know the content of his own. Two examples
of envelope content are provided in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. At the end of the session, the
envelope is opened and the choice of the subject is performed. There are 3 different types
of options: (i) if the preferred option was a sure amount, the subject receives the sure
gain; (ii) if the preferred option was a bet without information, he randomly draws one
ball from the bag involved in the bet and if the color of the ball matches the color chosen
before, he receives 15e, otherwise he gets 5e; (iii) if the preferred option was a bet with
information, the computer generates a sample of d random draws with replacement from
the ambiguous bag; the result of the draws is compared to the threshold td announced by
the subject and the winning color of the bet is deduced; then the participant randomly
draws one ball from the ambiguous bag and if the color of the ball matches the color
stated before, he receives 15e, otherwise he gets 5e. While the usual Random-Incentive-
System (RIS, first introduced by Savage, 1954) and Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM,
1964) mechanisms have been blamed for their inability to induce truthfull-telling for non-
expected-utility maximizers and for the subsequent violations of incentive-compatibility in
ambiguous contexts (Bade, 2015), the Prince device allows to overcome inherent drawbacks
of existing techniques and ensures subjects that truthful revelation of preferences is in their
best interest 49.
In this experiment, there are 13 MPLs, each containing 10 rows. In sum, this exper-
iment consists of 130 binary choices. Hence, there are 130 envelopes numbered 1-130 in
random order, such that each envelope contains one of the 130 questions. At the beginning
of the experiment, these envelopes are randomly distributed to subjects without replace-
ment. At the very end of the experiment, each participant receives a list describing all
envelopes which avoids deception by allowing him to verify that his envelope has correct
content.
49. see Chapter 2 for a complete description of the Prince mechanism in a similar framework.
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Option 1 : Bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from bag A.
Option 2 : 8.50e.
Figure 3.3 – An example of envelope content (certain bag)
Option 1 : Bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from bag B with a sample of
200 random draws with replacement.
Option 2 : 12.50e.
Figure 3.4 – An example of envelope content (risky bag)
Proceedings
The experiment starts with an oral presentation of the instructions 50. When the
explanation reaches the relevant points, the composition of the risky and ambiguous bag
are determined through the method described before and each subject randomly picks
one sealed envelope that serves for payment. After the instructions, a comprehension
questionnaire is implemented to test subject’s understanding of the experiment. Then, the
participant performs the tasks of the experiment using the computer in front of him. After
that, he is asked to complete a short form including basic socio-demographic variables (age,
gender, studies). The last screen of the experiment invites him to reach the experimenter’s
office with his envelope to proceed for payment.
Each experimental session should not last more than 1 hour including payment. The
maximum payoff is 15e and the minimum payoff equals 5e. The show-up fee (usually
5e) is included in the gambles payoff because agents seem to pay more attention to their
decisions and make less errors when the monetary incentives are high (see for instance
Lévy-Garboua et al., 2012). There is no particular subject requirement to participate. The
experiment can be easily programmed with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Finally, the design allows within-subject as well as between-subject analysis.
50. See Appendix 3.B for a full set of instructions.
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3.2.3 Experimental measures
Symmetric prior
With the elicitation of the signal-contingent strategies (tR,d)d∈D and (tA,d)d∈D, it is
possible to test for the existence of individual symmetric priors regarding the composition
of the risky bag and the composition of the ambiguous bag. In this framework, the
symmetry of beliefs seems to be pretty natural. Especially, the DM may think about the
bags as follows: "The number of red balls in it can be any number between 0 and 100. My
information is completely symmetric, and there is no reason to believe that there are more
red balls than [blue] balls or vice versa. Hence, if I were to adopt a prior probability over
the composition of the [bag], from [0:100] to [100:0], I should choose a symmetric prior.
That is, the probability that there are 3 red balls should be equal to the probability that
there are 97 red balls, and so forth." (Gilboa and Marinacci, 2016, p392). Moreover, since
the composition of the risky bag is objectively drawn from a uniform distribution over the
entire range of possible bag composition, subjects who successfully perform ROCL should
postulate that the probability to draw a blue ball is precisely 50%. Therefore, a DM
who reduces compound lotteries or has a symmetric prior should bet on blue for any set
of observations containing more than 50% of blue draws and bet on red otherwise (with
indifference at 50%). The same strategy is optimal for the ambiguous bag, as long as the
DM has a symmetric prior. Given the transparency and credibility of the random drawing
experimental procedures, any other signal-contingent strategy can be taken to imply an
asymmetric prior belief.
Ambiguity aversion
The aversion to ambiguity is estimated within the standard Ellsberg framework where
the DM is confronted with a binary choice between a prospect on the known urn and a
prospect on the ambiguous urn. Thus, the following ambiguity-aversion index based on
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certainty equivalents (Sutter et al., 2013) can be calculated for each subject:
IAA =
CEC − CEA,0
CEC + CEA,0
(3.1)
IAA is the normalized measure of the difference between the CE for the certain bag and
the CE for the ambiguous bag without information. For instance, CEC > CEA,0 means
that the ambiguous bag is less attractive than the certain bag for a color-bet, denoting
ambiguity-aversion. Since CEC and CEA,0 can take values in the interval [5; 15], IAA
ranges from -12 to
1
2 , where
1
2 refers to extreme ambiguity-aversion and −12 indicates
extreme ambiguity-loving. Hence, the participants are classified according to the sign of
their index: ambiguity-averse for strictly positive IAA, ambiguity-neutral for IAA=0 and
ambiguity-lover for strictly negative IAA 51. The denominator of the index accounts for
the fact that a 1e-difference should weigh more heavily for those who report low CEs than
for those who announce high CEs.
Second, it is possible to study the ability of participants to reduce compound lotteries,
although the detailed description of the connection between reduction/non-reduction and
ambiguity neutrality/non-neutrality is an issue outside the scope of this chapter 52. There,
the following index can be calculated :
IROCL =
CEC − CER,0
CEC + CER,0
(3.2)
which is the normalized measure of the difference between the CE for the certain bag and
the CE for the risky bag without information. In the spirit of Abdellaoui et al. (2015) and
51. Note that one cannot distinguish between an ambiguity-lover and a neutral agent with an asymmetric
prior regarding the composition of the ambiguous bag. Indeed, both agents might strictly prefer the
ambiguous bag and thus get a strictly positive IAA. However, this appears to be only a minor disadvantage
of this tractable index because symmetric beliefs are the most reasonable class of beliefs given the setting
of the experiment. Moreover, the design allows to test for the symmetry of prior and provides hence a
further insight on the beliefs.
52. Notwithstanding, the calculus of these two indexes allows to relate and compare the results of this
experiment with Halevy (2007) and Abdellaoui et al. (2015, see Table 5).
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Halevy (2007), if the subject’s preferences satisfy ROCL, he should treat both associated
prospects as equivalent and value them equally, then IROCL = 0. On the contrary, if
participants fail to reduce compound lotteries, the reported CE for the certain bag differs
from the CE for the risky bag, which yields IROCL 6= 0. Moreover, this index informs
on the distance between both CEs which is a relevant question. It allows to discriminate
between participants who value both prospects almost equally and those whose valuations
for these prospects differ significantly.
To summarize, if the DM’s preferences and beliefs satisfy: (i) ROCL, (ii) the symmetry
of priors on the composition of the bags, and (iii) ambiguity-neutrality, the theory predicts
that the agent will be indifferent between the three bags, which implies: CEC = CER,0 =
CEA,0. If one of these 3 conditions is relaxed, one equality does not hold as described
above.
Value of information
The value of information can be broadly defined as the amount a DM would be willing
to pay to obtain information prior to making a decision. There is a particular amount
below which he accepts to pay for information and above which he rejects the informa-
tion. This threshold corresponds to the DM’s reservation price for information which is
the amount that makes him indifferent between making the decision with information (and
hence paying the price) and making the decision without information. Although any DM
should be able to announce his price in theory, such task is not easily comprehensible in
practice and can be misunderstood. This relates concretely to answering the following
question: "What is the price for information that makes you indifferent between the bet
on the bag without information and the bet on the bag with information?", which is far
from intuitive. Hence, a crucial operational issue related to this type of design concerns
the elicitation of this price. Alternatively, the DM can be confronted with a series of
binary choices between the bet without information and the bet with information at price
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p. Indeed, asking subjects to express such preferences is less cognitively demanding than
asking them to reveal their indifference point. The price is varied so that the reservation
price can be elicited, and the same process is replicated for different informative signals.
I find this technique particularly heavy, potentially confusing and difficult to implement
in the lab. Thus, it is not straightforward to find a convenient and tractable device that
easily fits the intended purpose. In Eliaz and Schotter (2010) for instance, subjects, en-
dowed with money, are asked if they want to pay a fee to obtain information on the bet
at hand. In their experiment, the fee can take only 3 values ($.50; $2; $4) which does
not allow to precisely identify the individual indifference point. Attanasi and Montesano
(2012) proposes an operational design where the agent’s reservation price for informa-
tion is estimated through the BDM mechanism. However, the use of the BDM device to
incentivize choices has met numerous critics for its opaqueness and its failure to induce
truthful revelation of preferences 53. In Ambuehl and Li (2018), the value of the informa-
tive structure is approximated via uncertainty equivalents. In particular, they define the
agent’s Willingness-To-Pay for an ambiguous prospect with information as the probability
mixture over the gamble’s best outcome and zero that generates indifference.
To summarize, a consensus on the method to estimate the DM’s reservation price for
information has not yet emerged. In this experiment, the value of information is estimated
through CE measurements. The value of the prospect without information is elicited in
the non-informational phase. The effect of information on the valuation of the prospect
is estimated during the subsequent informational phase. Hence, it is possible to build the
following individual measures:
VR(d, 0) = CER,d − CER,0 (3.3)
VR(d, 0) is the value of the signal sd containing d draws that informs on the risky bag. A
53. Bardsley et al. (2010) stresses the complexity of the BDM mechanism in Section 6.5. See also Karni
and Safra (1987) and Bade (2015) for theoretical discussions.
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strictly positive VR(d, 0) denotes an increase in the attractiveness of the risky prospect,
which means that the information is valuable to the DM. If the value of information is
positive, is it increasing in the number of observations d? If Blackwell’s theorem holds,
then VR(d, d′) defined by VR(d, d′) = CER,d − CER,d′ is positive for any d > d′.
VA(d, 0) corresponds to the value of information in the ambiguous bag. It is given by:
VA(d, 0) = CEA,d − CEA,0 (3.4)
As reviewed in the Introduction, theoretical results predict positive value for ambiguity-
averse and ambiguity-loving agents (this last point is discussed more carefully in 3.3.3). As
for VR(d, 0), twofold analysis applies here: (i) the sign of VA(d, 0), and (ii) the comparison
with the value of signals containing more/less draws.
This may be also of interest to study the difference:
VA(d, 0)− VR(d, 0) = (CEA,d − CEA,0)− (CER,d − CER,0) (3.5)
which measures the differential effect of signals of the same length on the ambiguous and
risky bags. This question is especially relevant for those who perceive the risky bag as
an intermediate condition between the certain bag and the ambiguous bag (Yates and
Zukowski, 1976; Chow and Sarin, 2002). How does this difference depend on ambiguity-
aversion as captured by the index IAA calculated previously?
3.3 Theoretical background
3.3.1 Blackwell’s framework
The design presented previously falls into Blackwell’s framework in the sense that the
different information structures used in this experiment are Blackwell-comparable. Indeed,
the signal sd+1 which contains d+1 random draws with replacement from an unknown bag
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is more Blackwell-informative than the signal sd which consists of d draws. As stressed
by Gollier (2004, §24.3.2), such signal sd can be obtained from signal sd+1 by using a
‘garbling machine’, which adds a noise uncorrelated with the true state of nature (i.e.,
the composition of the bag). This is equivalent to showing that there exists a garble of
sd+1 which preserves the posterior probabilities of sd on the states of the world. A short
explanation is sketched here and the detailed discussion is relegated to Appendix 3.A.
Consider now the more general problem in which the bag contains N balls, each ball
being either blue or red. The proportions of balls are unknown and the composition of
the bag can be parameterized by the number of blue balls, k ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}. Without
information, the N + 1 compositions are objectively equally likely inducing a uniform
distribution on the states of the world. Hence, each composition is assumed to occur with
a prior probability of 1N+1 .
A signal is a sequence of random draws with replacement. For instance, the signal
corresponding to the following sequence of draws: blue, red, blue, is denoted (brb). Assume
that the DM obtains a signal of d draws from the bag. Among the d draws, a blue ball
has been drawn db times and it follows that db ∈ {0, 1, ..., d} and that a red ball has been
drawn d − db times. The joint probability of the state of the world k and the particular
signal (b...br...r) is given by:
Pr {Bag k,(b...br...r)} = k
db(N − k)d−db
Nd(N + 1) (3.6)
The conditional probability for this signal structure is hence:
Pr {Bag k | (b...br...r)} = k
db(N − k)d−db∑N
k=0 k
db(N − k)d−db (3.7)
To show that this information structure is less informative than the one with d + 1
draws, consider a DM, who obtains now a signal of d + 1 draws, but a garbling machine
replaces the last information of the sequence by b with probability 12 and by r with proba-
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bility 12 . For instance, reconsider the signal (b...br...r) containing d draws described before
for which a noisy information is added. This yields:
Pr
Bag k,(b...br...r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
b)
 = Pr
Bag k,(b...br...r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
r)
 = 12 k
db(N − k)d−db
Nd(N + 1) (3.8)
The conditional probabilities are given by:
Pr
Bag k | (b...br...r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
b)
 = Pr
Bag k | (b...br...r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
r)
 = kdb(N − k)d−db∑N
k=0 k
db(N − k)d−db (3.9)
Hence the conditional probabilities are preserved with the adding of a noisy information
and the signal structure obtained with the garbling on the (d + 1)th draws is equivalent
to the signal structure with d draws.
3.3.2 Commitment
It is well-known that non-EU preferences, especially ambiguity-sensitive preferences,
might not comply with the Independence Axiom which implies dynamically inconsistent
behavior (Siniscalchi, 2011). Dynamic consistency requires that ex-ante contingent choices
coincide with ex-post preferences. However, in this experiment, there is no reason to
assume that preferences before the realization of the draws match preferences after the
observation of the signal. Within the MEU framework for instance, Epstein and Schneider
(2003) axiomatize a recursive structure for utility which requires that each prior is updated
in a Bayesian way and that the set of priors satisfy the restrictive rectangularity condition.
Wakker (1988), Hilton (1990) and Safra and Sulganik (1995) prove that delaying the
choices after the realization of the signal might lead to the existence of choice situations
in which non-EU DMs exhibit information-aversion, inducing the Blackwell theorem to
fail. In particular, Li’s (2016) extension of Blackwell informativeness ranking does not
apply in general. Hence, the theoretical framework requires full-commitment to all signal-
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contingent strategies. Since the experimenter cannot exert control over the way subjects
form beliefs and the way they update their beliefs, dynamic consistency might not be
achieved in this setting and experimental results are more robust with full-commitment.
3.3.3 Mixed strategies
From the proof of Theorem 1 in Li and Zhou (2016), it can be inferred that: if the
signal sd is more Blackwell-informative than the signal sd′ , then sd is more valuable than
sd′ for all (ambiguity-neutral and ambiguity-nonneutral) DMs 54. When the DM has the
opportunity to observe an informative signal, he determines his optimal signal-contingent
strategy. A necessary condition for the result of Li is the possibility to replicate this
optimal strategy when observing a more Blackwell-informative signal. Hence, the value
of information is always positive since one can always choose to not take into account the
additional information. This is especially relevant for ambiguity-lovers who may be willing
to pay to avoid information (Snow, 2010; Attanasi and Montesano, 2012). One way to
proceed is to allow the agents to randomize their strategies, i.e., to play mixed strategies.
Consider the following example: The DM observes a signal containing 5 draws. Assume
that his optimal strategy is to bet on blue if the signal contains 3 or more blue balls and to
bet on red otherwise. Hence, he bets on blue starting from the signal containing (3 blue / 2
red). He is then confronted with a more informative signal containing 6 balls but he wants
to replicate his 5-draws optimal strategy. To this end, he rejects the additional information
by randomly eliminating one draw from the 6-draws signal. His optimal strategy to bet
on blue now starts at (3 blue / 3 red) with probability .5 and at (4 blue / 2 red) with
probability .5.
Although appealing in theory, mixed strategies are difficult to implement in practice
and it is not straightforward to find a tractable mechanism to elicit mixed strategies in
the lab. Moreover, it is not judicious to offer subjects a random device to reduce the
54. The converse is not true and requires convexity of preferences to hold.
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length of signals, since Bade (2015) has proved that ambiguity-averse agents may also
use randomization devices to hedge, yielding contamination of the experimental data.
In my experiment, subjects who want to avoid additional information should be able to
mentally randomize. Therefore, my design departs slightly from the theoretical predictions
since it does not allow subjects to explicitly state mixed strategies. This is motivated by
the fact that adding mixed strategies would excessively complicate the instructions while
reducing the tractability of the design. Moreover, it would expose the experimenter to
misclassification of subjects.
3.3.4 Predictions
Two hypotheses are derived from the theoretical literature reviewed in the previous
sections and can be examined through the presented experimental setting:
H1. Blackwell’s equivalence result under compound risk (Blackwell, 1951). To bet on the
risky bag, the value of information is strictly positive and strictly increasing in the
informativeness of the signal.
H2. Blackwell’s equivalence result under ambiguity (Li and Zhou, 2016). To bet on the
ambiguous bag, the value of information is strictly positive and strictly increasing
in the informativeness of the signal.
The prediction H1 translates to the following experimental hypothesis: For all DM i,
0 < V iR(d, 0) < V iR(d′, 0), for any d, d′ ∈ D such that d < d′. H2 is equivalent to: For all
DM i, 0 < V iA(d, 0) < V iA(d′, 0), for any d, d′ ∈ D such that d < d′. It is of interest to
investigate further the effect of the introduction of ambiguity in the composition of the
bag on the valuation of the signal. To this end, the difference V iA(d, 0)− V iR(d, 0) provides
the relevant measure.
Moreover, it is also possible to examine an additional hypothesis:
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H3. Value of information and attitudes towards ambiguity. The value of information
increases with ambiguity-aversion.
Thus, H3 is equivalent to the following statement: For any DM i and DM j (i 6= j), if i is
more ambiguity-averse than j (IiAA > I
j
AA), then V iA(d, 0) > V
j
A(d, 0), for all d ∈ D. For
ambiguity-averse DMs, some authors have argued that the value attributed to informative
signals which resolves ambiguity increases with ambiguity-aversion (Snow, 2010; Attanasi
and Montesano, 2012). H3 is intented to test the existence of such increasing relation
when information reduces ambiguity.
3.4 Conclusion
Thanks to technological innovations, the mass of available information has been con-
siderably increasing in the last decades, hence the individual valuation of information is an
issue of particular interest in our modern societies. Drawing on Ellsberg’s two-color exper-
iment, I have proposed an experimental design to measure the value of information under
compound risk and ambiguity in a model-free setup. The second objective of this chapter
is to provide an operational framework to test Blackwell equivalence result, which lacks
empirical evidence. Moreover, once subjects’ reservation price for information is elicited,
it can be related to ambiguity attitudes. Finally, the 3-urns design proposed here allows
to study the relation between reduction of compound lotteries and ambiguity attitudes
which makes it possible to conduct further comparative analysis with Halevy (2007) and
Abdellaoui et al. (2015).
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Appendix
3.A Proof: Blackwell’s garbling
In this Appendix, I show that the information structure containing d random draws
with replacement from the bag is a garble of the information structure with d+ 1 draws.
Formally, there are N + 1 possible compositions of the bag containing N balls, and
∀k ∈ {0, N}, kN of balls are blue and N−kN of balls are red in Bag k. An information struc-
ture is a tuple (S, P ) where S := {s1, ..., s|S|} is a set of signals and P|S|×(N+1) a matrix.
In particular, psk is the probability that bag k be realized if signal s is observed, i.e.,
psk := Pr(k|s). Vector ps. = (ps1, ..., psN+1) gives the posterior probabilities conditional
to signal s.
The information structure (S′, P ′), such that S′ := {s′1, ..., s′|S′|} and P ′ = [p′s′k]|S′|×(N+1),
is a garble of information structure (S, P ) if and only if there exists a Markov matrix 55
M such that:
P ′ =MP (3.10)
M = [ms′s]|S′|×|S| is the garbling matrix. The posterior distribution of the garbled infor-
mation structure is given by:
ps′. =
S∑
s=1
ms′sps. (3.11)
55. M is a Markov matrix if and only if it is nonnegative and row-stochastic, i.e.,mij ≥ 0 and
∑
j
mij = 1
for all i.
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Thus, all posterior probabilities in structure (S′, P ′) are a convex combination of the
posterior probabilities in structure (S, P ).
Showing that the information structure containing d draws (Sd) is a garble of the
information structure with d+ 1 draws (Sd+1) is equivalent to proving that there exists a
garble of Sd+1 which preserves the posterior probabilities of Sd on the states of the world.
It then follows from Blackwell (1951) that the structure given by d draws with replacement
is less informative than that containing d+ 1 draws.
Assumption: Each composition k occurs with a prior probability of 1N+1 .
d draws
Suppose that the DM obtains a signal sd of d draws from the bag. Among the d draws,
a blue ball has been drawn db times and a red ball has been draws dr times. It follows
that db ∈ {0, 1, ..., d} and dr = d− db.
For instance,
Pr
Bag k,(b...br...r︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
)
 = 1N + 1 kN ... kN︸ ︷︷ ︸
db draws
N − k
N
...
N − k
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−db draws
= k
db(N − k)d−db
Nd(N + 1)
With d draws, the set of possible signals sd is Sd and |Sd| =
∑d
db=0
( d
db
)
= 2d.
The joint probability distribution of the state of the world (i.e., the composition of the
bag) and the signal (i.e., the d draws from the bag) is:
(w...w) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...b) ... (b...b) Total
Bag k kd
Nd(N+1)
kd−1(N−k)
Nd(N+1) ...
kdb (N−k)d−db
Nd(N+1) ...
(N−k)d
Nd(N+1) tk =
1
N+1
Total
∑N
k=0
kd
Nd(N+1)
∑N
k=0
kd−1(N−k)
Nd(N+1)
...
∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d−db
Nd(N+1)
...
∑N
k=0
(N−k)d
Nd(N+1)
T = 1
The conditional probabilities for the signal structure (Sd, Pd), where Pd := [psdk]|Sd|×(N+1)
and psdk := Pr(Bag k| signal sd), are given by:
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(w...w) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...b) ... (b...b)
psdk
kd∑N
k=0
kd
kd−1(N−k)∑N
k=0
kd−1(N−k) ...
kdb (N−k)d−db∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d−db ...
(N−k)d∑N
k=0
(N−k)d
Total 1 1 ... 1 ... 1
d+ 1 draws
Suppose that the DM obtains a signal sd+1 of d + 1 draws from the urn. Among the
d+ 1 draws, a blue ball has been drawn db times and a red ball has been draws dr times.
It follows that db ∈ [0, d+ 1] and dr = d+ 1− db.
With d+ 1 draws, the set of possible signals sd+1 is Sd+1 and |Sd+1| = 2d+1.
The joint probability distribution of the state of the world and the signal is:
(w...ww) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...b) ... (b...b) Total
Bag k kd+1
Nd+1(N+1)
kd(N−k)
Nd+1(N+1) ...
kdb (N−k)d+1−db
Nd+1(N+1) ...
(N−k)d+1
Nd+1(N+1)
1
N+1
Total
∑N
k=0
kd+1
Nd+1(N+1)
∑N
k=0
kd(N−k)
Nd+1(N+1)
...
∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d+1−db
Nd+1(N+1)
...
∑N
k=0
(N−k)d+1
Nd+1(N+1)
1
The conditional probabilities for the signal structure (Sd+1, Pd+1), where
Pd+1 := [psd+1k]|Sd+1|×(N+1) and psd+1k := Pr(Bag k| signal sd+1), are given by:
(w...w) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...b) ... (b...b)
psd+1k
kd+1∑N
k=0
kd+1
kd(N−k)∑N
k=0
kd(N−k) ...
kdb (N−k)d+1−db∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d+1−db ...
(N−k)d+1∑N
k=0
(N−k)d+1
Total 1 1 ... 1 ... 1
Garbling machine
A garbling machine replaces the last signal by b with probability 12 and by r with
probability 12 . Such garbled signal is denoted s
g
d+1. Then:
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(w...ww) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...bw) (w...wb...bb) ... (b...bw) (b...bb) Total
Bag k kd2Nd(N+1)
kd
2Nd(N+1) ...
kdb (N−k)d−db
2Nd(N+1)
kdb (N−k)d−db
2Nd(N+1) ...
(N−k)d
2Nd(N+1)
(N−k)d
2Nd(N+1) t
′
k = 1N+1
Total
∑N
k=0
kd
2Nd(N+1)
∑N
k=0
kd
2Nd(N+1)
...
∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d−db
2Nd(N+1)
∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d−db
2Nd(N+1)
...
∑N
k=0
(N−k)d
2Nd(N+1)
∑N
k=0
(N−k)d
2Nd(N+1)
T ′ = 1
The conditionals for the signal structure (Sgd+1, P
g
d+1) are given by:
(w...ww) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...bw) (w...wb...bb) ... (b...bw) (b...bb)
psg
d+1k
kd∑N
k=0
kd
kd∑N
k=0
kd
...
kdb (N−k)d−db∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d−db
kdb (N−k)d−db∑N
k=0
kdb (N−k)d−db ...
(N−k)d∑N
k=0
(N−k)d
(N−k)d∑N
k=0
(N−k)d
Total 1 1 ... 1 1 ... 1 1
which is equivalent to the signal structure obtained with d draws from the bag.
Note that the conditional probability of obtaining signal sgd+1 from the garbling ma-
chine given that the machine received signal sd+1, msg
d+1sd+1
is given by:
msg
d+1sd+1
Signal received by the machine
(w...ww) (w...wb) ... (w...wb...bw) (w...wb...bb) ... (b...bw) (b...bb)
Si
gn
al
de
liv
er
ed
by
th
e
m
ac
hi
ne
(w...ww) 12
1
2 ... 0 0 ... 0 0
(w...wb) 12
1
2 ... 0 0 ... 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
(w...wb...bw) 0 0 ... 12
1
2 ... 0 0
(w...wb...bb) 0 0 ... 12
1
2 ... 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
(b...bw) 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 12
1
2
(w...wb) 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 12
1
2
It is then possible to deduce the relationship between the structure with d useful draws
and one garbled draw, the structure with d+ 1 draws and msg
d+1sd+1
:
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Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
 = Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
w

garbling
+ Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
b

garbling
= k
db(N − k)d−db
Nd(N + 1)
Moreover:
Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
 = 12garble w Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
w
+ 12garble w Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
b

+12garble b
Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
w
+ 12garble b Pr
Urn k;w...wb...b︸ ︷︷ ︸
d draws
b

= 212
kdb+1(N − k)d+1−(db+1)
2Nd+1(N + 1) + 2
1
2
kdb(N − k)d+1−db
2Nd+1(N + 1)
= 1
Nd+1(N + 1)
[
kdb+1(N − k)d−db + kdb(N − k)d+1−db
]
= 1
Nd+1(N + 1)
[
kdb(N − k)d−db(k + (N − k))
]
= k
db(N − k)d−db
Nd(N + 1)
which is verified for all k and for all db. Hence, the information structure obtained with
the garbling on the (d + 1)th draws is equivalent to the signal structure with d draws.
Thus, the structure Sd+1 is more informative than the structure Sd.

3.B Instructions
Note: The sentences in brackets are not included in the instructions but inform the
reader on the moment an action is performed.
— Start of Instructions —
Welcome everybody, and thank you for accepting our invitation to participate in this
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experiment. I am going to present the outline of the experiment, please pay close attention
to this presentation.
First, some important rules which must be respected: It is important that the experi-
ment takes place in silence, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants.
The use of mobile phones and calculators is forbidden. No particular preliminary knowl-
edge is needed to participate. As soon as the experiment starts, if you have any questions,
please raise your hand and I will assist you.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
What do we do?
You are going to participate in an economic experiment on decision theory.
In this experiment, you will have to consider three opaque bags, A, B and C, each con-
taining 100 balls. Each ball can be either blue or red.
The bags:
Bag A contains 100 balls and its composition is perfectly known. It contains exactly 50
blue balls and 50 red balls.
Bag B contains 100 balls and the proportions of blue and red balls are given by the
following procedure: There are 101 chips numbered 0 to 100. [The chips are presented
to the audience in increasing order so that everybody can easily check for the presence of
every number.] These chips are thrown and shuﬄed in a bag. One of you is now asked to
blindly draw one chip from this bag. [The chip is drawn and placed in an opaque box on
the table in front of the room.]
Here is a coin. One of you is going to toss this coin and if it comes up heads, the number
of the drawn chip determines the quantity of blue balls in bag B, the rest of the bag being
filled with red balls. If the coin comes up tails, the number of the drawn chip determines
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the quantity of red balls in bag B, the rest of the bag being filled with blue balls. For
instance, if the drawn chip is numbered 12 and the coin comes up tails, bag B is filled with
12 red balls and 88 blue balls; if the the coin comes up heads, bag B is filled with 12 blue
balls and 88 red balls. The number of this chip and the result of the coin toss are kept
secret until the end of the experiment. [At this point, the coin is tossed in an opaque box
and placed on the table in front of the room.]
Bag C contains 100 balls and the proportions of blue and red balls are given by the
following procedure: Here again, there are 101 chips numbered 0 to 100. [The chips are
presented to the audience in increasing order so that everybody can easily check for the
presence of every number.] These chips are thrown and shuﬄed in a bag. 99 secret num-
bered chips are added to the bag. These chips can take any number between 0 and 100 and
multiple chips can have the same number. [The second set of numbered chips is thrown
in the bag, while their numbering cannot be checked by the subjects.] One of you is now
asked to blindly draw one chip from this bag. [The chip is drawn and placed in an opaque
box on the table in front of the room.]
Here is a coin. one of you is going to toss this coin and if it comes up heads, the number
of the drawn chip determines the quantity of blue balls in bag C, the rest of the bag being
filled with red balls. If the coin comes up tails, the number of the drawn chip determines
the quantity of red balls in bag C, the rest of the bag being filled with blue balls. The
number of this chip and the result of the coin toss are kept secret until the end of the
experiment. [At this point, the coin is tossed in an opaque box and placed on the table in
front of the room.]
The gambles:
During the experiment, you will be asked to consider gambles on bags A, B and C. Espe-
cially, you will have to place bets on the color of the ball to be randomly drawn from these
bags. If the color of the drawn ball matches your selected color, you win 15e, otherwise
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you win 5e.
In some cases, you will be able to condition your decision on the revelation of obser-
vations from the bag. In such cases, a random ball is drawn from the bag, the color of
the draw is reported and the ball is replaced in the bag. This operation, called a random
draw with replacement, may be replicated.
The sets of observations provide information about bag B and bag C. They contain 1,
5, 20, 50 or 200 random draws with replacement.
The envelopes:
Before the beginning of the experiment, each of you will receive a closed envelope. Each
envelope contains two options. These options differ depending on the envelopes. Your
goal is to tell us which of the two options you prefer for each envelope of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, you will be rewarded depending on your envelope content
and your choices of options.
Important: There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this experiment, it is only a matter
of preferences.
Here are some examples of envelope content:
Option 1 : Bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from bag A.
Option 2 : 8.50e.
Option 1 : Bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from bag B with a sample of 50
random draws with replacement.
Option 2 : 12.50e.
Option 1 : Bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from bag C with a sample of
200 random draws with replacement.
Option 2 : 10.50e.
Each envelope is of a particular type indicated by a greek letter (alpha, beta, gamma...)
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in the envelope. There are 13 types of envelopes corresponding to 13 different types of
questions.
The options contained in the different types of envelopes are given in the following
table:
envelopes option 1 option 2
α bet on a ball from A xe
β bet on a ball from B xe
γ bet on a ball from B with 1 observation xe
δ bet on a ball from B with 5 observations xe
 bet on a ball from B with 20 observations xe
θ bet on a ball from B with 50 observations xe
ι bet on a ball from B with 200 observations xe
κ bet on a ball from C xe
λ bet on a ball from C with 1 observation xe
pi bet on a ball from C with 5 observations xe
σ bet on a ball from C with 20 observations xe
φ bet on a ball from C with 50 observations xe
ω bet on a ball from C with 200 observations xe
We have 130 envelopes, 10 of each type. These envelopes are numbered from 1 to 130.
Five of you are now asked to check their numbering.
With this established, I am going to walk among you and each of you will randomly
draw one of the envelopes.
DO NOT OPEN YOUR ENVELOPE! Anyone who opens his envelope will be imme-
diately excluded from the experiment and will not receive any financial reward.
During the experiment, the contents of the envelopes of type alpha will be presented
to you as follows:
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This question concerns bag A. Option 1 corresponds to the bet on the color of the ball
to be drawn from bag A. If the color of the drawn ball matches the selected color, you win
15e, otherwise, you win 5e. Option 2 corresponds to a sure amount x in euros.
First, tell us whether you prefer to bet on a blue draw or on a red draw from bag A.
Second, fill out the table on the right. Here, for each amount x, tell us which of the
two options you prefer. To this end, fill out the following table. In this table, each line
describes the content of an envelope. For your convenience, the filling of this table is
automated. When you tick a box of a line of the table, option 1 is automatically ticked
for the lines above and option 2 is automatically ticked for the lines below. Thus, it is
enough for you to tick a single box of the table to fill out every lines of the table.
Indeed, if for the first line of the table you choose option 1 "Bet on the color of the
ball in A", tick option 1 on the first line of the table. Then, option 2 will be automatically
ticked for the rest of the decisions, that is to say the lines 2 to 10. [During the oral
explanations with slides, each pattern of answers should be illustrated with an example
of a filled table.] If for the first line of the table, you choose option 2 "5.50e", tick option
2 on the first line of the table. Then, option 2 will be automatically ticked for the rest of
the decisions, that is to say for the lines 2 to 10.
You may also choose option 1 for the second line of the table. In this case, tick option
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1 on the second line of the table. Option 1 will be automatically ticked for the line 1
of the table, and option 2 will be automatically ticked for the lines 3 to 10 of the table.
Otherwise, you may choose option 2 for the second line of the table. In this case, tick
option 2 on the second line of the table. Option 1 will be automatically ticked for the line
1 of the table, and option 2 will be automatically ticked for the lines 3 to 10 of the table.
And so on until the end of the table. You can choose option 1 for the tenth line of
the table. In this case, tick option 1 on the tenth line of the table. Option 1 will be
automatically ticked for the rest of the decisions, that is to say for the lines 1 to 9.
Note that you can revise your choice as many times as needed before confirming your
choice and proceeding to the following question.
The contents of the envelopes of type beta will be presented to you as follows:
This question concerns bag B. Option 1 corresponds to the bet on the color of the ball to
be drawn from bag B. Option 2 corresponds to a sure amount x in euros. First, tell us
whether you prefer to bet on a blue draw or on a red draw from bag A. Second, for each
amount x, tell us which of the two options you prefer. Do so by filling out the table on
the right as described previously.
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When observations from bag B are available, the contents of the envelopes will be
presented to you a bit differently, for instance:
This is the content of envelope of type epsilon. Option 1 corresponds to the bet on
the color of the ball to be drawn from bag B with a sample of 20 random draws with
replacement. Option 2 corresponds to a sure amount x in euros. First, you announce
whether you prefer to bet on blue or on red depending on the color of the draws reported.
Here, you have to specify the threshold above which you bet on blue and below which you
bet on red. You answer this question using a horizontal slider as below:
You are asked to place your threshold on this horizontal line. If you place your thresh-
old below [0 blue / 20 reds], it means that you will bet on blue for every sets of observations
containing 20 balls.
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If you place your threshold between [0 blue / 20 reds] and [1 blue / 19 reds], it means
that you will bet on red for a set of observations containing no blue ball while you will
bet on blue for every sets of observations containing 1 and more blue balls.
And so on until the last threshold: if your threshold is above [20 blues / 0 red], it
means that you will bet on red for every sets of observations containing 20 balls.
After that, fill out the table on the right. Here, for each amount x, tell us which of
the 2 options you prefer.
Regarding bag C, the contents of the envelope of type kappa will be presented as fol-
lows:
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When observations are available, you will face for instance:
Your payment:
In this experiment, the minimum gain is 5 euros and the maximum gain is 15 euros.
Reminder: There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this experiment, it is only a
matter of preferences.
Plan of the experiment:
Practically, you will answer the questions of the experiment using the computer in front
of you.
First, you will be asked some comprehension questions to check your understanding of
the instructions. Your answers to these questions do not affect your payment.
Then, the experiment on your choices of options will start. The experiment consists
of 13 successive stages for 13 types of envelopes (13 different types of questions).
Finally, you will be asked to fill out a short complementary questionnaire to get to
know you better. Your answers to these questions do not affect your payment.
The last screen will invite you to reach the experimenter’s office to proceed for payment.
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In the office of the experimenter:
I will open the envelope in front of you and I will just implement what you chose during
the session.
If the option chosen during the session is a bet without observation of draws: the color
that you selected for this specific question will be recalled and you will proceed to draw a
ball at random from the bag involved in the bet. If the drawn ball matches the winning
color, you win 15e; otherwise, you only win 5e.
If the option is a bet with observation of draws: the computer will generate a set of
random draws with replacement from the bag involved in the bet. The threshold you
announce for this particular question will be recalled and compared to the set of random
draws to determine your winning color. Then you will proceed to draw a ball at random
from the bag involved in the bet. If the drawn ball matches the winning color, you win
15e; otherwise, you only win 5e.
If the option is a sure amount x: you get the xe gain.
Because you do not know the content of your envelope and because I will implement
your choices, it is in your best interest to tell us your preferred option at each question.
Indeed, if you tell us what you want, your preferred option will be the one implemented!
Verification:
At the end of the experiment, the two numbered chips and the two results of coin tosses
used to generate the bag B and the bag C will be publicly displayed. You will be free to
check the content of all bags.
Besides, you will get a list describing the contents of all envelopes. This list describes
the content of each envelope: number of the envelope, type of the envelope, option 1, op-
tion 2. You will then check that our description of the numbered envelopes was truthful.
You will also be able to check that the list does contain the 13 mentioned tasks.
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Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, henceforth, feel free to
answer as you like. Moreover, there is no time limit, so take all the time you need to read
the instructions and answer the questions.
Do you have any questions?
If everything is clear, you can now start the experiment!
— End of Instructions —
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Conclusion
This thesis investigates decision making under uncertainty when agents are provided
with statistical information. To address this issue, I draw on the theoretical literature that
provides models of ambiguity sensitive preferences and I examine the question from an
experimental viewpoint. More precisely, in all three experiments presented in this thesis,
the Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color experiment is adapted so that the subject can observe
random draws which enable him to learn the composition of the urn.
In Chapters 1 and 2, I study preferences for information precision when decision mak-
ers are informed ex ante. In the first chapter, I show that most experimental answers
can be explained by the Subjective Expected Utility model when both urns are partially
ambiguous, i.e., described by more or less precise sets of observations. However, experi-
mental results suggest weak but significant ambiguity aversion at the individual level. In
the second chapter, datasets are defined in such a way that posterior beliefs regarding the
composition of the ambiguous urn coincide with the actual composition of the risky urn.
Thus, the design of the experiment allows to directly assess individual’s perception of am-
biguity and his attitude towards it. I report that most subjects behave in conformity with
the Ellsberg paradox when preferences are elicited through direct choices. However, the
valuations of the bets on the risky urn and on the ambiguous urn do not differ significantly,
regardless of the precision of information.
The experimental findings of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 question the robustness of am-
biguity aversion. On one hand, my results on the Ellsberg two-color setting with a risky
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urn and a (fully or partially) ambiguous urn replicate the proportion of ambiguity aversion
usually reported in the literature (Oechssler and Roomets, 2015). Hence, increasing the
number of observations on the ambiguous urn does not result in an increase in its attrac-
tiveness in comparison to the risky urn, which suggests robust ambiguity aversion. On the
other hand, I find that valuation tasks elicit lower ambiguity aversion than choice tasks.
Moreover, when the decision situation involves two partially ambiguous prospects, most
choices can be reconciled with Subjective Expected Utility maximization. Therefore, this
research is in line with the experimental studies challenging the consensus on universal
ambiguity aversion and according to which ambiguity aversion among decision makers is
mitigated as soon as the design moves away from the standard Ellsberg two-color design:
e.g., in the loss domain or with low likelihoods (Kocher et al., 2015), in the Ellsberg three-
color design (Charness et al., 2013) and with natural sources of ambiguity such as the
variation in stock indexes (Baillon et al., 2017).
In Chapter 3, I consider the situation in which decision makers are uninformed and have
the opportunity to obtain information. I provide operating instructions for the elicitation
of the reservation price for datasets that contain more or less observations and, hence,
differ in their informativeness in Blackwell’s (1951) sense. The proposed design allows to
experimentally assess: (1) the value of additional information; (2) the Blackwell’s ranking
of informative structures; and (3) the relation between the valuation of informative signals
and ambiguity attitudes. The implementation of the experiment is the natural future
development of this research.
In this thesis, I focus on individual choices. In order to further explore the effects
of information on decision making under uncertainty, it would be of interest to study
the implications of information in strategic games when players have ambiguity sensitive
preferences. In game theory, informative signals can consist of sets of observations of
previous actions taken by the players. It can also refer to communication between players,
which is more or less reliable depending on the type of the message (e.g., cheap talk or
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certified information). Hence, this topic raises many stimulating questions that have not
been discussed yet.
Many economic problems can be represented as decision making under uncertainty. An
interesting research question asks about the influence of ambiguity on job search. In the
standard search-and-matching models of unemployment, unemployed workers and unfilled
vacancies all know the probability distribution of the match specific productivity. In real
life, however, agents usually do not have such precise knowledge and form beliefs about
the productivity distribution instead. Since productivity determines the wage earned by
the worker and the surplus collected by the firm, the ambiguity regarding its distribution
and the attitudes of agents towards ambiguity might have large impacts on the job search
process. The communication of information (e.g., via résumés and interviews) allows to
learn about the match specific productivity. In future studies, it would be of particular
interest to investigate the effects of ambiguity and information transmission on job search
and job creation decisions from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Another domain that provides a relevant framework to study information and choice
behaviors under uncertainty is health economics. When undergoing a medical treatment,
the patient has only partial knowledge regarding the future effects of the drug on his
condition. How agents process and value additional information? The choice of the health
insurance contract can also be conceptualized as decision making under uncertainty in
strategic games. Several works have attempted to model health decision making under
the realistic context of ambiguity but empirical evidence is sparse. Indeed, experimental
studies in health economics are challenging because non-monetary outcomes raises the
issue of incentives. However, hypothetical experiments have gained popularity among
economists recently. Further analysis in this direction must be considered.
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An experimental study of preferences for information
Abstract: In most real-life choice situations, decision makers cannot predict the outcome of their
action with certainty. Decision theory generally distinguishes between the typical case of risk, in
which the probabilities of the different events are objectively known, and the situation of ambiguity,
in which the informational context does not allow such objective probability judgment. However,
agents are often provided with partial information consisting of past observations, leading to sit-
uations beyond the traditional known-unknown probabilities dichotomy. This thesis empirically
investigates decision-making under uncertainty when statistical information is available. The first
two chapters focus on choice behaviors in the presence of information, i.e., when prospects are
described by datasets ex ante. These chapters study the influence of information precision on the
perception of ambiguity and on the attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. In the third chapter,
I consider the situation in which agents are uninformed and have the opportunity to acquire in-
formation. This chapter proposes an experiment designed to explore the individual valuation for
additional information.
Key words: Ambiguity, Decision Making, Experimental Economics, Preferences for Information,
Ellsberg Paradox.
Une étude expérimentale des préférences pour l’information
Résumé: Dans la plupart des situations concrètes de choix, les décideurs ne peuvent pas prédire
le résultat de leur action avec certitude. La théorie de la décision distingue généralement en-
tre le cas typique du risque, où les probabilités des différents événements sont connus objective-
ment, et la situation de l’ambiguïté, où le contexte informationnel ne permet pas d’établir de
telles probabilités objectives. Cependant, les agents détiennent souvent de l’information partielle
sous la forme d’ensembles d’observations passées, conduisant à des situations qui dépassent la
dichotomie traditionnelle entre probabilités connues et inconnues. Cette thèse fournit une anal-
yse empirique des comportements de décision en situation d’incertitude lorsque de l’information
statistique est disponible. Les deux premiers chapitres portent sur les comportements de choix en
présence d’information, c’est-à-dire lorsque les différentes options sont décrites par des ensembles de
données ex ante. Ces chapitres étudient l’influence de la précision de l’information sur la perception
de l’ambiguïté et sur les attitudes vis-à-vis du risque et de l’ambiguïté. Dans le troisième chapitre,
je considère le cas dans lequel les agents ne sont pas informés et ont l’opportunité d’acquérir de
l’information. Ce chapitre propose une expérience dont l’objectif est d’étudier la manière dont les
individus évaluent l’information additionnelle.
Mots clés: Ambiguïté, Prise de Décision, Economie Expérimentale, Préférences pour l’Information,
Paradoxe d’Ellsberg.
